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INTRODUCTION

I first address **relevance** of my study. The modern socio-political and cultural situation in the world is marked by the growing influence of Islam. If the number of Muslims in the world is about a quarter of all believers, the formation of political Islam affects the interests of many more people. The knowledge of how political Islamic movements and thinkers imagine the ways to realize their interests and achieve political change, including their readiness to use violence for these changes, although constantly increasing, is still insufficient. Changes in knowledge production respond to these new trends in public and political life. Regional studies are changing under the influence of globalization and the weight of knowledge about this large-scale process in contemporary social and human knowledge. Accordingly, any attempt to reflect on religious processes in a region or country must take into account the broader processes taking place around the world and their reflection in science.

One such reflection is the rapid growth of post-colonial problems. While constituting a popular theory, post-colonialism is at the same time a characteristic of the political, social and cultural life of a large number of modern countries (including the one to which the work is devoted - Pakistan). The question of how religion, and primarily Islam, is used by political elites to consolidate new nations formed after the collapse of empires is one of the most important issues in post-colonial theory, but it also remains under-researched. One reason is the predominance of security studies in Islam and in political and international relations-related disciplines. They think of political Islam as more of a threat or an enemy to which approaches need to be found.

The lack of such an approach is explained by the fact that it is impossible to draw a clear line between Islam, political and Islam in everyday life, and Western culture and society. Millions of Muslims also live within the Western world, and even

more holders of this religion live outside of it, being diversely connected with the West through consumption and ideology.

In 2010, there were 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, constituting the majority of the population in 49 countries. These impressive figures are the result of a long, controversial and ongoing historical process of Islamization: people, states and nations become Muslim as a result of a variety of factors. Islamization covers almost all spheres of society.

"Are textbooks for efficient Islamization your thing, or madrassas fitted out for mass brainwashing young minds more to your taste? Then, by all means, plan to stop-over in Pakistan". This is the ironic advice that Ivan Strenski, the Holstein Family and Community Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies at the University of California, Riverside, gives his readers while conducting a review of a recent book [Strenski 2019]. Drawing on this and other scholars' ideas, I consider in this dissertation the on-going impact of Islam on Pakistan. In other words, by focusing on Islamization, I present the ubiquitous presence of Islam in the politics and the everyday as a *process* the consequences of which still remain to be seen. Pakistan, in other words, is a country of particularly successful Islamization carried out by the state through education and control of everyday practices. Yet the ubiquitous presence and impact of Islam on the life of a given country need to be studied with the voices of ordinary citizens in mind, and empirical research carried out in the country is still insufficient. This dissertation views Islamization as a process whose consequences are not yet clear and known to science.

The importance of introducing the voices of ordinary Muslims into scientific use and using modern arguments and theories to analyze them is particularly important given that the media and scientific research on Islamic religion and violence have had a huge impact on the public and scholars.

There are several main reasons for selecting this topic: a) it is significant to study the religious culture in everyday life of Pakistanis and b) examining the religious, i.e. Islamic impact on culture and politics will be very fruitful research both

for academic as well as for critical understanding in overall about Pakistan and finally c) that is important to examine the gender interpretation in Islam as well as in the Pakistani culture which will be significant to know about the repressive or empowered status of a woman. I attempted to reveal the causes which have given the title of an underdeveloped country to Pakistan. This research will be also a definite route to understand the circumstances of how Islam influenced state politics and made it an extremist state from a secular one. The topic chosen for this study is extremely relevant. First, the relevance is related to the need for modern theoretical analysis of the ideological role of Islam in the formation of state policy, the influence of Islam as a state religion on the transformation of everyday practices in modern society, as well as analysis of the ongoing politicization of gender relations, which combines the interaction of factors such as political, religious and gender identity. Secondly, the relevance of the work is determined by the selected specific material. Pakistan which is the second-largest Islamic state by population, but is drawn into the globalization processes and develops modern technologies, including communication, because the actual role of Islam in today's daily life requires analysis and theoretical study.

The impact of Islam on societies, particularly on women, generally is regarded to be controversial. Since all religions are based on traditions, in contemporary societies their impact is complex. All religions are also controversial concerning women. The impact of Islam varies from country to country and can be undoubtedly negative, i.e. the condition of women under the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The academic examination of the impact of Islam tends to deal with similar cases of severe oppression and focuses on political Islam (which often indeed has been negative for many strata of populations but specifically for women).

I conceptualize the impact of Islam as the problem of religion. My main argument is that Islam is important and, in many cases, the major determinant of the social, political and cultural life in the countries, including Pakistan, is the bulk of the population with the Muslim majority. I define the case of the impact of Islam on the Pakistani people as one of the "problems of religion". When introducing the impact

as the problem, I follow Ivan Strenski who defines problems of religion as "key topics for the development of the study of religions" and considers "the function of religion" to be one of these. The problems of religion emphasize Strenski, arise as responses to important historical events or processes, and my premise is that, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and several terrorist attacks, the problem of the impact of Islam became particularly salient.

The media and academic investigation of the topic of religion and violence had an enormous influence on the common public and scholars alike. Islam has been closely connected to political conflicts and social violence. And indeed numerous studies are claiming that Muslims have been charged in recent decades for perpetrating a great deal of terrorist attacks on the name of Islam [Fish & Michel 2010]. Yet, the Western media, which is prone to sensationalism and "othering", often exaggerate the connections among Islam with violence. However, the prominence of extremist groups amplifies the perceived strong link among civil war as well as Islam. A recent Pew Research Center survey found that 50 % of Americans believe that Islam "mostly incites violating attitude among its adherents" [Karakaya 2015]. The public attitudes towards Islam are justifiably negative; in part, they have an opinion as Islam as a religion is liable for conflicts probably on a national and international level. Many scholars add to this the argument that the Islamic faith provokes conflicts [Ritchie 2003]. The image of the Muslim wars and Muslims fighting each other because of the rise of Islamic consciousness was famously put forward by Samuel Huntington in his "Theory of the Clash of Civilizations". Yet Muslim-majority countries are also characterized by plenty of positive things: they try to promote socio-economic development and reduce state repression but this is not easy tasks to fulfill.

Islam is also a very diverse religion. It now includes 'new Islam' or 'the revivalist Islam' [Nazli Kibria 2007, Peek 2005], which is a Muslim understanding of Islam that emphasizes 'the significance and impact of Islam in all aspects of lives'[Nazli Kibria 2007]. In this understanding of Islam, being Muslim becomes the only identity one is allowed to have and express publicly. Then the question arises

whether Muslims are 'all about Islam' [Nadia Jeldtoft 2011] namely is there a complete overlap between being a Muslim and being, for instance, a cultivated, rational, educated person of a specific class and gender? I look in my dissertation at how Pakistani Muslims make sense of Islam in their everyday lives to collect their voices and opinions on what they mean to be as Muslims. The choice of my theoretical framework stems from the fieldwork that I conducted, namely, what sense can be made about everyday lived Islam from the statements of the informants about the impact of Islam on their lives.

I now address **the existing studies on my topic**. In English-language religious studies and cultural philosophy, the problems of the Islamisation of states, cultures, societies and education are analyzed synchronously and diachroniously. A diachronic analysis of Islamisation is carried out concerning countries such as India, Indonesia, Tanzania, Turkey and others. Synchronous analysis of this process is prevalent in the literature and has been carried out in particular with the modern development of regions such as Inner Asia and countries such as Malaysia, Iran, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Egypt. Islamisation is generally understood as a process of increasing the influence of Islam in society. In addition to sources in which the main subject of analysis is countries, a significant segment of literature is formed by studies of the Islamisation of certain areas of social life, before education. Thus, when discussing the concept of the Islamisation of knowledge and its implications for philosophy, the scholars emphasise that Islamisation should not be understood as a mechanical process, but that it is necessary to see the adaptation of certain types of knowledge to the content of Islamic science, as well as a desire to strengthen the position of Islamic science in the context of contemporary knowledge.

A separate and rapidly growing field of research is devoted to Islamisation, understood as the increasing influence of Islam on Europe and the West as a whole. These include the work of Ivan Strenski, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of California at Riverside and Professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Aix-en Provence, Director of the Observatoire du religieux, Rafael Liogier, author

of the book "Myth of Islamisation, an essay on collective obsession". Strenski in his review of a number of recent scientific and art books, including Houellebecq's controversial novel "Submissiveness", challenges the popular argument that European civilisation is under threat of extinction for two main reasons: firstly, the mass arrival of migrants and secondly, the passivity of European elites combined with the growing racism and xenophobia among the conservative part of the working class. Strenski argues that the indifference of the elites towards the understanding of Europe as a Christian civilisation leads to a blurring of Europe's identity, but the prospects for re-Christianisation of Europe remain ghostly. At the same time, European Islam (the term of Tariq Ramadan) still poses no serious threat. Liogier criticizes the laws of France which focus on the principle of secularism, i.e. the coexistence of different cultures under the protection of a law which guarantees freedom of conscience, expression and religion, stressing that although citizens have the right to wear religious symbols, a law has been passed which prohibits the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and public places. The scientist also links the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment among ultra-right groups and a large number of French citizens to identity anxiety: the perception of "alien" as a threat is a sign of weakness.

Thus, the study of Islamization takes place in a continuum: from historical reconstructions to analysis of contemporary politics, from parsing the real process to criticizing the Islamization imagined by Europeans as a threat to the identity of their continent and their culture. Migration specialists and Islamic researchers in the West insist that more attention should be paid to the impact of individualism on Muslim and that the study of Islamization in the West should get rid of the 'ethnic prism' and explore Islamic identity using the more general analytical framework offered by religious studies.

Work on Islamization in Pakistan is divided into two groups, depending on the focus either on domestic policy or on the links between domestic and international policy. Let us characterize the first group by describing one of the earlier analyses carried out by Riaz Hassan, an expert on Pakistani Islamization, an Australian Islamic

scholar. He considers Islamisation to be the dominant state ideology that serves the interests of military regimes, the first of which came to power after the overthrow of the Pakistan People's Party government in 1977. On the one hand, he believes, it is clear that Islamisation was an instrument of legitimisation for the ruling regime, but it is not limited to this: other political and social forces in the country have played an even stronger role in making Islamisation a state ideology in Pakistan. It also shows that both the pre-war political regime, namely the government of the Pakistan People's Party and the president and then prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, used the emotionally strong religious phrases of 'Muhammad's equality' and 'Islamic equality' to provide mass support for socialist politics. When anti-government forces used Islam to turn people against the government of Bhutto, the government announced "Islamic" reforms, banning alcohol, gambling and horse racing and making Friday rather than Sunday a weekend. These historical nuances show that there is hardly a single political force in the country that would not try to use Islam to attract the electorate to its side.

The second group of studies on Islamisation in Pakistan has been carried out taking into account the contradictions arising from the country's involvement in international conflicts. The 40-year war in Afghanistan, which started with the Soviet invasion and continues due to American interests in the region, is just one example of the link between the use of Islam for strengthening national security in the context of Pakistan's involvement in the geopolitical games of the 'heavyweight' countries. For example, a number of armed groups are linked to Tehreek Taliban Pakistan, a religious and political movement aimed at building an Islamic state. Instability on the country's borders, conflicts between the state and tribes and other internal problems are connected with the processes taking place both in neighbouring countries and in countries far from Pakistan. It is no coincidence that Pakistan was seen as a failed state. Besides, different forces within the country had different ideas about how the country should develop: political leaders, the military and business circles used the symbols of Islam and the texts of the founding fathers in different ways to pursue their interests. Many of the challenges facing the country today are due to the arrival in

power in the late 1970s of General Zia ul Haq, who was particularly active in implementing the special Islamisation programme developed by his government. This manifested itself in the revision of criminal law following traditional Muslim law, as well as in the implementation of the norms prescribed by Islam in taxation and banking. Markus Daechse, an English Pakistani and South Asian historian, sees Zia ul Haq's policy of military Islamisation as a manifestation of colonial influence on the political identity of the country and its elite. The militarisation of politics is closely linked to Pakistani nationalism and the ethos of the national army. In Daechse's view, the colonial roots of modern Pakistani politics are manifested in the fact that the country's poor peasant population is seen by the elites as backward and driven only by religious sentiments, while politics is thought to be the privilege of the Westernized elite. Zia ul Haq believed that the ordinary Pakistani people were deeply religious and used religious symbols to legitimise their rule. The general and the president did what his predecessors did, but he was the only one who led the religious manipulation of the population to extremes.

As this president's activities coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, he brought the Sunnis to power, whose increasing influence gave Islamisation the form of 'Shariatisation'. In other words, laws have been passed that penalise those responsible for crimes under the rules of traditional Islam. The result was a gradual betrayal of the ideas on which the country was based, unreasonable use of the country's resources and fragmentation of social relations.

Islamisation is also addressed in several fundamental monographs on the history and present-day of the country. The problems of religious studies are thus linked to those of regional studies and country studies. Hilary Synnott, in the book "Transforming Pakistan", shows the difficulties of subordinating different ethnic identities to a single national narrative. The national building was hindered by a corrupt ruling class, army domination and authoritarian rule. Nighat Said Khan, a Pakistani feminist activist and scholar, in his book "Voices from the Inside: Dialogues

with Women" explores the contemporary history of Pakistan, criticizing the inconsistency in creating a national ideology as a cause of violence and social disintegration.

The impact of Islam on society, especially on women, is generally considered controversial. Since all religions are based on tradition, their influence is complex in modern societies. All religions also have complex and contradictory attitudes towards women. The impact of Islam varies from country to country and can certainly be negative: it is enough to turn to the position of women under the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Academic expertise on the impact of Islam tends to focus on such cases of brutal oppression and focuses on political Islam (which has often been negative for many sections of the population, but especially for women). However, there is also a need for closer examination, taking into account what anthropologists call local knowledge and drawing on the opinions and narratives of local citizens, as well as the status of gender relations in other South Asian countries, including Pakistan.

This is unlikely to be done without researching what everyday life is like in countries where the vast majority of citizens are Muslim. Government influence, the consequences of military and other violence, poverty, the agrarian nature of the country's economy, geopolitical pressure, regional differences, the coexistence of different tribes and ethnic groups in the country - these and other factors have an impact on Muslim daily life. Strategies for finding jobs, partners, education, family relations and sexual practices are included in the implementation of beliefs through religious practices in the community. Islam is 'localised' in Pakistan and other countries and how this is happening today and historically requires further study.

The goal of this dissertation is as follows: following an extensive analysis of a study on the problems of Islamization and the influence of Islam on various spheres of social and political life, this dissertation aims to consider Islamization of social and political life in Pakistan. Drawing on the existing Islamic studies and fieldwork, I examine the multifaceted processes of Islamization in Pakistan.

The purpose of the study necessitates the formulation of the following **tasks:**

1. In the course of analysis of the existing approaches to the influence of Islam and consideration of the ongoing discussions in the literature, identify the religious foundations of the genesis, content and social practices of Islamization.

2. Based on the explication of the conceptual logic of critical works on political and everyday Islam, to formulate and consider key problems caused by the process of Islamization.

3.To analyze the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of religion and religious studies in order to find those concepts that allow you to analyze the religious dynamics in a specific region, namely the "living religion" (lived religion).

4. Having identified the key arguments and components of the methodology of religious studies, to complement the existing range of approaches and options for analyzing the specific ways of existence of this Islam in the context of the countries of South Asia, those that allow you to analyze the daily life of this religion.

The scientific novelty of the research:

1. A number of new arguments have been introduced into religious studies, developing the problems of genesis, content and social practices of Islamisation. A systematic analysis of sources on the country's history and religious history has been carried out to understand the connection between political evolution and the instrumental application of Islam by the government and the country's elites.

2. A set of problems arising around the process of Islamisation has been structured and developed in a substance: instrumentalisation of the use of Islam, everyday Islam and living religion, Islam and gender relations.

3. The conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of religion and religious studies were analysed in order to find those concepts that make it possible to analyse religious dynamics in a specific region, namely 'living religion'.

4. In the methodology of religious studies, the concept of "everyday Islam" has been tested, which makes it possible to expand the range of approaches and options

for analysing specific ways of living this religion in the context of South Asian countries.

5. The combination of conceptual achievements of the literature on Islamic daily life and gender relations made it possible to introduce new information on the development of everyday religion of the Muslim majority in Pakistan.

6. An analysis of the relationship between the categories of gender and Islam made it possible to show that Islam has a particularly significant impact on women in Pakistan. The idea and image of a Pakistani woman were embedded in the nationalist narrative and set as symbols of national identity, and as a result, the social roles of women became subject to social regulation, especially by the state and its leaders.

The practical significance of the study. The results presented in the dissertation can be used both for further research in the field of religious studies, cultural philosophy, religious ethnography, studies of Islam, and for applied research into the processes of Islamization (ways of interaction between religious institutions and believers, differences between the religious practices of Muslims in the West and South Asia, the relationship between religious nationalism and violence, gender relations in patriarchal and conservative environments, etc**.). The theoretical significance** of the material presented in this work can be used in developing lecture courses on the theory and history of religion, the sociology of religion, regional studies and modern Islam.

Methodology and methods of this study is comprised from several strands. I conduct a conceptual analysis but I also wish to demonstrate the complexity of people's everyday lived religion and religiosity. For this, I use the qualitative studies tradition, including the tradition of ethnography of religion [Anon 2009b, McGuire 2002]. This gives a more comprehensive picture since it includes the experiences of people in the study who are not religious professionals and the making sense of religion outside the religious institutions. Investigating how people are living out religion in their everyday lives in both the private and the public sphere, I focus not on abstract categories of religion or belief but present the study of how religion is

practiced by real people. Everyday lived Islam and Muslim / Islamic religiosity, although they have been examined during the last two decades, are still rather un-researched topics and studies that examine Muslim majority's everyday religiosities In Pakistan specifically have so far been relatively few in number. In this dissertation, I apply the model developed by Caroline Berghammer and Katrin Fliegenschneein order to study Muslim religiosity in greater detail [Berghammer, Caroline & Fliegenschnee 2014]. Everyday lived Muslim religiosity is multi-dimensional and a combination of faith and behaviour. Of these two, behaviour, can be divided into two subcategories: (1) rituals and duties, and (2) ethical behavioural principles. All these aspects are influenced by the surrounding religious and cultural context as well as life-course events and social networks. As an outcome of this division, religiosity has certain functions that manifest themselves in daily life. I focus on the way Muslim men and women themselves understand their "Muslim-ness", that is their faith and how it is connected to their lives, what are their experiences and practices in the context of everyday life. I consider such components of the Islamic way of life as a belief system, nationality, ethnicity, class, educational background, rural or urban background, gender, age, and profession but also the contexts to which they are related. My initial premise is that the concepts of religious nationalism, everyday lived religion, and religiosity are inter-dependent I also believe that engaging into the theological discussions of Islam is not enough and that interviews – as part of religious ethnography - allow a glimpse to the internal insights into Islam and the ways of practicing Islam, which may be impossible to deal with if one is an outsider. The employment of an internal perspective is valuable because it offers access to the meanings of religion to those who practice it rather than offering or following qualifications made from outside the specific Islamic and national context. I follow here Dessing et al. (2016) differentiation among identity from the inside and identity from the outside. Dessing et al. also usefully reminds that although there are differences between individual and social religiosities, it is not always clear how to

differentiate between the two. I argue – dialectically – that both collectivist and individual values and attitudes are at a place in everyday practices.

The very formulation of research questions prompted the author to rely not only on philosophical and conceptual methods; phenomenological, for example, but also to involve empirical methods, to conduct semi-structured interviews with a large number of informants in four different regions of Pakistan.

Research studies about the impact of Islam on Pakistani Muslims regarding gender, political views, and everyday life is a limited but qualitative methodology of research has been used in innumerable studies. I have used inductive interview protocol, i.e., open-ended, semi-structured questions in an attempt to cover the specific gender interpretation and genuine opinions regarding politics and culture within an Islamic framework. The researcher selected "purposive sampling" which is the significant type of non-probability sampling to choose the primary informants. All interviews were conducted and recorded in the local language, 'Urdu'. The researcher conducted face to face and telephonic interviews as well. All interviews were open-ended semi-structured to get relevant information regarding the everyday life of Muslims and the influence of Islam on politics, culture, and gender interpretation. Each interview was recorded through audiotape with the permission of interviewees. Those recorded interviews were an essential part of our qualitative research and for final analysis. Open-ended interviews are more abundant in multi perspectives to get results in qualitative research [Bless and Smith 2000, 106].

In ethnographic research, qualitative method of research has an integral role. Taking into account its focus on participation in a given culture, participant observation has always been a key method for collecting data [Ali 2004]. As, a participant observer and locale researcher, I am a witness of the social situations of the primary ways of adoration for Islam by local Muslims and explored how Muslims implicitly and explicitly adjusted Islam in their culture. The researcher has conducted eighty formal structured interviews in her own locale site "Pakistan". Pakistan has four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP); therefore eighty interviews

were equally conducted (twenty interviews) in each province. The reason to divide the interviews equally in each province is ethnicity and multi-cultural characteristic of Pakistan. Every province has its own culture with diverse particulars as language, dress patter, food and customs but all of them share the same religion with a somehow different interpretation of Islam due to demographical and cultural background. All the interviewees were self-identified Muslims and holding different occupations such as lawyers, teachers, students, labourers, religious preachers and business holders. The age of informants (age and occupation has been mentioned in discussion with their remarks) was almost from 18 to 75. Fieldwork lasted for six months beginning from June to December 2018. All the interviews had been conducted and recorded face to face in person with a maximum time of an hour. The researcher used the pseudonyms to ensure the privacy of her informants. Besides participant observation, formal interviews and group discussions, tens of informal and friendly group discussions with Muslims (particularly women) have also been conducted that provided a treasure trove of information about the everyday Islam of Muslims and their religious and cultural interpretation about gender and politics. All the interviews were conducted in locale language 'Urdu' and English translation in this piece of research is my own.

At the start of interviews, informants were explained briefly about the object of study and after their consent, a demographic form (has been added at the end of the report) was filled by participants. Informants were told that they have a right to stop anytime during the interview or they can skip a question if they do not want to answer any question. The Researchers has used different techniques while conducting interviews i.e. probing and cross-examining to know the better understanding of the level of religiosity and its influence on a micro and macro level. Interviews were saved through jotting, daily diary, field notes and audio- tapped narratives to analyze. Once the whole data was compiled, each semi-structured interview was reviewed categorized logically according to chapters, and then the summary was organized. Finally, data was analyzed and interpreted into themes and codifications.

A number of social scientists have used the approach of cultural and religious self- assessment of respondents [Mogahid 2009, See also Sen & Sauer 2006, Meng 2004]. So, here I followed them but with an addition by classifying the responses of informants (i.e. 2 out of ten).

A cross-analysis was conducted to crosscheck the level of religiosity and its impact on the cultural attitude of Pakistanis through the similarity and differentiation of information shared by informants. Almost one-third of the respondents have the same answers (especially about gender interpretation) and instead of dropping these responses, I used cognitive interviews to understand the reason and added in my analysis.

To summarize my methodology and methods, I developed the theoretical framework comprised from the concepts of "lived religion", "lived Islam", "Muslim religiosity" and "religious nationalism" to look at the following three aspects of the contemporary Pakistani society: the state governance, gender relations, and the everyday. This dissertation aims to examine dimensions of Muslim religiosity from statements about Muslim men and women's everyday lived religion. I demonstrate, following Strenski, Orsi and other scholars of lived religion, that it has dynamic and controversial nature. I reconstruct in my dissertation a specific social and cultural context which, according to Orsi [Orsi 2003] is characteristic for lived religion. Combining conceptual analysis and qualitative fieldwork among the Muslim citizens of Pakistan, I conceptualize Islam as a lived religion in the country where Muslims constitute a majority.

The main arguments to be put forward for a defense:

1. The problem of the Islamisation of societies and cultures is viewed in two ways: studies either focus on the domestic politics of the country or deal with the complex dynamics of international influence and domestic political interests.

2. Pakistan's political history and modern life are characterised by the instrumentalisation of Islam: Islamisation has been and continues to be a way of

legitimising the ruling regime and all political and social forces in the country are appealing to Islam to increase their influence.

3. The methodological resource of modern religious studies in the study of Islam is to focus on the concepts of "living religion" and "everyday Islam", i.e. the attitude to follow Islam-related attitudes and social practices in everyday life.

4. Gender relations in Pakistan are closely linked to political struggle, including Islam as a political force and the foundation of national identity. The place and role of women in public life have become a symbol of Islamization of Pakistan.

5. The development of the tradition of religious ethnography makes it possible to show that a qualitative research methodology is a way of better understanding everyday Islam in general and its gender dimension, which makes it possible to supplement the conceptual analysis with a demonstration of the complexity of everyday religion and religiosity of people.

6. The application of the qualitative research methodology made it possible to carry out a systematic analysis of Islamization and to demonstrate the peculiarities of this process in political, gender and everyday aspects.

Degree of reliability of the conducted research results. The results included in the dissertation work were obtained on the basis of studies conducted at a high scholarly level by applying contemporary methods and using relevant and recent sources. Scientific provisions, conclusions and recommendations formulated by the author are theoretically justified and confirmed in the course of fieldwork.

Approval of the research results. The main provisions of the dissertation were tested in scientific publications of the author, at a number of conferences in higher education institutions in Yekaterinburg, including the conference "Pivovarov Readings. Synthetic Paradigm: Science, Philosophy, Religion Studies" (Ural Federal University, 01.11.2018-03.11.2018) and within the framework of lectures delivered during pedagogical practice for Master's students of IGUE "Geobranding" in 2017.

1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I discuss the conceptual framework of this dissertation. The dissertation contains three main chapters with different conceptual approaches. Therefore, my dissertation is structured around the following concepts and related theories: (1) Lived Religion, (2) Islamization, (3) Gender, (4) Everyday, (5) the Link between Religion and Culture.

Concept of 'Lived Religion. "Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice", compiled and edited by a historian 'David Hall' [1997a] was the first work which introduced the concept and term of lived religion [Knibbe and Kupari 2020, 160, Ammerman 2014, 194]. Hall defines the 'lived religion' as 'a way to do the religious history of American' which takes up largely unused insights in this field, to facilitate scholarly comprehension of the everyday living of laymen and their thought. The historian Robert Orsi and social scientist Nancy Ammerman, who has been closely associated over time with the approach of lived religion, have a magniloquent role among contributors in the concept of 'Lived Religion' [Ibid, 160].

Everyday religion understood as observing contemporary religious lives comprises an essay by a social scholar Meredith B. McGuire, now one of the leading supporters of lived religion. All these researchers interpret the approach based on their particular objects and academic contexts, but in a slightly different way. McGuire's goal, [2008, 4] in the study of "Lived Religions: Beliefs and Practices in Everyday lives" is to question the scholars of religion to "revise basic conceptions of what we are investigating and how we are studying it. The sense of the term "lived religion" lies in the "difference between the true experience of religious persons and the in institutionally prescribe religion and its defined faiths and practices" [Knibbe &

Kupari 2020, 161].To McGuire [2016, 163], [2007, 186], [2008, 14] the corporeality is an especially significant aspect of the concept of lived religion.

Within the idea of the lived, Robert Orsi also finds the phenomenological nature of connections. Orsi argued that the research of lived religion reflects a fundamentally analytical methodology pioneered by anthropologist Michael Jackson, concentrates on religion as a continuous, complex and interacting process of everyday life [Kupari 2020, 161, see also Orsi 2010,4].

Ammerman's perception of the term 'lived religion' is more flexible as compare to McGuire and Robert Orsi. She [2013, 3] does not support "the foundational reviewing of what the religion is" but sees a more realistic analysis of lived religion as a means of understanding the religions, namely in the contemporary world [Kupari 2020, 162]. Ammerman [2013, 3] has acknowledged the historic burden of sociological categories and descriptions of religion. Therefore, she did not offer to abandon or displace, but purpose to enhance them. The term of lived religion, defined by Ammerman [2014, 191] pertains to religion as intertwined with every life of individuals [Ibid, 191].

The fourth well-known advocate of lived religion approach is Ivan Strenski who does not confine himself with the focus on American mainstream religion but the world religions (i.e. Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam) are his discussion while applying this approach. All of the three above scholars (Orsi, McGuire, and Ammerman) also support our research but in a general way. But Ivan Strenski directly supports our work in case of Pakistan as an Islamic society because he is the one who applied his lived religion approach on Islam (above three scholars' focus is the religion of America and modern society). Ivan Strenski suggests that philosophers, who study religion, should review their interpretation of the term "religion " and follow the paradigm of political philosophy [Strenski 2012]. Likewise, Bryan Rennie [2012] takes an interest in the collaboration involving in the philosophy of science and history, as a paradigm for how philosophy about religion could work together with history about religions. Thus, it is particularly reasonable to start discussing the

positive future of philosophy about religions with the viewpoints of the historian of religions such as Ivan Strenski. And it is not unexpected that Strenski's opinion like other renown theorists of lived religion, as Robert Orsi, David Hall, is a critique of the way as the philosophy of religion is being practised [Strenski 2012,3]. Here, we want to discuss the concept of "Lived Religion" purposed by 'Ivan Strenski' because his idea of lived religion directly hit the religious culture of Pakistan.

Strenski states that "philosophy of religion" requires a study of both philosophy and religion separately. He refers to analytical philosophy while defining the term "philosophy". He believes that the interpretation of religion is simplified by analytic philosophy. From the last two decades, the analytical philosophy of religion has widely considered the nature of theism as the focus of its study [Schilbrack 2012, 2]. The core issues to discuss in analytic philosophy of religion are generally interpreted from primary data like books and published texts. And it is the main concern to reveal, whether someone can claim that God really exists or not, if God really exists as administrator then why evil prevail in the world? The bond between rationality and belief in God and the miracle as a breach of laws concern nature. It is also not extraordinary for an analytical philosophy in theological textbooks to address issues taken directly from Christian theology: the essence of God, spirituality, prophecy, the survival of the soul.

This is certainly preferable for social theorists to a paradigm change, who has been more obsessed with studying the religious practices and values at the elemental level rather than investigating doctrines and religious structures [Prudhomme 2010]. The analysis of, for instance, Parker [2002] articulated this quantitatively. He made a list of replies for selection from the group, in different surveys conducted in Latin America, 'Catholic in my way' and thoughts of devotees outside of the Church [Parker 2002]. Parker's concept of lived religion connected with McGuire's idea of lived religion, which indicates that religious rituals and practices in daily life do not go down the direction of religious entities [McGuire 2008]. He relates it to the Lived Religions that are practiced and define as of resurgence of popular religions; nowadays

these forms of religion are in a trend for most of the societies. The rise in consumer culture and the communicating technologies and the emergence of globalization have developed an open room for the individualization and development of religions in a kind of unrestricted religious environment where individuals may have the freedom to follow whatever they want. McGuire [2008] stepped away from official religion which is analyzed on an institutional base and focused her work on social and individual rates. She dealt with an agglomeration of religious belief which is sometimes shifting, multidimensional and conflicting, which is a component of religion that sometimes finds to be of little significance [Kupari 2020, 160]. The lived religion that has come to fact and represents that not only the beliefs and the authorized religious communicators (priests, religious scholars etc) have changed, but most significant is, what society perceive about these changes. That idea of lived religion as a practice and dimension of behaviour has been currently applied by Ganzevoort and Roeland [2014].

The distinguishing feature of this concept is that it emphasizes on devotion and hence includes all phenomenological dimensions of religious affections in the philosophy of religion. But this philosophy no longer includes all religions all over the universe by describing religion as "faith in God"; it is still impersonating as generic theism (Islam is theistic religion as Christianity and can be studied under Strenski's analytical philosophy of 'live Religion"). Strenski suggests that "the sacred" is the comprehensive and right dierection for understanding the religious affairs. Currently, Strenski's main criticism of theological philosophy is that it takes what he terms a logical interpretation of religion [Strenski 2012, 4]. In other terms, it describes religion through spiritual phrases, values, belief systems, traditions as well as other kinds of theological debate. Analytic philosophy of theology believes that the ideas what religious beings think or believe are essential to religions.

Strenski proposes that theological philosopher considers "lived religion " to be their primary focus, which includes identity, material culture, social behaviours, the emotional state of being, way of life, and cultural heritage. My point of view is that

the propositional dimension (the "beliefs ") is not possible to take away from a definitive place in practising religion. I value the theological historian 'Bruce Lincoln [2003] who remarked that "Religious beliefs and practices are described as those whose purpose is to bring about a world and its human beings in a right and a real way". It is notified through definition by a religious belief that something might be a religious practice or not, and thus discursive is indeed pivotal key.

Strenski has fairly highlighted the lived religions as ways of life that make the discourse meaningful. When philosophers of religion assume that ideas which seem necessary are all prepositions, they concentrate on all what is, under one or more labels, essential to understand the purposeful conduct. While studying religions, I suggest (Godlove 2002 supports me in my proposal) that the discursive and philosophic aspect of religion is unavoidable as it is inevitably important to understand human behaviour. Hence, Acceptability of the suggested emphasis on lived religion by Strenski does not mean that philosophers of religion should not discuss the religious beliefs, but it means they would not study them anymore in a "cognitive" way.

The point of view by Strenski is that "as the interpretation of religion shifts by philosophers, the philosophy of religion shifts with it automatically". Here, I would like to follow his direction just to see where I believe it goes. Strenski is right in one sense: when the targeted topics to study will be changed—from abstract terms and religious attitudes towards lived religion, namely allegiance, material culture, habits, emotional existence, personalities as well as community — the results of philosophy of religion would be surely distinct. In this regard, Schilbrack [2004] has highlighted the point about the performance of philosophers of religions and questioned that what philosophy of religions has historically done is to explore the logic regarding religions.

Our review of Orsi, McGuire, Ammerman and Ivan strenski – perhaps the most prominent four social scientists involved in the study of lived religions – shows that the approach of lived religion is not reliant on a particular theory or methodology, but rather pronounce to a broader trend in research.

Concept of Islamization. Islamization is commonly seen as a phase of religious and cultural change aimed at expanding the involvement of religious entities and the intensity of religious observance particularly in Pakistani state and society [Sheikh 2008,596, Riaz 1985, 264]. This expansion is mainly achieved by redefining the role of the current social and cultural entities and reorganization the state apparatus. The main focus of Islamizationeither repressive or democratic process is structural transformation and role reinterpretations of institutions including education, religion, law, economy, culture and mass media [Pupcenoks 2012, 274, Riaz 1985, 265]. As Pupcenoks [2012] suggested that Islamization would be better conceptualized through three approaches which concentrate on the Islamization of (i) education (ii) social policies (iii) economy. I have followed that proposal to discuss the Pakistani society with a historical background of how Islam evolved in seven decades and penetrate in all spheres of society.

Islamism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with multiple aspects and each aspect has various functions and a particular set of factors. The Phenomena of Islamization as a process represent in various ways like repressive, tolerant and democratic Islamization [Pupcenoks 2012, 286]. For instance, both states; Pakistan and Turkey are Islamic democracies. The Islamization in Pakistan is mainly a kind of "repressive Islamization", whereas Islamization in Turkey is a great example of a democratic and liberal Islamization in many aspects [Pupcenoks 2012, 287]. The Pakistani "Conflicted Repressive Islamisation" model depicts a more oppressive and straightforward form of democratic Islamisation in which the state government take legal actions to ensure the strict interpretation of shari'ah in all social sectors, particularly, education and economy as well as entertainment [Ibid]. So, the model of "Conflicted Repressive Islamisation" by Juris Pupcenoks [2012] explained directly with the case of Pakistan is supporting my research.

A significant amount of Islamic revival in Muslim majorities such as Pakistan is inextricably linked with concerns of political influence and the personal

accomplishments of both; the radical Islamists and the politicians who gain benefit through this mutually beneficial relationship [Mukharjee 2010, 350].

It is not unreasonable to discuss the term Islamization as a process of expanding the significant influence of Islam in term of politics, law, society and culture [Sheik 2008, 598, Rais 2017, 23]. A lot of scholars elaborated about the process of Islamization and particularly also with the cases of Islamic states. In the first half of the 20th century, the origin of the concept of Islamization rooted back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt [Sheikh 2008, 594]. Islamisation in case of Pakistan should not be proposed as widely associated with the Middle East's 'institution' of Islam, especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the state authoritatively collaborate with the Islamic institution or religious scholars [Sheikh 2008, 596]. While discussing Islamization in the context of Pakistan, it has been explained by a lot of authors that how Islam has been being used in politics since the past seven decades of the history of Pakistan. Both, opposition parties and government enticed to Islam when there was no political merit in their voting base [Mukharjee 2010, 326, see also Metcalfe 2004, 236].

I differentiate between a narrow understanding of Islamization as the concrete political program which was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s and proclaimed increased justice and other public goods under Islamic laws made available by revelation and a broad understanding of Islamization as ambivalence toward modernity and its values that is expressed in the on-going attempts to "Islamize" the state, the society and the culture in Muslim majority countries undertaken by the nation-states in recent decades, including Pakistan. This notion captures both the attempts of different political groups (i.e. the military) to capitalize on Islam and the various impact of this process on society, i.e. gradual move of Pakistan towards a theocratic legal framework, limiting females' roles in the public sphere, depicting women As the underlying cause for corruption and poor morals and the breakdown of cultural norms [Farzana 2008, 594, Mumtaz & Shaheed 1987]. I do not also define Islamisation, not as a fixed ideology, but, again, as the processes and networks by

which various political actors try to capitalize on Islam and religious groups and citizens in Pakistan try to build their ideas of the 'true Muslim'.

Significance and function of religion have been radically transformed in Pakistan and has been stated by 'Shafqat' as "a state has undergone from official Islam to Islamization" [Shafqat and Jaffrelot (ed) 2002, 145].

So, the above-defined concept of Islamization by Farzana Sheikh [2008], Riaz Hussain [2000, see also 1985], Rasul Bakhsh Rais [2017], Shafqat [2002], Mumtaz & Shaheed [1987] and Juris Pupcenoks [2012] support my work in discussing the phenomena of Islamization as a gradual process to inject religion in all sphere of society through political power. Contrariety to the revolutionary ideology of harmony, freedom and stability by founders, the state and culture of Pakistan have been embroiled in Islamic politics transformed into Islamization, religious extremism and terrorism. These pose the most serious challenges for national security and Pakistani contemporary society [Rais 2017, 26]. The extreme version of Islam, which has supporters and allies in groups that seek to follow their Islamic vision via constitutional diplomacy, is waged in an extremely costly and fatal war with Pakistani state [Rais 2017, 23, Babar 2013].

Concept of gender. The question of gender is one of the most important and hot question marks of Islamic history (Irigaray 2001). It enlarges across borders, cultures, languages, and customs. Surprisingly, this gender question is different in every location and culture. The perception of gender is mainly supposed as a set of conducts, attitude and stimulus that evolve and formulate sexual differences based on society and culture [Nye 2008, 87, Davidson et al 1979].

There is not any clear definition, mutually consented among social scholars, about the concept of 'gender' or 'male and females'. Many people know what it means with a difference between men and women. In a modern cultural sense, it is incredibly difficult to do everyday life without making this difference and people have a solid concept to be from one of both categories [Nye 2008, 82]. The most confounding issue arises with this approach as "what is meant by distinction"? What determines gender,

or makes an individual a male or female. This all debate concerning the concept of 'Gender' is a significant area of research for studying culture and religion [Nye 2008, 83, Jason Scot 1986].

There are still no fundamentals for determining gender – rather, gender relies on what growing culture considers being gender. So, in this context, culture, as well as religion, renders male and female. Thus to make a statement such as "Females are more religious than males," or "men can be more successful rulers" or "males ought to be the religious scholars and in talking about gender instead of sex distinction [Nye 2008, 82]. The behaviour, which is more culture-like than "human" ones, has continued to rely far more on variations in class rather than (biological) sex in the psychological analysis of differences between male and female. For Daly, females are suffering and adoring a male god by worshipping who is coerced by males. It includes women with their abuse and discrimination as a participant in religious rituals and social values. Mary Daly thus suggests that for this reason, all conceptions of religion are man-made. Religion is both androcentric (male-centred). As passive subjects oppressed by religion and imposed oppression, it is the only position place for females. There's no truth outside this illusion of social ties, and then god (as an object of belief) can be limited to patriarchal exploitation [Nye 2008, 87]. The situation of Muslim women is a perfect illustration –it can be seen that western feminists are confused over 'what' they ought to argue about Muslim women who are contented within their religious and cultural values [Ibid, see also McKerl 2007].

Thus, as a researcher of religion and culture, I am inspired by the notion of Malory Nye [2008] who directly influenced my work. She argued that 'gender' is defined and distinct by cultural and religious background and it must be conceptualized and differentiate in the context of that particular culture and religion. Religious studies must be critical for gender. In fact, gender seems to be a very significant category of distinction as a central factor in the nature and ideology of power inequalities in many societies, Gender-critical research ought to explore how both male and female construct and follow religious traditions [Nye 2008, 82].

A major concern with the study of religion as well as culture, though, remains centred on aspects of women's religious experiences. Western perspectives regarding women belong to other religions – for Instance, women in Islam – need to study delicately and extensively for exploring the religious practices, such as carrying hijab, or the wearing Veil.

Gender is the active process of the "enactment of social categories" within historical and cultural contexts. Given the social, cultural, and historical constructs of gender, feminist theorists ask, "(if) gender is interpreted culturally (if) Gender is built culturally, what is this construction's way or mechanism?" [Butler 1990]. That question has eventually become the core of philosophical discussions. Sex differences come into existence from the time when a child is born. This lasting identification is evident in how identity and learning of gender roles take its shape [Davidson et al 1979]. Gender identity connotes to the sentence that the child is a boy or girl with the role he/she must have to play in a social environment where they are given birth and brought up culturally. Children are assigned specific roles culturally and socially by a process which them boy and girl and they must develop the roles as their identity (as male and female). Hence, gender identity is constructed as both males and females grow up and play their expected role in social surroundings and specific culture.

Gender within a cultural and historical context is the dynamic procedure of "Ratification of Social Classification" [Nye 2008, Baveja 1981]. This statement about gender in historical (which is religious) and cultural context have created questions for feminist thinkers as "[if] gender is formulated on a cultural base or [if] gender is the social interpretation of sex, which is the technique of this explication [Nye 2008, Butler 1990].

Simultaneously, Muslim feminist and egalitarianists have drawn the concentration of researchers to the social, cultural and religious raise of gender in Islamic societies [Amin 1992]. Their focal idea of discussion is to analyze the women's status with their roles, identification, contributions in the community and

their liberty from specific prejudiced 'religious' traditional and social norms and beliefs.

As the popular concept and theory of gender have shaped women's lives, the question of the way gender is constructed has become inevitable. The question of gender by and large is one of the most pressing queries of Muslim history [Ross 1995]. It extends across the boundaries of location, culture, nationality, language and tradition. Even though the question varies following location and culture, the notion of gender is generally understood as a set of behaviours, attitudes, and motivations that socially and culturally construct and develop sexual differences [Davidson et al 1979]. The materialization of sex differences is internalized from the time when children are born. This enduring identification is manifested in how gender identity and the learning of gender roles take its shape [Ibid]. Gender identity refers to the consciousness that one is a boy or a girl with the roles to which each must play in the society where they were born and bring up. The child develops the roles that are socially and culturally assigned to each sex through the process of the internalization of being a girl or a boy. Therefore, gender identity is formulated even as both males and females develop, internalize, and embody their expected roles in society.

Beyond doubt, the existing gender roles have benefited men more than women. The prevailing construction of gender condones the subordination and alienation of Muslim women in most Muslim countries. Muslims' inclination to the hierarchical principle of gender should come as no surprise since such a principle accelerates male supremacy, superiority, patriarchy and misogyny. This gender pattern continues to exist in Muslim communities by way of politicizing gender difference through a variety of mechanisms so that the control over women's bodies and individualities remains unchallenged.

Concept of Everyday. Several researchers have been trying to examine the historical roots of the everyday theory from the beginning of 20th century, which reaches back to the middle of the 20th century and represents a greater diversity of cultural origins [Loraine 2015, 111]. These studies are magniloquent, insightful and

useful to a theorist who is intrigued by the term of "everyday" but, in view of writers and thinkers, they are all still androcentric. In humanities like social, cultural and religious studies, the term "everyday" is a centre of discussion and is gradually expanding its scope in other areas, as in history and politics. "Everyday" has been devoted as a theoretical term to a significant number of philosophical studies [Sim 2015, 110].

Maurice Blanchot [1987] has described the concept 'everyday' where the spontaneous or pre-reflexive subjects – an abstract way of life – can be observed without absolutisms [A. Smith 2015, 1138]. Michel de Certeau clarified the idea of Everyday as "a domain of practical complementation which had not been fused into any discipline and showed the vigorous naivety which only grows if the practices stop to obtain its dialect. For Henr Lefebvre [2002;196], everyday reports seem to be more skeptical about the concerns for autonomy within broader organized practices in social life and he used the term as the basis for defining the "level" of actual nature of culture within a society [A. Smith 2015, 1139]. "Everyday life, on the first glimpse, appears to be all over, then does not seem anywhere" [Loraine 2015, 111, Sheringham 2006].

The term "everyday" has emerged as an area of "experiences" as well as an analytical concept. This happened through three mechanisms identified by Watson and Bennett [2002, 10-13]. Firstly, the advent of "the public," "parts of the democratic transition of culture and political lives" that defined specific issues, attitudes and social entities as "in-shared", "usual" and "common," highly acknowledged to practice in the public views and transmitted employing technology. Second, the manner in which the image of common and ordinary contributed to the "appearance of new modes of social institutes," that allowed more analysis of the term "everyday" [Ebrey 2016, 161]. The third and the last mechanism is the rise of new social and progressive movements, including LGBTs and feminism that are generating new insights into the power dynamics of everyday and different lifestyles.

Earlier fieldwork studies have emphasized the division across the everyday lives of 'male' and 'female', to such an extent that they identify them as 'two distinct

realms that go unnoticed [Liebelt 2018, 4]. A further dichotomy, between the practice and values and ambiguities in everyday as a concept, consists of a 'public domain' specified for men and 'domestic domain' for a woman would be appropriate to complement by Hirschkind [2014] on the list of 'Orientalistic,' binary critics. In a parallel trend, Panina Werbner's research of Muslim Punjabi female's transgressive manifestation of individuality, novelty and entertainment during many cultural moments like a rite of Hina night on wedding, could also be subjected to a same specific argument [Werbner 2018, 3].

Turning to the more current and comprehensive review by Michael Sheringham in "Everyday Life: Surrealist Theories and Practices" [2006], it suddenly begins to feel that this gender gap does not reflect the spatial and selective constraints facing all writers [Sim 2015, 112]. Sheringham's ambitious research has highlighted the wide selection of mainly continental thinkers, critics and cultural scientists and authors as George Bataille, Michel Leiris, Maurice Blanchot, George Lukas, Jean Baudrillard, Henri Lefebvre, Matin Heidigger, Andre Breton, Ronald Barthas, Stanly Cavell, Guy Debord, J.-A Boifford and Ludwing Wittgenstein.

In past, dominant factors of the theory of everyday tended to concentrate on popular culture, supported daily life and the general public and were primarily influenced by the ideas of Michel de Certeau and Henri Lefebvre [Sim 2015, 111]. In fact, Lefebvre and de Certeau are still two among the most prolific in the field of critical paradigm as compare to other critics like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and Sigmund Freud, because their studies are explicitly focused on daily life, unlike other major criticism of everyday as a concept. Whilst feminist critical theorist has highlighted the gendered restrictions for all those paradigms and the research of cultural scientists including such Ien Ang, Kristin Ross and Meaghan Morris is extensive and effective, it is surprising that no feminist critic has produced a critical analysis about everyday life. However, this surprisingly has to mention that most canonical theoretical concepts for "Everyday life" are discussed by male authors. Before the 1970s, it was a prevalent historical omission of women from the field of

the intellectual discourse of these social concepts [Sim 2015, 110]. Feminist critical theorists need to look at alternate modes for the different areas of culture like literature, live reporting, and art —for more and probably relevant perspectives and backgrounds of everyday theories. This is even more surprising than those of the absence of a woman-written critic of daily life, is the gender discriminated work used as a phenomenon in a cultural and intellectual context of everyday as a concept.

Among other contemporary critiques, Ben Highmore has been significant in improving critical approaches and ways of thinking in the study of everyday life and particularly, for researchers in the humanitarian sector. His analysis and studies regarding the theory of everyday have inspired my current research. Highmore's approach reflects mostly on the disparities and dynamics of the theorization and delineation of the typical categorization of 'everyday'. This has also been expressed in his writing "The Everyday Life Reader" [2000] addressing the issues and included several women 's cultural critiques and analysis of sociologists from the 1980s and far beyond, namely Mary Kelly, Carolyn Steedman, Kristin Ross and Dorothy E. Smith [Sim 2015, 111]. Similarly, Highmore historically discusses the gender-specific ways of routine such as domestic chores like cooking and explores the socio-esthetic analysis of feminine cooking by Luce Giard [2004, 321]. Hvid Jacobsen [2009] figured out that within the "modelling" of that field, more contemporary research was carried out by Highmore [2002] and Gardiner [2000]. From this and other writings, Jacobsen typically summarizes "the complexity of everyday life" in seven beneficial dimensions: site, time, space, attitude, objects, approaches, objects, perspective, scholarly abstractions and experience. It provides an extensive map of everyday lives, a sort of "cloud atlas," "a maze of stories intertwined" that could seek to capture its "multitudes of encounters" [Ebrey 2016, 159].

In fact, for most of the social researchers, the un-directive everyday is correlated with all of its complexity and the variability due to diversified nature of daily life affairs [Highmore 2001, 96, Smith 2015, Lefebvre 2007, 190, Benjamin 1999]. In overview, there is an eminent feature in the theoretical approach for everyday, which

sees the diversity and spontaneity of everyday practices and encounters that are not easy to conform to the main conceptual system of modernity and thus finds in the everyday for the means that can be critically questioned of this conceptual ordering. Girard and de Certeau offer the renowned framework that ordinary cultures are described as 'a viable science of the particular one' that causes of upturning our thought patterns wherein the scientific pragmatism is knowing about general [A. Smith 2015, 1139, Girard 1998, 256].

When we talk about everyday life in the context of Pakistani culture which is the culture of Islam and everyday lives revolve around religious principles, Talal Asad comes out of critiques of the anthropological approach of Islam where theologically Islam was quite missing until around the 1980s. He relied on Foucauldian thoughts of discourse, articulated the issue of Islam as just an anthropological topic [Liebelt & Webinar 2018, Marranci 2008, 37]. Everyday lives in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan can be explained and defined through a claim by Talal as:

"If you would like to begin writing about Everyday or Anthroplogical Islam, you should start from a notion Mulsim do in their daily lives which are included and related to the original holy text (Quraan and Hadith) of Islam. Islam is not a specific social system and not as stratified ethics and beliefs. Islam is just a traditional system" [Asad 1986, 14].

Asad described 'tradition' as 'instituted practice' permitted through a discursive tradition. Some of the major critics of this philosophy have stressed that individuals who identify themselves as Muslims live and construct different types of identity in their everyday life, according to a number of spiritual, sentimental and aesthetical records that are not necessarily approved by the religious traditional discursive system [Liebelt and Webner 2018, 3]. Such scholars emphasize "the everyday life" in a context of 'indeterminacy, openness, and unclarity' in Islamic practice in defining aspects of Religion and Muslim's morals that are not appropriately represented on the Asadian discursive model of Islamic traditional system [Schielke & Debevec 2016, 11]. Robbins emphasizes that traditions and beliefs 'provide everyday lives with a

great deal of the way to progression or at minimum a sense of moral ability' [Robbins 2016, 28]. Robbins theory can be linked with the everyday culture of Pakistani people who claim that their religious beliefs give them strength for moralities and good deeds.

The link between Culture and Religion. Focus of the work of Max Weber, Paul Tillich and Clifford Geertz, the concept "religion and culture" is employed by scholars to name a field that studies the links between these two fields. Religion and culture are understood to be separate areas that may or may not interact with each other. The concept "religion and culture" therefore names the investigation of their interactions and influences upon one another. There is a popular assumption that "religion" is different from "culture" (understood as language, art, customs, practices). "Religion" is understood by many as the public expressions (such as texts, rituals, symbols, institutions, etc.) of an intimate, personal experience. Scholars of religion often examine these public expressions and comparing them across cultures in search of the similarities and differences. "Religion and Culture" is the designation of the research trend which deals with such public expressions of inner experiences as art, architecture, writing, behaviour, etc.

There is also the concept of "religion in culture" which means that "Religion" is an element in the human cultural mechanisms, which are historical products within themselves. They resulted from historic changes which can be which may be natural or triggered by certain influences – for instance, politics, economics, gender as well as the environmental and demographical factors. To study religion in culture is to assume that everything is the outcome of human's beliefs, behaviour pattern and social structures. Religion is an aspect of human cultural systems and thus something that can be studied using the same tools and methods that are being used other components of culture.

The shared interplay between religion and culture has been considered in the literature: Culture determines religion, but there is always a significant impact of religion culture. Therefore, the destiny of culture and religion is intertwined. Religion itself has been understood as a cultural system. In his essay 'Religion as a Cultural

System' [1993] Geertz speaks about 'the cultural dimension of religious analysis' [1993, 89]. He is not talking here about religion per se but about this cultural dimension in general. The understanding of culture, or, rather, cultural analysis, as Geertz calls it in "Interpretation of Cultures, is linked to 'one question: how to frame an analysis of meaning', that is 'the conceptual structures' humans 'use to construe experience' [1993, 313]. Thus, according to Geertz, the investigation of phenomena such as religion, ideology or the arts as cultural systems cannot be reduced to, respectively, descriptions of religious belief, political coups and institutions or pieces of art. Differently put, Geertz's understanding of culture is not 'cults and customs', but 'the structures of meaning' through which humans 'give shapes to their experience' [1993, 312]. Geertz differentiates between generalized cultural structures, widely shared in society, and more specific cultural systems with internal structures of their own. Systems of religion, politics and the arts might have their own and distinct cultural structures. Religion as a cultural system brings to ordinary life different things and it 'varies with the religion involved' [1993, 123]. There are relations between wider symbolic structures and more specified internal ones. Religious concepts and ways of understanding the world can 'spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to provide a framework or general ideal in terms of which a wide range of experience – intellectual, emotional, moral – can be given meaningful form' [1993, 123]. This is what Geertz calls the 'model of aspect'. The importance of religion as a cultural system lies in its capacity 'to serve', for individuals or groups, 'as a source of general, yet distinctive, conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them' [1993, 123]. Apart from Geertz, Tillich and Castoriadis also have made mentioned the importance of the problem of the meaning in the definition of religion. But this orientation is not without problem since "meaning" overlaps with "function". Also "meaning" can be understood ethnologically, or psychoanalytically, or semiotically. Freud in his work "The Future of an Illusion" researches the relationship between Religion and Culture and speaks about the psychological significance of religious representations. Religion and culture

would have the oedipal base, according to Freud. Culture, a bastion against nature, includes all power, knowledge and organization; its meaning is negative and oppressive. The culture is not homogeneous; it is coercive and obsessive in its religious aspect, and it involves the anthropomorphisation of nature, fears, and desires.

I, in this chapter, briefly described the main concepts of my dissertation and in the following chapters I will demonstrate how they can be used to describe the various aspects of Islamization in Pakistan. Before I proceed, I would like to briefly address the state of art, which is usually referred in Russia as the "degree of development of the problem".

In English-language religious studies and cultural philosophy, the problems of Islamization of states, cultures, societies and education are analyzed synchronously and diachroniously. The diachronic analysis of Islamization is carried out concerning such countries as India, Indonesia, Tanzania, Turkey and others. Synchronous analysis of this process is prevalent in the literature and has been carried out in particular with the modern development of regions such as Inner Asia and countries such as Malaysia, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. As a rule, Islamization is understood as a process of the increasing influence of Islam in society. In addition to sources where the main object of analysis are countries, a significant segment of literature is formed by studies of Islamization of certain spheres of public life, before education. Thus, discussing the conception of Islamization as knowledge and its inference for philosophy, the scholars emphasize that Islamization should not be understood as a mechanical process, but it is necessary to see in it the adaptation of certain forms of knowledge on subject matters of Islamic research, as well as the desire to strengthen the place of Islamic science in the current modern knowledge.

A separate and rapidly growing field of research is devoted to Islamization, understood as the increasing influence of Islam on Europe and the West as a whole. Here one can note the works of a professor in the field of Religious Studies. Ivan Stranski, Professor at the University of California at Riverside and Professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Aix-en-Provence, Director of the Observatoire du

religieux, Raphaël Liogier, author of "Myth of Islamization, an essay on collective obsession". Strenski, in a review of a number of recent scientific and artistic books, including Houellebecq's controversial novel "Submission", challenges the popular argument that European civilization is at risk of extinction for two main reasons: first, the mass arrival of migrants from conservative Islamic states and their refusal to accept European values; second, the passivity of European elites, combined with the rise of racism and xenophobia among the conservative part of the working class. Stransky's argument is that the indifference of the elites towards the understanding of Europe as a Christian civilization leads to a blurring of Europe's identity, but the prospects for re-Christianization of Europe remain elusive. At the same time, European Islam (the term Tariq Ramadan) still poses no serious threat. Liege criticizes the laws of France that focus on the principle of secularism, i.e., the coexistence of different cultures under the protection of a law that guarantees freedom of conscience, expression and religion, stressing that although citizens have the right to wear religious symbols, a law has been passed that prohibits the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and public places. The scientist also linked the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment among ultra-right groups and a large number of French citizens to identity anxiety: the perception of "alien" as a threat was a sign of weakness.

Thus, the study of Islamization takes place in a continuum from historical reconstructions to the analysis of contemporary politics, from parsing the real process to criticizing the Islamization imagined by Europeans as a threat to the identity of their continent and their culture. Migration specialists and Islamic researchers in the West insist that more attention should be paid to the impact of individualism on Muslim and that the study of Islamization in the West should get rid of the "ethnic prism" and explore and Islamic identity using the more general analytical framework offered by religious studies.

Work on Islamisation in Pakistan is divided into two groups, depending on the focus either on domestic policy or on the links between domestic and international policy. Let us characterize the first group by describing one of the earlier analyses

carried out by Riaz Hassan, an expert on Pakistani Islamization, an Australian Islamic scholar. He considers Islamization as the prevailing ideology of the Nation serving the interests of military regimes, the first of which came to power since the leadership of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was overthrown in 1977. On one hand, he believes, it is clear that Islamisation as a tool to legitimise the ruling regime, but it is not limited to this: other political and social forces in the state became a cause of playing an even stronger role in making Islamisation the state ideology of Pakistan. It also shows that both the pre-military political regime, namely the government of the Pakistan People's Party and the president and then prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, used the emotionally strong religious phrases of 'Muhammad's equality' and 'Islamic equality' to provide huge assistance for Social programs. When anti-state forces exploited Pakistanis against the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by using religion as a political tool, the state ruling powers announced "Islamic" reforms, banning alcohol, gambling and horse racing and making Friday rather than Sunday a weekend. These historical nuances show that there was hardly a single political force in the country that did not try to use Islam to attract the electorate to its side.

The second group of studies on Islamization in Pakistan took into account the contradictions arising from the country's involvement in international conflicts. The 40-year war in Afghanistan, which began with the Soviet invasion and continues due to the realization of American interests in the region, is just one example of the link between the uses of Islam for strengthening national security in the context of Pakistan's involvement in the geopolitical games of "heavyweight" countries. Thus, a number of armed formations are associated with Tehreek Taliban Pakistan, a religious and political movement aimed at building an Islamic state. Instability on the borders of the country, collisions between the state and tribes and other internal problems are connected with the processes going on both in neighboring countries and far from Pakistan. It is no coincidence that Pakistan was seen as a failed state. In addition, different forces within the country had different ideas about how the country should develop: political leaders, military and business circles used Islamic symbols and texts

of the founding fathers in different ways to pursue their interests. Many of the country's difficulties today are due to the arrival in power in the late 1970s of General Zia ul-Haq, who was particularly active in implementing the special program of Islamization developed by his government. This manifested itself in the revision of criminal law following the norms of traditional Muslim law, as well as in the implementation of the norms prescribed by Islam in taxation and banking. English Pakistani and South Asian historian Markus Dessel sees the policy of military Islamization of Zia ul Haq as a manifestation of colonial impact on the state politics and its elite. The militarization of politics is closely linked to Pakistani nationalism and the ethos of the national army. The colonial roots of modern Pakistani politics are manifested, in Dessel's view, in the fact that the country's poor peasant population is seen by elites as backwards and driven only by religious sentiments, while politics is thought to be the privilege of only a westernized elite. Zia-ul-Haq believed that the ordinary Pakistani people were deeply religious and used religious symbols to legitimize their rule. The general and the president did what his predecessors did, but he was the only one who led the religious manipulation of the population to extremes.

Since this president's activities coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, he brought the Sunnis to power as a result of their growing influence. Islamization took the form of "shariatisation". In other words, laws had been passed that punished those responsible for crimes under the rules of traditional Islam. The result was a gradual betrayal of the ideals on which the country was built, unreasonable use of the country's resources and fragmentation of social relations.

Islamization is also considered in several fundamental monographs on the history and present-day of the country. Thus, the problems of religious studies are combined with those of regional studies and country studies. For instance, the book "Transforming Pakistan" by Hilary Synnott is important to our idea of the importance of Islam in building a nation from scratch. The author shows the difficulties of subordinating different ethnic identities to a single national narrative. The national

building was hindered by a corrupt ruling class, army domination and authoritarian rule. Nighat Syed Khan, a Pakistani feminist activist and scholar, in "Voices from the Inside: Dialogues with Women" explores contemporary history in Pakistan, criticizing the inconsistency in the creation of national ideology as a cause of violence and social disintegration. Pakistani scientist Lawrence Zeering, in his monograph "Pakistan in the Twentieth Century", formulates a key argument for this dissertation: "Pakistan was formed as a result of a religious-political movement, so it would not have remained faithful to itself if it had not stressed the religious origins of its origin.

The link between Islam and gender relations is discussed in the literature, mainly in view of the strong patriarchal traditions of this religion and the possibility of opposing them. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, an Iranian anthropologist and activist, has published several monographs on the relationship between Islam and gender, written in an anthropological conception, but also by the viewpoint of Iranian Muslims seeking to understand their faith and culture.

It also reveals the important contradictions between feminist solidarity and nationalism: "'Muslim Females struggling hard for women's equal rights and would have been compatible with the anti-colonial, democratic and secularist, albeit authoritarian and repressive policies of new countries. Contemporary western women as feminist were able to oppose the conservative aspects of their religion and culture, in the name of liberalism and social democracy, but, in their fight for gender equality, Muslim women could not accept either foreign philosophies of feminism or their own local political ideals. In the viewpoint of both colonialists and westernized secularists "Islam" represented traditional ideas of patriarchy, which were to be ignored or destroyed in the interest of progression."Feminism," i.e. the defence of female rights and gender equality, was an imperialist ideology for certain liberals and anti-colonialists and was meant to be opposed.

Pakistani-American writer and scholar Asma Barlas challenges the widespread perception in the West that oppression of women stems from the very teachings of Islam, as well as the belief of many Muslims that the Koran justifies patriarchy and

gender inequality, writes the book from the perspective of an educated Muslim believer, "Either to believe in Muslim woman of Islam or read out the patriarchal and conservative versions of the Quran." In it, she insists that the Koran teaches about gender equality and that it is anti-patriarchal in spirit. By constructing a historical review of the interpretative phases about Quran and religious authority generally within a given religion, Barlas shows what historical processes have led Muslims to "read" the inequality and patriarchate in the Quran in order to legitimize existing social relations. She insists that patriarchal interpretations of the Quran are a function of which social groups read it, for what purpose and in what context. This is an important argument for the purposes of our work since the thesis deals with the instrumental use of Islam by different social forces.

A number of authors address women's rights, women's education, the link between gender issues and modernization, the differences between urban and rural women. They describe attempts by women in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and other countries to show that many of their compatriots practice an Islam different from that Encouraged by Islamic groups, religious institutions, mosques and seminars for Quranic teachings. At the same time, they describe the serious challenges faced by progressive women who risk being killed by Islamic extremists for refusing to close their faces. These authors show how women, including those in Pakistan, face escalating gender-based violence and deeply unjust laws that secondary rather than protect women from violence. It is demonstrated that patriarchal attitudes are broadcast by the school and university system. For example, by conducting a content analysis of Pakistan's school textbooks, scientists had found that patriarchal ideology was spreading in four main areas: (1) masculine dominance, (2) strong opposition to inter- and female gender roles, (3) patriarchal family structure, and (4) sport as a purely male activity.

The expansion of research into the phenomenon of daily life, its contradictions and changes, is due to the fact that in the second half of XX century, the interest of scientists attracted practices and attitudes of everyday life. The study of everyday life

comes to the fore in social knowledge under the influence of the so-called "turn to practice", which allowed to show the multi-layered and complex structuring of this phenomenon. The daily life of believers is captured in a study by Robert Orsi. Ivan Strenski, and several other authors of the concept of "living religion". Insisting that religious daily life sets a special social and cultural context, this group of authors initiated today's popular approach to religion as a set of social practices, with "practice" understood as a set of actions by which a tradition, church, or community sets the parameters on what religiousness entails. The concept of "living religion" is characterized by three lines of reflection on religious daily life: first, the emphasis on recognizing the differences between official doctrine and officially prescribed norms of behaviour and the various manifestations of adaptation, resistance or improvisation on the part of members of congregations concerning formalized representations of religion and attempts to strictly regulate the behaviour of believers; second, practices are not thought of as random, but as taking the form of ritual. Accordingly, scholars studying living religion conduct field studies also in temples (places of official worship) and during pilgrimages, secular holidays, holy days, family gatherings, etc. The third line is to study the connection between practices and systems of meanings and symbols. Islam understood as a living religion in a country where Muslims make up the majority is a topic much less studied than Islam as a living religion in Western Muslim communities.

Methodologically, in addition to the arguments mentioned above, the tradition of ethnography of religion is used to study Islamization [McGuire 2002, Spickard 2002, see also 2009] - to complement the conceptual analysis by demonstrating the complexity of everyday religion and religiosity of people. The use of ethnography of religion provides a more complete picture compared to political analysis only, as this methodology allows for the inclusion of the experience of people who are not experts in religion as well as the understanding of religion beyond the religious bodies. By examining how people practice their religiosity in daily life in personal as well as social spheres. Ethnography of religion allows for a focus on how real people practice

religion rather than on abstract categories of religion or belief. Everyday Islam [Dessing 2016, McGuire 2008] and Muslim/Islamic religiosity, although they have been studied over the past two decades, are still fairly uncharted topics and studies that explore the everyday religiosity of the Muslim majority. Relatively few empirical studies have also been conducted in Pakistan in this regard [Dessing 2016, 50, Jeldtoft 2011, 1135]. Caroline Bergammer and Catherine Fliegenschnee have drafted a model for a more detailed study of Muslim religiosity [Berghammer & Fliegenschnee 2014, 94] assume that Muslim daily life is multifaceted and is a contrast of behaviour and religious beliefs. There are broadly two sub-types of behaviour: (1) practices and obligations (2) moral standards of behaviour. The cultural and religious background affects almost all of these factors. Surrounding them and the theme of the relationship between religion and culture is also actively discussed by scholars working in this paradigm.

2. ISLAMISATION OF STATE POLITICS OF PAKISTAN

In the following chapter, I examine how religious nationalism emerged and evolved from a modern liberal state to an extreme vision of Islam and its impact on today's fragile state of Pakistan. I apply a critical approach to analyze the transformation of a regime that changed the religion-political orientation of Pakistan. This chapter examines the impact of Islam ideology and the identity of Pakistan. It aims is to consider the interrelated dynamics of religion and politics in Pakistan. I also consider the religious evolution in the political system of Pakistan: a predominant Islamic populated country. I will also attempt to explore systematically, the circumstances of Pakistani politics in which it took the influence on norms, traditions, and cultural speculations that come out from the religious domain of Islam.

2.1. Religious nationalism and religious fundamentalism

The theoretical foundation of my analysis is comprised of the works of scholars who investigated the links between religion and violence, including the studies of religious fundamentalism as well as the specific religious nationalism. Regarding religious nationalism, Mark Juergensmeyer (the American sociologist and religious studies author who coined this term) delineates several traits of religious nationalism. First, he claims that the main difference between the Western (secular) and non-secular understanding of nationalism is "the religious nationalists' insistence on the divine justification for human laws and democratic institutions" [1993, 196]. Second, there is "the assumption that certain lands are the province of only one religion" combined with the belief that some nations need to be guided by "the dominant

religious community ideology" [Ibid]. Third, is that "religious nationalists cherish group loyalties over individual rights and personal achievements". Juergensmeyer cites the examples of India, Sri Lanka and other but surely Pakistan development can be also characterized with help of this concept.

Religious fundamentalism, in its turn, has been analyzed by sociologists, IR specialists, and religious studies scholars. It is a controversial term that started its existence from American Protestantism and only in the 1980s attracted the attention of scholars. One of the reasons why it is a controversial concept is succinctly explained by Luca Ozzano. The scholar correctly claims that the thing which focuses on the socially destructive nature that has hindered up to a certain point in the study of this phenomena. Fundamentalisms generally comprise of "social resistance forces," who are trying to combat the modernity [Luca Ozzano 2009, 342]. He also adds that. the negative attitude towards religious fundamentalism on the part of scholars is that, first, it doesn't correspond to believes and values of scholars who also tend to consider it as a threat and are reluctant to study it in detail, second, because its growth continues globally, it contradicts the widely adopted secularisation paradigm, according to which religion eventually will stop being influential because it would be reduced the private sphere only.

Pakistan is the world's second-biggest Muslim territory, with more than 200 million populations. Pakistan was founded with the ideology of Islam and the majority of inhabitants (96.2%) are Muslim. Most important is that Islam is the official religion of Pakistan, which can be proved from the official name of the state as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. According to the constitution 1973 of Pakistan, "Non-Muslim is not eligible to hold the seat as a president of the state of Pakistan" [Andrabi 2005].

Islam is the youngest universal religion, and in the contemporaneous time, there are many states with predominant Islamic population, exist in various parts of the world [Halper 1963]. These Islamic states have variations considerably among each other due to social or cultural traditions, level of financial growth, etc. However, most

of these states share common characteristics on a political level as military regimes and sovereignty or authoritarian [Qureshi 1989].

Lawrence Ziring [2006] accounts in his book "Pakistan in the Twentieth Century" that "Pakistan came into being the aftermath of a religious-political movement; therefore, it cannot be right to itself if it could not perpetuate the religious position of its origin" [Ziring 2006]. He also elaborates that the "Objective Resolution 1949" was an acknowledgement to amalgamate religion into political infrastructure. The initial step to govern a state was obtained from God, who was considered as an ultimate crown. So, it was in the convention that anything would be repellent, which will be against Islam. In this book, Ziring has discussed the history of Pakistan and examined magniloquently of those circumstances, which become the reason for the Independent, predominantly Muslim state within Subcontinent. He also provided an in-depth and inclusive description of the events that made an impact on the state politics of Pakistan from secular liberal to Islamic state [Ziring 2006].

In "Pakistan: Democracy, Development, and Security Issues" [2005], Lawrence Ziring discussed those challenges which democracy of Pakistan has encountered in the last sixty years due to external and internal interference mostly in religious form. Analyzing various primary and secondary sources of Pakistan, India, and West, different authors have contributed in this book to examine Pakistan's political issues with an eye on the challenges of democracy [Ziring 2005].

Another recent survey was also conducted by Fair et al., [2013] to measure religiosity in Pakistan and its connection with support to Militancy and Sectarian conflicts. It was documented in a survey that 58 per cent of Pakistanis attend "Dars-e-Quran" (Reading of Quran Session). The reason for participation in these Quranic sessions, according to study, is predominantly personal piety. Six thousand interviews of Pakistanis adults were conducted on "belief about political Islam, Sharia Law, the legitimacy and efficacy of Jihad (holy war) and attitude toward specific militant organizations" [Fair at al, 2013]. This research explored that contrary to popular perceptions; there is no connection between personal religiosity and highly sectarian

sentiments. And that while there is a high level of support in general for Sharia Law and reason for its support was that Sharia Law means good governance rather than their desire to support militant groups, who happen to champion such slogans [Fair at al, 2013].

But the Impact of Islam in moulding the political values of the followers has been quite prevalent. As Hussein Razi (2008) says that Islam has affected significantly to the political attitude on a lot of matters as the conception of justice, public and private rights in the context of individual and collective identity, the structure of the legal, political institution, characteristics of lawmakers, the rights and duties of sovereign and subject [Razi, 2008]. He further quoted that Islam has a more profound and broadened domain than nationalism, which make sit together with most of the population.

To understand the link between Islam and politics in the state of Pakistan, it is significant to go through the history of the relationship between Islam and Pakistan while keeping in mind theoretical contributions from partition studies literature as well as the one on the links among religion, nationalism and state, including studies of religious fundamentalism and nationalism. In 1947, after India gained independence from the British, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two nation-states: India and Pakistan. The lines were drawn and the whole population was distributed between the two emerging nations based on religion, which was the primary marker of national identity. Pakistan, literally translated 'the land of the pure' did not exist and had never existed as a geographical place or even the name before the Indian partition in 1947. The so-called Radcliffe Line between the two nations was drawn arbitrarily, without regard for connections between people's birthplace and nationality. The 1947 Partition of British India left many traumatic memories: violence, including rape, and many disturbances took place on both sides of the border. About one million people were killed in riots which overwhelmed Punjab after independence and about twice that number were displaced and crossed the border [Balasubrahmanyan 2011, Bhavnani 2014].

In post-colonial India, the modernist leadership among the Muslim minority demanded the separate homeland 'Pakistan' to live and get rid of the Hindu majority. The religion of Islam was beginning to be used with the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, as an ideology for the organization of a modern nation-nation. The use of religion to define a nationalist project, as the sole basis of it, was an unprecedented event in the history of religion as well as in the nation-state formation. This bold and unusual movement of Pakistan was advocated with great ardour by many Indian-Muslims, especially those leaders who belonged to the secular and modernist elite. However, the anticipation was that Pakistan would be a western-style nation-state came into being in the sole name of religion, Islam. This idea was welcomed with doubts by the religious elites whose concern was more about Islamic Revival than the national self-determination. Already, in 1942, Islamic theorist and activist Abdul Al-Maududi posed the most pointedly to the proponents of Pakistan.

"The most important question for me is whether the system of government in Pakistan will be based on the sovereignty of God or the sovereignty of the people. In the former case, it will surely be "Pakistan" (Land of the pure), but in letter case, it will be ungodly part of the land as a country, where according to your; non-Muslim will rule" [Akhtar 2010, 598].

The modernist elites and Islamists, since the emergence of the state of Pakistan, represented ideologically contrasting groups. The Islamists demanded the expansion of Islamic law in all sectors of Pakistani life, first of all, the use of Islamic law to conduct punishments and to dispense justice. They also promoted such Islamic practices as the prohibition of alcohol, gender segregation, etc. In addition, they insisted on distancing from Western influence, whether it is moral, cultural representations, and gender equality ideas. In short, they wanted to make of Pakistan an "Islamic State". In contrast, modernists objected to the expansion of Islamic law and the enforcement of Islamic practices. They also suggested that the country develops following the Western models, including secularism. Political leaders were trying to find a compromise between the needs and interests of both groups because

they were seeking political support from both groups. The Islamists are a stronger political group in Pakistan. They are also much stronger as a voting bloc. The constitution of Pakistan has a special section on Islamic Provisions: "All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions" [Constitution/Preamble 2020]. Political leaders employ Islamist groups to expand their power base. This explains why Islamism, usually known as, "Islamic fundamentalism, a vision of Islam which has its origin in the prehistory of Pakistan, gradually, dominated Pakistan and strengthened its roots in almost the whole Islamic world. Recently, Pakistan has witnessed the emergence of theocratic jihadism, a further redefinition of Islamism whose focus was the Islamic tenant of Jihad (Struggle) and tried to place state authority under the direct control of the Sunni clerical establishment, the Ulema.

Pakistan was created on the base of an argument called 'The two-nation theory' which stressed that the India sub-continent was simply constituted of two nations - the Hindu nation and Muslim Nation. As a plan of religious nationalism, two-nation theory postulated that the most important exist around which the political issues were revolving is the boundary between the large-scale communities. And these large-scale communities, according to the two-nation theory, each compose a nation demanding a nation-state for its practice of self-determination. The declaration of 'Two Nation theory' was announced by the president of the All-India Muslim League (first political party made for the rights of Indian-Muslims), Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1940, in Lahore (the capital of Punjab). At this annual historical meeting, the Muslim league officially arrogated a resolution for the foundation of the maverick Muslim state, separate from the Indian sub-continent. This resolution known as "Lahore Resolution" (due to the location of meeting) came to be considered as the first formal memorandum for demanding the creation of Pakistan [Ali 2003]. In the Muslim League's presidential address, Jinnah (the founder and first president of Pakistan) argued;

"The issue regarding Indian partition is not inter-communal but international levels and therefore must be resolved strictly speaking as…They [Islam and Hinduism], in a stern sense of meaning, are not only different in the social order, and it is a fantasy to evolve then as a common nationality. Both Muslims and Hindus have different ideologies of religion, traditions as well as literary texts. We do not intermarry or interdune and are therefore linked to two separate cultures founded on different theories and ideas. Both have different aspects of life and on life. It is quite probable that Hindus and Muslims take their motivations through distinct sources of history. Each of both has different epics, heroes and episodes. It is quite possible to notify that the hero of one is the rival of the other and their conquest and beats overlap…. Muslims are a nation given any theory regarding the concept of nation, so we should have our own separate territory and independent state [Jinnah 2000, 8-9].

As Jinnah's speech shows, the religious community as a nation, regardless of prominent sectarian variations, Jinnah's use of Islam as 'national' boundary also ignored the distinguished cultural differences among Muslims who were arising from several ethnolinguistic regions of the sub-continent where they lived. The Pakistani population was comprised of the people of adjoining areas of North-Western India like Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir and North-West Frontier Province, along with Muslims from Deccan and Gangetic Plains where they were in minority demographically, and Bengal (Muslim-dominated areas and province of Northeastern India). All of them were ethnically, culturally and linguistically different, but it is a widely accepted view that they all shared a sense of being Muslim.

Islam was made the foundation of a peculiarity of the nation-state of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the people of newly born Pakistan did not even share a common vision of Islam or its role in their society, despite sharing the sense of being Muslim. Besides, Pakistan is a state which was achieved with the ideology of religion and Pakistani state took almost all the measures whether national or foreign to make Pakistan as the representative of Islam at least on the level where it serves to define a common vision of Islam and its role in Pakistani society. Even a particular vision of Islam can be

realized from the official name of the country, a written constitution, financial system, foreign relations and every major public policy of Pakistan has been serving to secure the power of vision of Islam [Jinnah 2000, 9].

Since 1947, Pakistan shifted its national identity from being a liberal democracy and Muslim majority state to the officially declared Islamic state that had brought some major changes both within Pakistan and all over the Islamic World. For political objectives, Pakistan redefined Islam as a political ideology to exploit the religious sentiments of its inhabitants. Eventually, a new interpretation of Islam completely changed the whole scenario of the state and encouraged a very narrow and conservative vision of Islam that promoted jihad and now extremism.

For the whole phases of the set of intricate relation among military and civilian ruling class the Islamic opposition forces. During its seventy years of existence, following the concept of religious nationalism, we can say that Pakistan shifted in its self-conception from simply being a Muslim majority state to be an Islam state, a development of enormous consequence for the redefinition of Islam. Thus, in this chapter, my concern is to explore how religion has injected and impacted the identity and politics of state and shifted it from simply being a secular Muslim-majority state with rigid use of religion as a tool in the political system. Accordingly, the first part of the chapter will attempt to investigate the historical background of the existence of Pakistan. The second part is about politics in a post-independence time when the secular state was under the pressure of Islam until the theocratic jihadist stage of Islam in politics. The third phase of the chapter is about the current impact of Islam on politics and the crucial fragile condition of Pakistan. Finally, I will end up with some opinions of people through interviews survey, whether politics mixed up with religion is good or not and what should be better in their viewpoint.

Although the study of religious symbols and their use in establishing societal norms of identity, authority, and order belong to the purview of the historian of religions, the rigorous treatment of religion in the context of the nation-state, be it in Pakistan or any other non-Western nation-state received little academic consideration

in the study of religion during the first four decades after World War Two. Pakistan was a product of the post-World War II, Western-dominated international order of nation-states, which emphasized self-determination and sought to extend the principles of liberal democracy through the development of new nation-states in the former European colonies. In many parts of the world, the emergence of nation-states forced a clash between the worldview of the Western European Enlightenment and the worldviews of indigenous cultures grounded in their traditional religions.

Toward the end of the 1970s in many countries in the world, the local cultural response to the Western Enlightenment worldview inherent in their nation-states shifted to the most negative and uncompromising end of the spectrum. These scathing critiques of the Western worldview were articulated in religious discourse and were termed 'religious fundamentalism' in the Western media, extrapolating from the phenomenon of Protestant fundamentalism which emerged in late-nineteenth-century America. As these responses propelled political movements that rocked the stability of the Western international order, religious fundamentalism began to attract widespread academic consideration by the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s as illustrated by "The Fundamentalism Project" of the University of Chicago under the direction of Martin Marty and Scott Appleby and sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Initiated in 1988, this project sponsored the work of an assortment of scholars whose articles on religious fundamentalism were published during the 1990s in a multi-volume series edited by Marty and Appleby. These articles collectively constitute an important contribution to the understanding of the variety of movements in different regional contexts. Many of the works published in those volumes are utilized in this study.

The consideration of religious fundamentalism was launched in 1989 with the publication of Bruce Lawrence's "The Defenders of God". Lawrence subtitled his work "the fundamentalist revolt against the modem age" and was one of the first scholars to suggest that religious fundamentalism may more properly be seen as a manifestation of the anti-modernist religious philosophies [Lawrence 1995].

The most comprehensive single study of the phenomenon is the above-mentioned Mark Juergensmeyer's The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State- Published in [1993], Juergensmeyer's work builds on Lawrence's identification of 'religious fundamentalism' as a religious ideology of anti-modernism and suggests the locus of the conflict resides in the contested construction of the nation-state [Juergensmeyer 1993, 40]. Therefore, Juergensmeyer regards all forms of 'religious fundamentalism' as forms of religious nationalism.

Juergensmeyer's work constitutes a critical contribution as it identifies the conceptual contours of the phenomenon. Indeed, it still represents the most sophisticated comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon. However, there are major gaps in Juergensmeyer's work, both factually and theoretically. Remarkably, Juergensmeyer never considers the case of Pakistan in his comparative work on religious nationalism. Moreover, he never clearly explicates the curious mixture of modernism and anti-modernism that is the hallmark of religious nationalist movements. Regarding his use of the term "religious nationalism" instead of "religious fundamentalism" as a step forward in addressing this problem, Juergensmeyer writes, "One of the advantages of this term [religious nationalism] is that it allows one to make a distinction between those who are modern and those who are modernists — that is between those who simply accept modem society and those who go further and believe in the secular ideologies which dominate modem cultures [Juergensmeyer 1993, 5]." However, Juergensmeyer never defines the set of attributes of modernism nor the subset of attributes that would distinguish the "modem" from the "modernist". This semantic sleight of hand serves to cover an important theoretical lacuna that has plagued the scholarship on religious fundamentalism/religious nationalism [Oberoi 2004, 98].

David Little, working from his research into nationalism and human rights, comes at the issue from a different angle and provides an interesting conceptual suggestion to help bridge the gap. Little admits two broad categories of nationalism, which he designates as "liberal" and "illiberal." Illiberal nationalism is understood by

Little to constitute a retrograde version of liberal nationalism under which there exists an ethnically discriminatory "preferential political and legal system [Little 1996, 66]." Through his study of Sri Lanka, little suggests that religious nationalism may rather easily degrade into the ethnically discriminatory illiberal nationalism. While I do not accept Little's binary scheme, my framework similarly suggests that nationalism contains within it many potentialities and that specific political uses of religion may trigger the manifestation of an illiberal potentiality.

Based on the research presented in this dissertation, I show that the 'degraded' form of nationalism occurs when the deployment of religious symbols alters the balance of collectivity membership discourses such that the influence of the liberal collectivity-membership discourse is severely undermined. I show that the defining feature of any form of religious nationalism/ religious fundamentalism is the level of the potency of its worldview to undermine the concept of individual sovereignty. Religious nationalism, at its extreme, can espouse a conception of order which ascribes sovereignty solely to the collective entity of the religious community and dictatorial authority to those who can claim to speak in its name. Through my examination of the graded development of religious nationalism toward this extreme, I demonstrate how illiberal nationalism represents a range on the continuum of possible religious-nationalist worldviews.

2.2. Phases of political History of Pakistan

To understand perfectly the evolution of religious nationalism in the politics of Pakistan, I am going to apply the analytical method. To meet this aim, the chapter has focused on elaborating those circumstances which become the reason of a secular modern state to the extreme vision of the Islamic state. I have divided the political history of Pakistan into six phases on the base of religion that was injected by the Pakistani rulers who use Islam as a tool to empower themselves. I am going to

elaborate from 1947 until the current situation. Each phase of Pakistan's political history in this chapter demonstrates how the state power has been exercised to enforce politics that made ways to set up a certain doctrine of Islam and its impact and connection to society. So, Following are the phases as; (1). Indo-Muslim Modernization: Post-Jinnah Era (1947-1958) when all laws and norms were implemented according to Britain's period (2). Islamic Modernism: Era of Islamic Development (1958-1971) (3). Islamism: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Era (1971-1973) (4). Jihadism: Zia-ul-Haq Era (1973-1988) (5). Theocratic Extremism: Talibanization: Benazir Bhutto Era (1988-2001) (6). New Orientation and Struggle against terrorism.

Indo-Muslim Modernization: Post-Jinnah Decade [1947-1958].

Jinnah's speech on August 11th, 1947, four days prior to the official announcement of the foundation of Republic of Pakistan, laid an unambiguous goal of creating a liberal democracy- a self-limiting state of Government who will not have an interfere in religion will be the personal matter of Muslims and Minorities. Jinnah stated;

"You all have freedom; the temples are open to your visit freely; the mosques and all other worship places are welcomed for you to go to Pakistan. You all who belong to every religion, castes or beliefs or sect have freedom and state has no right to interfere in your business" [Jinnah 2000, 8-9].

In a speech on 11th August, Jinnah took the opportunity and expressed the vision of future Pakistan, in which sovereignty rests on people. His whole speech expressed nation-state as an Enlightenment ideal of popular sovereignty. Each member of Pakistan is equal due to a citizen of the state. He said that Non-Muslim is as Pakistani as Muslim equality of citizens as Pakistani demonstrates a Lockean form of liberalism, where the state has no right to dictate on the citizen's relationship with their religion, Jinnah was aware of these Lockean's liberalism and its implications and expressed explicitly in the speech.

In the period of Jinnah's death in 1948, Pakistan faced a lot of internal and external political problems. The newly born state of Pakistan was still ill-equipped to cope with the competing demands of the forces of democracy and Islam. The most difficult political issue which Pakistan faced was to define the destiny of Pakistan after Jinnah. But it was decided to draw the destiny of Pakistan by trapping of both democracy and Islam in documenting the constitution.

Besides, Jinnah used the rhetoric way in constitutional documents. Such as, Objective Resolution (Qarar-dad-e-Pakistan) as a preamble of the constitution, in which MaulanaMududi, who was the leader of Islamic party named "Jamat.e.Ulma.e.Islam" (JUI), said that God is the sovereign power in the universe and it was also stated that "authority has been given to state through its people, in which the country will be ruled by the elected leader through the democratic way [Ahmad 2008, 484]. The democratic principles as articulated under the supervision of Islam would be strictly noticed. The ambiguity in the objective Resolution (first shape of the constitution) regarding how the democratic rules and representative government will work within the supreme authority of God impeded progress both in the path of Islam and the cause of democracy. But the 'constitution 1956' of Pakistan did not change the political situation of Pakistan. Despite, the fact, stated in the constitution [1956], Pakistan was proclaimed to be officially declared as a democratic country followed by the tenant of Islam, neither the democratic principle nor the Islamic spirit was sufficiently reflected in the manner in which the state of Pakistan was governed [Nicholas 2015, Dawn 31st Oct 1954].

In the whole age of Pakistan (from 1947 to till now) the Islamists of all religious parties (i.e. JUI. JI) could hardly satisfy from the state political system. Even they wanted a more rigid constitution referring to the Islamic nature of Pakistani's political framework. Added to this, they started a protest against secularists (most politicians were foreign qualified elites with European lifestyle) and put their four demands to add as the provisions of the constitution, to work out for transformation of Pakistan into an Islamic state [Asim 2018, 97]. Furthermore, Islamists stood for establishing a

worldwide Islamic Caliphate, based on Sharia. At this stage, JUI can be distinct for other Islamists of Jamat-I- Islami (JI) who claimed that Islam is an entire ideology and state should be ruled by them on that bases. However, JUI (a religious group of Islamists) evolved in the clerical form of Islamism, who was given space and authority by every authoritative representative (rulers) of state for their survival in power.

Sectarianism was continuously applied by JUI to further agenda. Islamists rejected the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. They declared that "Non-Muslim cannot be given the liability of making the state policies or dealing with matters vital to its security and integrity [Ibid 2018, 98]." This issue aroused the question for the definition of a Muslim. A committee of Islamic scholars was appointed to define Muslim, but they failed and then it was decided to define that who is known as on-Muslim and finally it was stated in the constitution. But it created a great riot in Pakistan by Islamists from Deoband sect whose religious party was known as 'Jamat-e-Islami (JI) who declared 'Ahmadis' (one sect of Muslims who were declared as non-Muslim) as non-Muslim in 1953. They even authored pamphlet 'Al-Shihab' in which they protested in the whole country that Ahmadis were apostates; therefore they deserve the death penalty [Ibid 2018]. The great violence was brought about by Muslim fanatics against Ahmadi communities. These riots by Islamists against Ahmadis paralyzed the government. The power of Islamists to mobilize the public against Ahmadi could hardly be brushed aside by the secularist leadership. Even the court of inquiry constituted to investigate about Ahmadi crises and stated that;

"Unless one point has been fully proven in this study that, so long as the people are convinced to think what they are called upon to do is right to religion, you may place them on any direction, irrespective of moral and civic behaviour" [Saeed 2016, 101].

The secularists adopted a "get-tough" policy to cool down the riot caused by Islamists. The army was the main beckoned to maintain law and order. So, the fanatic Islamists were arrested and convicted. It is regardable, in this connection that chief of Jammat-i-Islami named 'MaulanaMududi' with many other Islamists experienced the

wrath of the secularists. Thereafter, all those imprisoned Islamists were commuted by the political leadership in Pakistan. The military assisted the government to make the situation cold between state secularists and Islamists, through the temporary imposition of martial law and in doing so, the army got gradual inroad into political areas.

Islamic Modernism: The Decade of Development [1958-1971].

During this chaotic period of the weak and scattered civilian government, Islamic modernists again tried hard to institutionalize the more inchoate vision of Islam and finally passed a moderate Islamic as well as the constitution in 1956 with the Objective Resolution as its preamble. This constitution was again contained a "repugnancy clause" that reflected the most compromise of secular modernist for Islamists consensus. The constitution 1956 called for the legislature to bring all laws "into verification under the rule of Islam and Sharia", and president of state-appointed commission (all major members of Islamic parties i.e. JI and JUI) for advice in this task.

The 1956 constitution still put the secularist in contention with the Islamists and Ulema (Islamic scholars) to enforce their religious ideological world views. In contradiction to the secularist, the Islamists made their demands for verification of laws whether they are repellent to Islam will be decided in the court of sharia by the ultimate presiding role of Islamic clerks. For Islamists, the law-making, and repugnancy of any law will be given licensed through religious authorized people. But, on the other hand, the demands of Islamists for determination of law's repulsion by sharia court ultimately violates the sovereignty of individuals (democracy) as demonstrated in parliament.

The key to true change would be that we ought to recognize, hold tightly to and look for the core meaning to Islam, and pursue fresh ways to adhere to it in the competitive environment" [Ghani 2010,197, see also Ayub 1966, 84].

In 1956, when Pakistan civilian government seemed unable to maintain the country and resolve the threat of secession of East Pakistan (recent 'Bangladesh') and Baluchistan (a sovereign region at that time), Pakistan came into control with armed forces under general Ayub Khan. General Ayub Khan immediately, proceeded with the development of a robust Islamic modernist structure of Pakistan to make satisfy both parties i.e. modernist and Islamists. But his main aim was to put the state "on even keel" [Ghani 2010]. On 7th October 1958, Ayub Khan addressed on Radio and accused that politicians in Pakistan exploited the sacred name of Pakistan for their political benefits. He chalked the new way for Pakistan, as economic development for masses, rather than Islam.

Soon after coming into power Ayub Khan decision (on 10th October 1958) to drop the word "Islamic" from Pakistani's official name [Ghani 2010] Constitution of state was originally formulated by Ayub Khan, referred to Pakistan as the Republic of Pakistan. Such attempts by Ayub Khan provided Pakistan with a secular oriented environment. But, on the other hand, this also created much annoyance among Islamic groups [Ibid 2010].

Furthermore, Ayub Khan proclaimed the second constitution [1962] of Pakistan, where he rejected the demands of Islamists who were forcing laws of repugnant to Islam. Ayub Khan explicitly rebuffed such demands in the 1962 constitution on the base of parliamentarian rules and popular sovereignty [Ghani 2010, Heldman 1972, 66]. But it can be said that Ayub Khan was modernist, his regime instituted several policies to permute Islam with Islamic modernist interpretations. He established a Central Institute of Islamic Research (CIIR). It was the first time when the state made a great struggle to present a strong vision of Islamic modernism by using the Islamic scriptural and legal sources. Central Institute of Islamic Research

was administered under the supervision of Dr Fazlu-Rehman as well as by other Islamists.

The CIIR began to produce new policies on certain matters like bank interest, and family planning, electric slaughtering of animals, and polygamy and divorce laws for family court. When Ayub Khan came into rule, he did not feel any hesitation to acknowledge that his authority "lay ultimately with the power of the sword" [Ghani 2010, Jahan 1972, 61]. Even after lifting of Martial law in 1962, Ayub Khan kept on relies heavily upon the army to the main neutral bond between modernist and Islamists. That's why his regime period is called the Islamic modernism. In addition to having relied upon the military to sustain his rule, Ayub Khan, in dealing with the Islamists (who were continuously criticizing the mixing of modernism with religion) increasingly adopted policies. The aim of Ayub Khan in adopting some Islamic policies was to impinge upon the Islamist's terrain and subverting their claim that Ayub Khan's regime is demonstrated the modern decadence [Ibid]. He delivered main khutbas (religious speeches) which were purely made to impact the Muslim mind at the mass level. In attempting to portray Islam with modernized interpretations, Ayub Khan made Islamic Research Institutions and many other laws about polygamy, family planning, abortion, divorce rights to women and family courts. And, notwithstanding, Ayub Khan's earlier steps were ordered to exclude the word "Islamic" from the official name of Pakistan. But afterwards, for impressing Islamists, he gave name 'Islamabad' to newly constructed capital and the preamble of constitution 1962 recognized Allah's sovereignty over the entire universe [Nasr 2001, 82].

Nevertheless, with all Ayub's bilateral attempt, political opposition kept on mounting. On the religious front, Islamic parties were still unsatisfied from President Ayub khan's "Islamization masquerade" and the religious party "Jamat-e-Islami" supported a female candidate 'Fatima Jinnah who was the sister of 'Quaid-e-Azam, (father of Pakistan) against Ayub's attempts to get the public acceptance in mid-sixties [Ibid, 83].

The situation became more problematic after the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965. Pakistan was defeated in war and the economy got more in crisis which increased the grinding down of public confidence in Ayub Khan's abilities to give them the "fruits of development". Under all these circumstances, the public perceived the promises of economic development made by Ayub Khan, were all façade as Islamists had always portrayed it and called it 'western decadence'. However, the development program by Ayub Khan in Pakistan did not give any benefit to the overflowing masses [Ghani 2010, Jahan 1972, 61]. They even not only failed in realizing the facade brand of modernization by Ayub, but it also became more envenom over the swiftly growing economic inequalities. The opponents of Ayub Khan, all Islamists, got together and in the second half of the sixties, the bandwagon of Anti-Ayub forces kept on demonstrating and even this protest against Ayub became the daily affair in whole Pakistan. Now, this was the lucid indicator that General Ayub Khan's power as ruler had vanished to convince the public to walk with his program for Pakistan's modernization. But in all these realities, it is noticeable that Pakistan's military entered into the political scene and said President Ayub for honourable exit and again they provided the replacement from the military. Thus, the very forces (the military was in favour of Islamists) who were behind Ayub's coming into a rule, in final analyzation, were also liable for his replacement. In this way, the significance of the military- rather than masses or modernists, as the main backbone of Pakistan's political authority becomes established.

Islamism: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Era.

The Bhutto's regime in politics of Pakistan was an indication of somewhat unusual circumstances. In 1971, Pakistan suffered a series of political crises which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan to successfully become the independent state of Bangladesh. The dismemberment of Pakistan created a severe distance in Islamic modernist oriented structure of the state. This defeat in war prevailed frustration among

masses that forced Ayub Khan to resign and elected new Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to preside over the trembling remainder of Pakistan [Toor 2011]. Pakistan was further in challenges due to revolt in Baluchistan as well as ethnolinguistic disruption in Sindh (one of the four provinces of Pakistan).

Bhutto was in confronting from both sides i.e. continuous force for the agenda of Islamists and political state issues. So, Bhutto gave a response to challenge through compromising with agenda of Islamist opposition parties, who were keeping on the mount to the slogan of Bhutto and even declared him unqualified for the presiding authority of the state. Because Bhutto's political party was known as "People's Party" and he emphasized on; that (1) "Islam is our faith"; (2) "Democracy is our polity" (3) "Socialism is our economy" (4) "All power to the people" [Toor 2011, Ramay 1968, 7].

Thus, Bhutto tried to add all three ideas such as socialism, democracy and Islam, in the basic ideology of the People Party (name of Butto's party in politics). But Islamists had always been suspicious of Bhutto's socialism – which they blamed as anti-thesis of Islam [Toor 2011, Ramay 1968, 7]. However, Bhutto's compromises started in earlier time even from his election campaign 1970 to the whole period till 1977. So, in attempting to neutralize the allegation by Islamists, socialism went against the very idea of Islam [Ibid]. Bhutto added Islam (in the first line of the slogan) alongside socialism in people's party Manifesto, to make happy to the Islamists. Even, Bhutto opted political rhetoric by changing the full version of People's party from socialism to 'Islamic socialism' with the slogan of Musawat-i-Muhamadi (equal rights prescribed by Quran and taught by Prophet Muhamad PBUH). Besides, Constitution 1973 is totally an Islamic oriented constitution (unlike 1956 and 1962 Constitution), emphasized as "Islamic doctrines would be the official standard and sovereign of Pakistan and laws which will be against of Islam would not be permitted to enforce in Pakistan. "To be a Muslim" will be the main qualification for the ruler of the state" [Constituion/Preamble 1973].

A Muslim Ideological Committee was also constituted to give recommendations to the government about ways and means according to Islam, for allowing Pakistani Muslims to order their lives personally and publically. The most important on basis of these "Islamic Provisions" in part IX of 1973 constitution [Ibid, 70-72] Bhutto made a bench of scholarship (leader of all main Islamic parties JUI and Jamat-i-Islami) to submit the final draft of the constitution covering all established laws under the Quranic dictations and Sunnah which officially enforced on 14th August 1973. Even, any legislation made by two-fifth of any house of the national or provincial legislatures was instructed to refer these, to the Islamic Council for final legislative process based on Islamisity [Akbar 2014, Burki 1986, 71].

If religious groups and parties accepted Bhutto's Constitution, it now means they accepted his leadership. The Jamat.i.Islami and other politically active Islamic groups objected to the modern lifestyle of Bhutto which was in their opinion, was against the qualification of the president, according to the new constitution 1973. Fundamentalist Islamists claim to disqualify Bhutto due to his western style of life, the taste of alcohol, a public statement in favour of socialism and other such imperfections.

Bhutto tried to boost his image due to mounting blames regarding his un-Islamic lifestyle. But Bhutto's compromises did not mollify the Islamist oppositions, even they invigorate more to force for the full enforcement of Islamist system in the whole country, known as "Nizam-i-Mustafa" (The system of Muhammad PBUH). Bhutto made additional concessions to the Islamists about dealing with the demands for the creation of an Islamic state just for staying more in power [Akbar 2014, Burki 1986, 71].

The first important step that Bhutto took for making the Islamists happy was the decision to declare Ahmadis (an Islamic sect) as Non-Muslim in 1974, through a constitutional amendment [Toor 2011]. The anti-Ahmadi amendment was the most powerful symbol of Bhutto's regime shift toward an Islamic counter structure. The constitutional amendment was severely compromised by liberal and modernist due to

Islamist's pressure. Similarly, in spring 1976, the long-lasting struggle of Islamic groups to maintain a monopoly over religious issues was undermined by Bhutto's decision to invite the Imam of Macca and Madina (sacred places of Islam for pilgrimage) to Pakistan. Bhutto also arranged international conferences about the Prophet's life, with governmental funding and placed the copies of Quran in all first-class hotels. Measures, as initiated by Bhutto, for introducing more aspects of an Islamic structure, were banning of alcohol, gambling and night clubs and Islamic studies were instructed to be compulsory for school and college and Friday (Friday is considered the day for prayer to God in Islam) was declared as a holiday rather than Sunday in Pakistan [Constitution 1973 /Art-62].

Most significantly, Bhutto promised that all laws would be complemented according to Islam within six months and all Islamists of religious parties would be authoritative scholars to finalize these laws. But after two months, in 1977, after Bhutto announced these measures, his power was deposed by a military coup under General Zia-ul-Haq [Akbar 2014, Burki 1986, 67-71].

Jihadism: Zia-ul-Haq Era [1973-1988]

"I was obliged to step in to fill in a vacuum created by the political
leaders. I have accepted this challenge as a true leader of Islam"
[Aqil 2014, Rizvi 1991, 48-52].

General Zia-ul-Haq came into power of Pakistan and imposed the third martial law with this excuse that country need order for a new peaceful election in the coming months. He tried to justify his military rule by portraying his image publicly as "Messiah". With his piety, Zia-ul-Haq gave surety to the Islamists with PNA (Pakistan Nation Alliance consisting of nine political and mainly religious parties) that he would try his best to the implementation of the Nizam-i-Mustafa. But PNA and including Zia-

ul-Haq have a threat of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the ex-president) of being restored their power. So, on 3rd September 1977, Zia-ul-Haq with support of Islamists arrested Ali Bhutto with murder's charges and had sentenced him to the death penalty [Aqil 2014].

Zia-ul-Haq did all that Islamists had been demanding from all state authorities. Four days later of the Zia-ul-Haq regime, Nizam-e-Islam (System of Islam) was announced and invited the religious parties especially Jamat-i-Islamiti be the junior partner in the government. Government with the support of Islamists promptly enforced 'Hudood Ordinance', qualification of witness and punishments in the light of Quran and Sunnah and established government collection of revenue in form of Zakat (alms) and Ushr (land tax on agriculture).

Zia-ul-Haq inaugurated interest-free banking and promised to make more in with the next three years of his regime. He promulgated a new Qanun-i-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) to symbolize the Islamic law in Pakistan, based on Shariah and testimony of a woman was considered as half of man and in Hudood cases (theft, rape, robbery, drinking) women were unqualified for testimony [Aqil 2014, Haider 1991, 92].

Federal ShariatCourt (FSC) was established which was given the authority to make a declaration about any law repellent to "Quran (holy book of Islam) and Sunnah" (deed of Prophet). Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Appellate Bench were given their supreme authority whose judges were Ulema (religious scholars).

In April 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ex-ruler of Pakistan) was executed by the Zia regime and on the force of Islamists (especially Jamat-i-Islamic). In September 1979, "the true soldier of Islam" (Zia-ul-Haq gave this title to himself in first address after being president of Pakistan) cancelled national election with the promise of the promulgation of Nizam-i-Islam (Islamic system). Using the implementation of Islamic system as the basis of his being in power, Zia-ul-Haq carried forward further steps of Islamization. A lot of educational reforms were enacted with perhaps of Islamist, like Arabic language and Islamic studies were included as a compulsory subject to bachelor level. Veil (Parda in Islam term) for women was permitted and extra marks were given for learning Quran. The government appointed a Shariah faculty at

universities (Quaid-I- Azam University) and then Islamic International University in Islamabad was established that consolidated education in Law and economic with the focus of Shari'ah to make Islamic system [Aqil 2014, Ahmad 1991, 62].

As the dictatorship (Zia-ul-Haq) began to suffer due to opposition about martial law, Zia-ul-Haq struggled hard to get more support from Islamists.

Zia-ul-Haq recognized officially madrasa certificates (A snad) as the equivalent of university education. Islamic scholars (Ulema) were appointed on bureaucratic and zakat administrative (revenue) positions. Even, Zia-ul-Haq regime designated an Amir (religious scholar) and his advisory council, the traditional model of Islamic law and political system, instituted a Federal Council "Majlis-i-Shura" and appointed Islamic scholars (Ulema) on this advisory board [Ibid].

The Islamic system of state promulgate by Zia-ul-Haq was the reflection proposed by Jamat-i-Islam and another Islamic group. Maududi himself had great trust in policies of Zia-ul-Haq and even he announced in October 1978 that there is no need of making Islamic activities outside the recent political system, to establish an Islamic state [Ghani 2012, Dawn. Jan 15th 1992]. In spring 1978, the Zia-Ul-Haq regime established Shariat Appellate Benches as equaling to four high courts in the forecasting of Islamization of sate's legal system and Ulema were the cabinet leaders of this Bench.

In a highly symbolic gesture to corroborate that Pakistan state's law and government were being into conformity with Shari'ah, Zia-ul-Haq with whole approval of Islamists enforced Hudood Ordinances (concerned with Zina, Qazf, prohibition and theft) on February 10th, 1979 [Hassan 2003, Dawn April 25th 1992]. Following traditional Islamic Jurisprudence, the ordinance established Hadd crimes (those are defined in Quran and Sunnah) and tazir crimes (non-Hadd) with punishment and evidentiary requirements approved by the legislative authority of Ulemas (Islamist). And further, Jamat-i-Islam (religious political party) directly involved in state power through implementing its demands and programs, especially close to the military. The JUI established the modern structure of its Islamic political party, as

executive officers, regional and city administrations, student and youth councils and organization under an individual authority, newspaper and magazines about Islamic teachings on a daily and weekly basis.

Along with these institutionalizations, Islamists (especially JUI: Jamat-i-Islami) started to create a clerical ideology on state-level through their pronouncement of public policy that encircles the series of public policies from the domestic economy to foreign relations. The foundation of JUI's main structure was its mosque and madrasa system that was able to operate at a far-reaching and sophisticated level, as a network of party organization. Still, this system of religious politics (in madrasa form: Al-Huda International, Minhaj-ul-Quran and hundreds of others) is deep-rooted in Pakistan. Even in elections, religious parties (JUI, JI) succeeded in the provincial assembly in NWFP, where the first Islamic system of Pakistan was enforced by Islamic political official leaders [Hassan 2003, Dawn April 25th 1992].

In 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan and Pakistan seemed itself in a perilous strategic threat environment. Pakistan faced enemy forces of Allies from both borders from east and west because India was the Allies of the Soviet Union and rival of Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq was the ruler of Pakistan at that time, who mobilized support for Jihadist guerilla movement (soldiers were got ready on the name of Islam named as Jihadist), with the cooperation of Saudi Arabia and the United States, to eject the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Zia-ul-Haq's response to the Afghan crises initiated the existence of the Jihadist counter structure in Pakistan [Hassan 2003].

Jihad was considered by Islamists of religious parties (JUI and JI) as the base of their Islamic program and they took part in it with full energy to make it the means to establish the actual Islamic order. The Jamat-i-Islami (JI) and Jamat-i-Ulma-e-Islam (JUI) were at the forefront for the establishment of jihadist counter-structure in Pakistan. When the Islamic clerics of JUI suppressed Jamat-i-Islami, the counter structure took the form of theocratic Jihadism. The Jihadist movement in Pakistan was the result of of the choices of the regime in power i.e. with the consent of Zia-ul-Haq and army support [Hassan 2003, Dawn Oct 10th 1988]. In this case, it was

predominantly Zia-ul-Haq's response to the presence of Soviet troops forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan army decided to establish a client regime in the neighbourhood i.e. Afghanistan. Jihadism consolidated as a new face of Islamization in which Jihad represented the source of Islamist transformation.

In the whole early 1980s, Zia-ul-Haq (as General of Pakistan Army) used Islamists especially Jamat-i-Islami to mobilize Pakistan public remarks regarding Afghan regime policy, demonstrating it as a jihad (one pillar of faith in Islam) against aggression. The Islamists (Ulemas) trained and also facilitated the Afghan resistance fighters, the Mujahidin. Jamat-i-Islami (UI) sustained connection with Afghan mujahidin organizations that were supported directly by the Zia-ul-Haq regime with the backbone power of the military [Rashid 2003, Aqil 2014].

The Hizb-i-Islami was the most favoured mujahidin organization, by the Zia-ul-Haq regime and recipients of the high level of Pakistani support. The Jamat-i-Islami had incredibly close relations with the Hiz-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hikmat Yar. Hizb-i-Islami was established purely according to the ideas of Jamat-i-Ulema-Islam. However, important episode regarding this play was the development of a deeper relationship of Jamat-i-Islami with Pakistan Army and security Services by supporting operations in the Afghan War. Even till now, it is maintained on the same level. The younger of religious parties had already become radicalized through the organization's relation in paramilitary operations to resist Bangladesh secessionism in East Pakistan.

Most of the members of the Jamat-i-Islami, especially of its youth wing, participated in Soviet War alongside Afghan as mujahidin and developed their military and organizational ties and expertise [Rashid 2003, Aqil 2014]. As Afghanistan's resistance against Soviet became a cause to celebrate within the Muslim world, the Pakistani Islamic parties 'Jawab-i-Islami' got impressive pan-Islamic fame due to its close tie with Afghan mujahidin.

The enhanced and high profile Islamists enjoyed within Islamic radical circles in the Muslim World ensured that Jihadism would remain as a pivotal pillar of Islamic

agenda by Islamists in Pakistan. As the Jamat-i-Islami lost its deeper half from Pakistan people, it deepened more on its role in Afghanistan's policy by Zia-ul-Haq as a source of economy, authority, and honour [Rashid 2003, Aqil 2014, Hussain 1988, 137].

After Zia-ul-Haq's death, Jamat-i-Islami kept up its role in Afghan Jihad and Jihadism also continued to maintain its role in the Islamic program in the political structure of Pakistan. The new Islamic leader Qazi Hussain of Jamat-i-Islami in 1987 took up Jihad as the main tenet of the Islamic agenda by Islamic parties and develops further ideology of Jihadism. The Islamist (leader of JUI; QaziHussain) tried to convert the Islamic parties into a mass revolutionary single party through rearticulating of Jihadist ideology. Islamists (Ulema) had amassed commiseration both in Pakistan and the whole Islamic world due to its struggle for supporting Afghanistan as mujahidin [Rashid 2003, Aqil 2014, Hussain 1988, 137].With the exodus of Soviet forces religious parties of Pakistan allied with Hizb-ul-Islami as the strongest Jihad organization and supported its agenda for an Islamic transformation of the region.

On the contrary, after a year of withdrawal of Soviet forces, Jamat-i-Islami established and trained its Jihadist organization known as Hizb-ul Mujahidin to fight for Kashmir against India. During the early post-Zia-ul-Haq period, Jamat-i-Islam remained the most powerful and forcible party for Pakistan's army forces which considered JUI as its best choice for supporting in Afghanistan and Kashmir wars. Islamists changed the Islamic ideology after empowered by its close ties with the Pakistan army, from the Islamic system of law to Jihad as the prominent component of public Muslim identity.

The theocratic jihadist provocations when Zia-ul-Haq granted an indemnity to Shi'a community (one major sect in Pakistan) for the collection and administration of Zakat and Usher (annual tax on rich Muslim to aid poor people). In making the law of Zakat, Pakistan's zakat ordinance reviewed the basic difference between Sunni and Shia on the conception of a legitimate Islamic order. According to Deobandi (a sect

of Islamic originated from Saudi Arabia) perspective, Zia-ul-Haq did a mistake by granting an exemption of Zakat to Shi'a sect and making Pakistan under Hanafi (doctrine according to Shi'a concept) jurisprudence, was not an actual Islamic state. Eventually, the Law of Zakat exemption represented to the state sanctioning of Shi'a denial of the authority of Sahaba. The exemption of Shi'a from zakat became a reason of objection on the order of Pakistan Zakat ordinance and ultimately sectarian violence started in the form of theocratic Jihadists [Aqil 2014, 137 Dawn 7th Oct 1988].

In1983, the Shi'a community gave their support to Pakistan People's Party (PPP; the political party of ex-president 'Zulfiqar Bhutto) against Zia-ul-Haq government. President Zia-ul-Haq patronized religious parties (JUI and JI) and its madrasa system, to create an institutional counterweight to his internal opposition. Jamat-i-Islami was back supported by regime, which deepened the ties both between the Deobandi sectarian movement (against regime and Shi'a sect) in Pakistan and Afghan Jihad.

At the outburst of Afghan Jihadist resistance to Soviet war, Maulana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, (educated in Darul Ulema Haqania; the strongest Jihadist organization) an Afghan belonged to Pashto tribe, organized a Mujahidin group known as "Harkat-i-Inkalab-e-Islami (the Movement of the Islamic Revolution), initially constituted with joining of Afghan Pashtun Deobandi Ulema and madrasa students. This followed jihadist organization was also supported a little by Zia-ul-Haq. Zia-ul-Haq used JUI's Islamists for supporting Afghan mujahidin against Soviet troops. But JUI (religious party) was not given an official and formal role to play between Pakistan and Afghanistan [Rashid 2003, Aqil 2014, Dawn 7th Oct 1985].

In the first five years of the Afghan war and while supporting it through jihad movement, Islamists (JUI) enlarged its madrasa system with the establishment of hundreds of feeder madrasas in two provinces of Pakistan (NWFP and Balochistan). All these madrasas were fielded in the 1980s with skilled Deoband Ulema from its own Jihadist organization in Afghanistan.

In 1985, it was officially approved by the Supreme Court of justice 'Sami-ul-Haq' that the government stood for the enforcement of an actual Islamic system. He declared that the enforcement of the Islamic order of Khilafat-i-Rashidah would need the Islamists to take it into account its vision through a practical way i.e. campaign of jihad throughout the state [Ibid]. In September 1985, the first formal modern militant organization was registered and established by Deoband doctrine of Islamic governmental system, called 'Khilafat-i-Rashidin (Caliphate of the Rightly Guided). The name of this militant organization was known as 'Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan' i.e. SSP (Army of the sahaba; sahaba is known as the companion of Holy Prophet PBUH). The title of the monthly journal of the organization was "Khilafat-i-Rashidah". Islamists from all organizations i-e SSP, JUI, JI and Deoband Jihadist organizations in Afghanistan and Kashmir all considered themselves as mujahidin of one Jihad for the implementation of the Khilafat-i-Rahidin i.e. governance of rightly guided.

Theocratic Extremism: Talibanization [1988- 9/11/2001].

In November (1988) elections in Pakistan, Banazir Bhutto (daughter of ruler Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) elected and showed a noticeable shift from the previous pattern of male dominance in the politics of the state. Electoral wining of a women 'Benazir Bhutto' created complications in the relation among three parties: Islamists, military and the secular oriented civilian government in Pakistan [Batool 2007, Nasr 1994, 209]. It also reduced the prospects for mutual dialogue and possible cooperation, based on mutual regard among these following parties.

The first opposition's objection to the new leadership of Benazir Bhutto was the Islamic fatwa as a woman leader. According to the doctrinaire level, Islam nominates men as in charge of women and Islamists constantly maintained objection that women could not be the leader of the Islamic state [Batool 2007, Munir Report 1954, 285].

Islamists were objecting Benazir's leadership intensively due to her 'socialist in doctrine' (as received from her father named Zulfiqar Bhutto) western education plus lifestyle. That's why; it seemed hard that Benazir will receive the endorsement of Islamists.

But Benazir Bhutto changed herself in quantifying with religion-political realities surrounding her. Benazir Bhutto got married toa tribal man, bearing of children and adoption of "dupatta" (head cover), was all indications of her surrender before Islamists and her awareness of the need to reorient her public image for political advantage in a primarily conservative, closed climate. The same effort of Benazir, to mollify the Islamists, was also the political game of her father during his regime in Pakistan. But Benazir Bhutto could not please the Islamists and military at the same time. So, she was blamed with many weak strategies of government and was dismissed by Islamists with indirect power of the Army [Batool 2007, GPO 1954, 285].

In 1994, theocratic Jihadism of Islamists (JUI, JI) became the main backbone on political public, religious and defence level, due to the strategy of Banazir Bhutto during the second term of Prime Minister. Benazir Bhutto decides not to repeat those mistakes which have become the reason for termination of her termination. She gained her independent power base on Afghan Jihad by feeding Jamat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI) and constituting a paramilitary force of madrasa students of Deoband sect, called "Taliban". Benazir Bhutto empowered Deoband (sect) forces of theocratic Jihadism in the competition of jihadist organization of JUI supported by the military. But this competition of military and civil rule caused the reason for sectarian violence within Pakistan.

The Taliban swiftly took control of twelve provinces out of thirty-one in Afghanistan and promptly enforced the theocratic Jihadist sovereignty. As it can be observed that the Taliban facilitated the main legal Jihadist organization (Sipa Sahaba Pakistan i.e. SSP) for their jihadist struggle of sectarian violence within Pakistan and other Islamists (JUI) were supplying Mujahid groups fighting in Kashmir [ICG Asia Report 36, 2002, Ziring 2008,51]. The sectarian war prevailed in many areas of

Pakistan as well as Afghanistan assisted by Taliban and SSP Jihadist training camps across the border in Afghanistan. Now it became difficult to settle down the sectarian violence in the whole country by military and Benazir who both were the actual reason for all this fire. When Benazir tried to pull up the rising power of Deoband theocratic jihadist organization (Taliban were the creation of Benazir) in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan. She was removed the second time from her seat in 1996.

New Orientation and Struggle against terrorism.

In 1996, the election of Nawaz Sharif was fixed as Prime Minister after two months of removal of Benazir Bhutto. During the same days of newly elected Prime minister, the Taliban occupied the major city "Mazar-i-Sharif" of Afghanistan. Ruling government (Nawaz Sharif) promptly negotiated and finally vested legal authority to the Taliban as the licit government of Afghanistan [Asia Report 2002, Ziring 2008, 51]. Pakistani government (civilian prime minister under the military support) granted the same authority to theocratic jihadist of all sect (JUI, SSP and JI) after proving legal diplomatic acclamation to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. All Jihadist organizations and Taliban training centres (madrasas) were in the control of the military on eastern and western borders due to political and geostrategic interest in securing Pakistan's hegemony over Afghanistan.

Pakistan Army played a dual game to survive and secure the image of Pakistan on the international level because Pakistan was being blamed as a terrorist country after the tragedy of 9/11. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, 2001, army dictator of Pakistan 'General Pervez Musharraf' stood beside the United States and took the opportunity of circumstances. By December 2001, the Taliban regime was removed in Afghanistan with the military operation. It was a high time when Pakistan had been given the chance to develop a new orientation as anti-terrorist state [Aqil 2014, Tohid 1997, 66].

Even by December 2001, the Taliban regime was removed from power in Afghanistan. It was a high time when Pakistan had been given the chance to develop the new orientation.

The tragic event was an irresistible chance for President Pervez Musharraf to bring an end to Pakistan's diplomatic isolation and to restore its connection with the USA that it had been under though a coup two years previously seized power. In exchange for the heavy aid package and the termination of the financial sanctions, after Pakistan initiated of a nuclear test in 1998, he provided intelligence and organizational assistance for U.S. operations in Afghanistan [Raghave 2019, 2]. President Bush lauded Pervaiz Musharraf for denouncing the tragedy of 9/11 attack and the 'still more bravery, vision and purpose' he'd displayed since that day, at the November press conference jointly held and the dictator Pakistani was called the "brave head of state" of a "forte ally".

Going through the political history of Pakistan, it can be concluded that religious parties and Islamists contributed to the emergence of a new structure of politics. Currently, several religious parties are involved in the politics of Pakistan and even secular, foreign qualified politicians also divert themselves on the track of Islam to get power in government. Because it is clear to every new politician from seventy years of the political history of Pakistan that it is not possible to sustain and empower politically without appeasing Islamists [Nancy 2003, 23-53].The political organisation of Deband (with hundreds of Madrasas, Islamic Jihad centre and preaching centres), Jamat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamat-i-Islam (JI) self-promulgated Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution. Other three religious parties of different sects 'Shia' Brelwis and Ahl-e-Hadith promulgated their political alliance called "MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal (MMA) and surprisingly, it won the election of 2002 and hold power in North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP).

The religious game for politics still frequently activates on the slogan 'Islam in danger'. The first and main reason for Islam and Islamists being a part of politics until today is "Ideology of Pakistan" (known as Nazriya-e-Pakistan) and this ideology was

the base of existence of Pakistan on the name of Islam [Nancy 2003, 23-53, MalteGaier 2010]. When any amendment is done in state policies by making the state as a modern way, Islamists get active and raise a protest against state rulers and legislatures with back support of the military. Therefore, in seventy years of Pakistani history, there is no civilian leader who had completed his tenure (only Military dictators as Islamists). Every leader was blamed for anti-Islamic personality or secular state policies. Even Prime Minister 'Mian Nawaz Sharif' participated in Hindu festival "Dewali" in 2007 and he was blamed of blasphemy and protests were raised for his disqualification as a leader [Ibid. So, Islamists are still active as religiopolitical leaders in state policies of Pakistan and injecting Islam with an extreme impact on laws, society and indirectly affects the everyday life of civilians and government structure.

As Demerath and William noted, "The secular and modern leaders who rule the state, use religion as a tool to make their power strong but try to keep themselves away from religion" [Ibid]. This political strategy of democratic rulers, military dictators and politicians to hold Islam at bay in every regime of Pakistan in its seventy years of history. Every policymaker and politician brings their agenda with all focus on Islam, to be successful in power because they know that Islamists in the judiciary and military are the real backbone to control the state. Religio-political parties, especially Jamat-i-Ulema-Islam (JUI) and Jamat-i-Islami (JI), have been involved in state politics throughout the time of Pakistan's existence. They always had to claim that they are the sole pure and pious server of Islam and Pakistan. But they disserved to both, Islam and Pakistan. Islamists diverted the attention of people from actual issues concerned with social, economic and political development [Amir 2008, 45-64].

Even religio-political attitude of elites in power is another major aspect of the phenomenon. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime declared Ahmadis as non-Muslim. The legal public announcement created social repression and disturbance in the whole society of Pakistan. Still, today, Ahmadis are suffering the same circumstances and cannot live a free life as even a minority (as non-Muslim). Islamization injected by religiopolitical parties through the direct legal support of Zia-ul-Haq aroused the

sectarian tendencies throughout the state [Amir 2008, 45-64, Nancy 2004, 52]. The sectarianism became a serious problem for the state until today. Even, the government has to give security to holy places and festivals of one sect against others. Like, Deoband sect call 'Shia sect' as non-Muslim and bombed their holy places (Imam Bargah) and many shrines of the Sunni sect were also bombed with hundreds of people by other sects. So, every year thousands of people are killed due to sectarianism created by Islamists and ruling elites.

Now-a- days T.V channels (Madni, Peace, QTV, Hadi, Haq, Labaik, Paigam, Takbeer, Ahlebait) are all playing a role in the Deeping of the sectarianism problems. Through their sermons, on TV channels, in the mosque on Friday Khutba, religious scholars (Ulema) declared many religious doctrines as "infidels" and provoke the public for their massacres. That prejudice is being prevailed by them, not only through sermons but also through the newspaper and weekly magazines by a religious organization will governmental certified permission [Ibid].

In the last decade, four thousand innocent people have died in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Mosque, shrines, procession, Eid gathering, and other religious crowd have been bombed by suicide bombers from different Islamic sects. On December 28, 2009, in Karachi, the largest congregation of Ashura (day of Shia sect) was targeted by bomber and hundreds of people were killed. This type of explosions has been exploded in series on every religious gathering every year till the recent years [Ibid]. From the last five years, suicide bombing and terrorism have extended the hit areas from sacred places and religious gatherings to school, universities hospitals and markets. This series of bombing in the last few years have created permanent terror in people.

2.3. Politics through the Lens of Pakistani People

The actual image of Pakistan can be drawn from the whole above discussion through the evolutionary stages of how Pakistan changed its identity from simply being a democratic Islamic state to a theocratic definition of Islam. The researcher has conducted interviews of Pakistani citizens to reveal the impact of Islam on the political thoughts of Pakistani people.

There are some main questions which have been inquired by the researcher to measure the Islamic injection in politics by Islamists. The questions which were asked as; the opinion about political system either it should be democratic and modern or according to Sharia, the state government should be ruled by modernists or Islamists, opinion and reason for banning alcohol, who is responsible for terrorism, the intensity of sectarianism, remarks about enforcement of sharia by Taliban as well as the status of Taliban and Osama Bin Ladin and lastly, whose political regime was better in past and why?

The intensity of sectarianism conducted by researcher is that three out of every ten informants said that their sect is the pure form of Islam and other respondents believe that all sects are equal in Islam and deserve to be regarded. So, most of the people have not the instinct of sectarianism.

When it was asked about the suicide bombing and terrorism, five respondents (they had a background of religious education from madrasas) supported terrorism and called it as 'Jihad' to impose religious norms in society. Twenty percent respondents have a belief that the Taliban did great to enforce Sharia (Taliban forcefully tried to enforce Sharia by compelling women for the full veil, no female education etc. in 2010). Respondents justified their opinion by saying that the Taliban are struggling hard to glorify the religion of 'Islam'. However, each out of ten informants [most of them belong to the province of NWFP where Madrasa system is supported by Saudi Arabia's funding and people have a more rigid interpretation of religion and culture] favoured the attacks of extremists (Taliban) on cinema, saloon for girls, videos/CD magazines and girl's educational institutions. They explained their opinions that these all attack are justifying to (1) Root out the anti-Islamic culture

(2) Create fears in anti-Islamic people (3) Attract the people to Islam (4) Force the state powers to enforce the Islamic laws against anti-Islamic forces.

Although it was surprising on asking about the political party which is better in their opinion, five out of ten responded that any party is supportable either the leader is modern or religious who can run the state in smooth as well as Islamic way. It is clear now that Pakistani people have come to know that all religious parties are the puppet of military and have no strong vision to run state rationally and society cannot be developed in only with religious dimension [Riaz 2008, 17]. On asking about the steps taken by the government in the 1970s when alcohol and clubs were banned, science subjects were connected with Quranic verses, and beards for man and veil for women were declared compulsory, eight out of ten respondents supported Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq's regime for these steps and justified that these enforced steps were the actual base of the state of Pakistan because it had been achieved as the laboratory of Islam. However, on the question about banning alcohol in present, eight out of ten informants reported that it should be strictly banned and punished and other twenty per cent said that it should be a personal matter of everyone.

On asking about the recent political situation of Pakistan and state involvement in taking steps to make the society Islamize, seven out of ten (70%) respondents replied in affirmative that it is a state responsibility to focus on enforcement of Islamic laws and regulations and confront against anti-Islamic propagandas. However, three out of ten (30%) informants suggested that Pakistan is already an Islamic state with a lot of extremist steps in past and it is enough to make it Islamize, now it is a time to focus on making the society better in technology and science and somehow modernize to compete for the other world.

When the people were asked to name one of Pakistan's former leaders, they assume the country's greatest responsibility for religious extremism and terrorism, every fourth person gave this responsibility to General Pervaiz Musharaf and the second most nominated name was General Zia-ul-Haq (both were Chief of army staff who used Talibanisation as 'Jihad' for various national and international political

agendas). But, fifty percent people said that Osama Bin Ladhin is Mujahid (Fighter of Islam) not a terrorist and deserve to be regarded, even recently the Prime Minister of Pakistan "Imran Khan" sympathetic toward Taliban and called Osama Bin Ladhin as 'martyr' [BBC News 26th June 2020].

More than 60 per cent informants believe that religious scholars or the religion should involve in state politics as Islamists already served Pakistani more than military or intellectuals. They (especially educated informants) gave the reference of Quran [surat 18, 64] and Philosophical poet 'Allama Iqbal'[Iqbal, Bal-e-Jibril; 37] that politics cannot be run without the direction of religion and politics is only a monarch in absence of religion. That's why most of the informants had reported affirmative that Shariah Law should be enforced in Pakistan but not in the way of Taliban (informants gave a reason that Shariah attempted to enforce by Taliban is not according to the doctrines of Islam).

It can be sum up with a comment that the impact of Islam as an injection in society on political aspect and level of support for religion within politics by Pakistani people is high particularly in rural areas. They have absolute affirmative views for governance through Sharia and support for laws regarding blasphemy and against Ahmadi sect (Ahmadis were declared as non-Mulsim in Constitution 1973). However, the resistance is noticeably lower in urban areas but among the educated people. The informants who support terrorism or jihadism and Osama Bin Ladhin and Sharia Law mostly belonged to Pashtun areas (Province NWFP). The cause for their support can be an education system of Madrasas which was the root of breeding Taliban. Even people with higher education have the same response as illiterate people in these areas.

In this Chapter, I have demonstrated that the employment of the concepts religious nationalism and religious fundamentalism as well as the analysis of the country's politics lets one grasp the relationship between faith and state and state establishment's instrumentalization of Islam to gain power and eradicate conflicts. However, the co-optation of religion to unite political powers became a parliamentary and military policy as a tool for justification of government policies. Ultimately, this

historical study also allows one to see in the reconstitution of Pakistani-Islamist nationalism and to examine how political and social transformation in Pakistani society restructures the relationship within the state as well as Islam as the process of Islamism.

The concern of this chapter has been to explain the evolution of religious nationalism and its influence on the state politics of Pakistan. The primary idea was to get the basis for understanding the interrelated complexities of religion and politics' in a nation-state where the form of the state defines a form of Islam and vice versa. To accomplish these aims, the chapter has focused on elucidating how political conflicts in Pakistan constitute contestations over religious symbols. And Survey was conducted through interviews to measure the level of religiosity in politics and its impact on civilian's thoughts. Specifically, I have sought to explain how the evolution of Pakistan's religious nationalism from Indo-Muslim modernism toward Theocratic Jihadism occurred as a phased realization of a potential inherent in Pakistan's religious nationalism.

For each of the phases of Pakistan's history examined in this chapter, I have demonstrated how state power has been exercised to implement policies that serve to establish a conceptualization of Islam and its impact on society. Since Pakistan is a nation-state whose identity ostensibly is derived from Islam, we have observed how almost every measure taken by the Pakistani state has become emblematic of Islam and has constituted a publicly recognized, religious symbol. Political confrontations have ensued as Pakistan's religious parties have challenged the state policies of various regimes to prevent the establishment of what they considered in each instance to be an objectionable conceptualization of Islam and its relation to society.

I have examined a set of complex interactions among civilian and military ruling elites and the major Islamist opposition organizations, based on which I presented the detailed account of how specific historical circumstances of religious nationalism in Pakistan have generated four competing conceptualizations of Islam

and its impact on the state politics— Indo-Muslim modernism, Islamic modernism, Islamism, and Jihadism.

Important finding which merits specific mention pertains to how Pakistan has, ever so often, in over seven decades of its existence as a sovereign state, presented a perplexing image of a country which was urging forward, standing still and moving backwards - all at the same time. Thus, for example, popularly elected leader Zulfikar Bhutto, once elected, tilted towards authoritarian – type policies - based on coercion and intimidation by Islamists. Similarly, Zia's regime, having assumed power by staging a military coup, subsequently considered it "advisable" to maintain an image of democracy by conducting elections- however contrived and rigged they may have been. Thus, within the pendulum-like oscillation that Pakistan experienced since the attainment of statehood in 1947, the pattern was again quite confused and somewhat unclear.

A policy of appeasing the Islamist sentiments for the sake of gaining political advantage for oneself for one's political party, as has been characteristic of the political leadership in Pakistan, can only be expected to prolong the past pattern of political instability and continuing conflict. This might enhance the "relevance" of the military in the political process. More succinctly put, authoritarianism, and the traditional pattern whereby the military has functioned as the master and not the servant of the people, will, in all probability, continue until Pakistan is not unwilling to forego the icing of Islam on the political cake of Pakistan and go for the very substance which constitutes the cake, and decide on its ingredients.

The peace and prosperity of Pakistan require its leaders to institutionalize a new direction for Pakistan's religious nationalism. As this study has attempted to demonstrate, the evolution of religious nationalism in Pakistan represents the realization of only one potential inherent in Pakistan's religious nationalism. It also suggests some important lessons to be learned. As Pakistanis again search for a common vision of Islam and its impact in their society, they would be well served to remember that Pakistan's ethnolinguistic and sectarian pluralism is the nation's

hidden strength. Should Pakistan develop a Pakistani ethnic-nationalist discourse that incorporates the full range of Indo-Muslim cultural expressions that is the nation's rich heritage and safeguard that pluralism through the enforcement of individual rights, Pakistan will have laid the foundation for genuine political participation. If it does not, Pakistan's identity will remain unresolved and no regime in Pakistan will enjoy genuine legitimacy.

Such a straight-faced and direct approach in dealing with Pakistan's woes will need to take into account, in addition to religion- cultural matters, also concern such as economic development, redistribution of wealth, education, etc., and will be possible only under a political leadership which is willing, if required, to stake its future on functional and utilitarian policies aimed at ensuring Pakistan's potential survival in future as a stable democratic society. More clearly expressed, political harmony and peace in Pakistan can only be attained in a climate which manifests ascertain the degree of consensus on broad issues of political objectives and goals.

3. ISLAMIZATION OF GENDER BELIEFS AND GENDER ROLES IN PAKISTAN

This chapter examines the Islamic interpretation of gender and gender-based practices in the culture of Pakistan. This and the next chapter are written based on qualitative research (survey, interviews). I also used Quranic sources and kept in mind that the Islamic interpretation of gender, especially the ideas about women, is considered repressive in another modern world. Previous research was conducted on the legacy of the exploitation of females. The need to achieve gender equality policies at the national level were emphasized [Baruah 2004]. Women in Pakistan face the number of restrictions imposed on them as a result of the conflict between tribal customs, religious interpretations and the remnants of the feudal system. Women differ in term of their socioeconomic status: 'highly-educated females in Pakistan who work at a higher level with high wages, in comparison to the majority of illiterate women, unemployed [and] or facing exploitation as low pay workers. Gender equality has not been distributed evenly. At the same time, there are different religious doctrines, social set up, tribal culture, languages and ethnicities. Gender equality in Pakistan is thus understood differently. Add to this the rural-urban divide. There are many poor women in the villages since Pakistan is an agricultural society while educated females belong to main cities like Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad have opportunities to avail high professional jobs. Yet they, too, suffer from stereotypes based on gender. Islam considers woman as a subordinate of man. Such views result in overexploitation of women. Gender inequality and gender segregation remain still little known by both male and female.

3.1. Gender Issues in Political Evolution and Social Life

In Chapter One, I described the political evolution of the country but omitted the specific episodes of it which are particularly relevant for the main focus of this chapter – the gender relationships in my country. Importantly, when General Zia al-Haq came in rule in 1977, not only this put a halt to the processes of modernization initiated by Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but he launched a process of Islamization involved discriminatory legislation against the rights of Pakistani Mulsim women. This led to the creation of strict state power over the lives of Pakistani women. This included their public appearance, their behaviour, their job choices and their morality. Islamic morality was put in the centre of the nationalistic discourses and the crusades for Islamic morality were often organized around such issues as women's dress and women's moral conduct. If earlier all fundamental rights, including gender equality, were guaranteed by the Constitution, Zia ignored them and he introduced the 1979 Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance involving the offences of Zina, that might be stated as fornication and adultery and zinabil-jabr that is viewed as assault and rape [Yilmaz 2014, 182]. Non-marital sex, as a result, was proclaimed illegal. Also, the Law of Evidence was introduced which, again, had a particularly detrimental impact on women. The legislation eliminates women's testimonies while the punishment for illegal sex depends, first, on the evidence and facts of the prosecution rest on the criminal's marital status. Of course, progressive forces in the country tried to demonstrate the contrast between progressive and conservative Islam and to emphasize the blow Islamization caused to human rights-based perspective but these attempts prove unsuccessful.

The other important episode in Pakistan's political history that I want briefly to remind readers about is the career and the end of Benazir Bhutto who is 1988, the first woman as a prime minister and the very first female to represent an Islamic state. While showing solidarity with women and giving speeches about their health,

education and discrimination, she could not effectively protect woman rights. At the time of her assassination in 2007, she was preparing to become a prime minister for a third term. The assassination caused turmoil in the country when many of her supporters took to the streets. Part of the reason why Benazir Bhutto's good intentions concerning women's conditions were that she could win little support by promoting gender equality. Nawar Sharif gained power as a Prime Minister and in 1997 and he continued with introducing the laws which were hostile towards women, namely the ordinance of Qisas and Diyat that had been proceeded with the shariah-based reforms in criminal law of Pakistan. [Kassam 2010].

The state of Pakistan launched the production of conservative discourses which put limits on the chances of women to work. For instance, state governer's and opposition's debates, government legislative statements, constitutional and legal frameworks as well as educational or judicial institutions, although connected with the international and global institutions, were promoting the patriarchal ideas according to which a good woman is the one that stays home and takes care of her family without risking to dishonour her family by doing something wrong in public or workspaces.

Seguino and Lovinsky [2009] analyzed with data collected through the World Values Survey of many countries (including Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, United States, and many others). Their research was focused on religiosity and gender attitude; it has been come to know that religiosity is incontestability corresponded with a patriarchal mindset. Withal, all these findings are admissible, but other background factors of respondents must also be taken into regard before concluding. For instance, in case of support of uneven wages among men and women, the impact being a male was comparatively as higher as religiosity [Seguino and Lovinsky 2009]. This research study accentuates that despite these level religiosities, people who have higher degrees of education and functional economic status, are more flexible in showing a better attitude about the equality of Gender. Both scholars did not find out any specific religion which is most hostile toward gender equity. This

study denotes that " most prevailing religious and not exclusively Islam which is expected to have a stereotypical image- have different influences on gentle attitudes and aftermath, equally negative and positive [Seguino & Lovinsky 2009,49].

Gender is indeed one of the key factors of culture in Pakistan. Patriarchal values implanted in culture and traditions, ascertain a social status of gender. Filomena M. Critelli [2010] has presented the multifaceted study regarding gender issues in Pakistani society. She explored through her analysis about gender politics in Pakistan, as it is usually formulated in the Islamic context, depicting women's suppression supposed to be based solely on religion. This approach has ignored the complex role of other state institutions. She said that not only the religion or other institution, but historical, cultural, political, and geographical factors also directly impact on gender relations. Speaking of the value or position of women in a certain society both culturally and religiously, she says, "Pakistani society is a joined oriented family system rather than a nuclear one. Typically, this familial orientation is interpreted according to the men's interest and gives the patriarchal nature to society". She, further, continues with stress on 'honour' (called Izzat in Urdu) that has additional cultural importance. The individual is considered as the representative of the family. There is more pressure on females to maintain family honour with their harmonious and minimize actions. Behaviours that oppose tradition and cultural values, as to take a stand in choosing a life partner, resist parents against their decision, try to seek a divorce, or complain about sexual harassment or as assault even to one's own family are considered as weakening the power and honour of family which is usually the cause of gender violence.

Robena Zakar [2013] describes the belief and attitude of men towards their intimate partners. Her piece of research has revealed some different factors when a man thinks and behaves inferior or does violence against women. She justifies her statement through findings of the study as man has a belief that woman deserves snub (Sarzansh in Urdu i.e. rigorous warning) if she avoids of sex or has a negligence behaviour for the care of family or she is sexually disloyal. Men consider it their legal

and religious right to dictate and control their better halves in reproductive matters and sexuality. Benson [1985] elaborates it further that people who manage their wives sexually and socially and specify their duties and limits, they always keep trying to clarify their conduct by applying some rational reasons. For instance, men who commit violence and treat their women as subordinates always try to defend themselves through religion, Patriarchal Interpretations, and other traditional stereotypes. But many researchers revealed that these type of attitude and thoughts of men about women in the context of gender interpretation cannot be measured as fixed, as they vary man to man due to their socioeconomic, racial, geographical, ethnic, religious and educational level as well as the social status of women.

However, a comprehensive and systematic study still has not been conducted on the attitude of a man about women as well as the religious and cultural interpretation of gender and its issues. For instance, hardly there is any research that has a specific aim to understand the men's interpretation of gender and his attitude of violence in Pakistan. Lack of research in this area can be seen from this fact as only two pieces of research have been conducted on men's belief and attitude toward women in Pakistan.

Fikree [2005] explored that fifty percent of respondents in his research has a strong belief as "husband has a right to hit or humiliate his wife". He further reports that the public has a high tolerance attitude toward inequality in gender or intimacy partner violence, particularly, abusive language and vulgar wording as abuses and humiliation toward wife was perceived as the privilege of the "Annoyed Husband". When we mention the attitude and thinking of men toward women and perception about gender, we just need to go back to the roots of reason. So, Ali &Gavini [2008] has revealed some origins of male supremacy. They explain that men's dominant attitude and supremacy can be traced back to social background, a feudal-dominated system of economy based on agriculture in the whole country. So, based on these roots and reasons, Pakistan is highly patriarchal, like many other developing countries. Consequently, it promotes the unequal relationship in marriage.

If we talk about the rights and duties on the base of gender, there is an imbalance in specifying in the context of both males and females. Sadaf Naz [2017] discussed in her piece of research named "Perception of women academics regarding work-life balance: Case of Pakistan" that working ladies in traditional societies i.e. Pakistan, mostly have to face the difficulties in keeping a balance between their duties at home and workplace. Because it is supposed in culture as the first and foremost duty of women is to take care of the home. She further added the reason for the imbalance in home-office life is: first in more cultural areas; women have more burdens of demands due to socio-cultural values. The central aspect that extends the women's domestics responsibilities is the joint family system, where she must do domestic chores on a large scale. So, this lack of work-life balance had a series impact on the mental and physical health of women. Because participants for this research had several roles in their life, as a wife, caretaker of children and husband's parents are managing daily domestic chores, and as job holder, she is serving to the society. These overload responsibilities compel women to neglect their mental and physical health. It revealed from research (seven out of ten respondents) that they are facing stress due to work-life imbalance and must perform the dual of the female as well as male. According to the author, the reason for this entire imbalance in life and stress is the second place of women in the context of gender. That's why a woman is earning money as a male and serving in the home as female, no matter how it is hard for her.

Gender identity also bears judgment for value as male or female as in some cultures one sex is preferable to others. For example, in many Middle Eastern countries, a human being is considered as "incomplete" due to having a female baby and it makes her a reason to be observed as having "something missing" [Saʿdāwī 1982]. In some cultures, it is a great discomfiture and sometimes humiliation for a family to have a baby girl [Baveja 1981].

Even this is the reality that many Muslim families, who openly express their preference to have a baby boy, whilst some of them say welcome to both sexes. [Errington 1990]. But this general prevailed tendency cannot negate this fact that in

some Southeast Asian Muslim societies like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia where a baby girl is sometimes more wish able. The reason is the same as for having a son i.e. parents want a female child so that they can move to their daughter's homes after being older. Genderdiscriminationas male and female sexuality are distinct anatomically or as biological nature. Sexual borderline is defined as "The sex through which human being is ascribed by social categorization" [Baveja 1981].

Ultimately, this question was the core debate of philosophy. Like, Simone-De-Beauvoir stated that interpretation of gender is flourished in existence with the viewpoint of the opposite: "Man is represented in both positive and natural as the most common use (mostly to give example "He" is used to indicating human being) for nominating human being, whereas a female is regarded or represented as in negative context, explain through confined standard, without mutual benefit" [English 1977].

De Beauvoir delineates women's insignificance, detachment and subordination as being the "other". This "other" has ever been the reason for opposition, which moves the "one" upward. The "other" has contradictory significance, which exists and construct in every culture and society. Thus, the relation of man and woman for humanity is explained in a way that humanity accepts enthusiastically only to the male gender, whereas, women are pointed out as relative to and depending on male or men. On the other hand, to De Beauvoir who does not accept the title or recognition as 'other' (used for women) in gender interpretation, Irigaray explains that women be recognized as "another" [Irigaray 2001]. She claims that the denial of women to be known as 'other' indicates the negation of 'another' as equitant of men.

Irigaray argues that women should consider and accept themselves as 'another' subject beside men who is in deductible to the masculine subject [Irigaray 2001]. She maintains that when women are thinking as 'another' in gender context explicitly indicate as they enjoy an equal ant position beside men. So, men and women coexist as subjects, which construct humanity and they should be supposed on the 'the two'.

Here, the main factor of 'two' is to be equipped in 'sexual dissimilarity' and it implicit: two subjects in the context of gender should not be instituted or interpreted

in the hierarchical or genealogical link [Irigaray 2001]. According to Irigaray, the main obligation of these two subjects (man & woman), is to conserve the human species and to transfer culture while regarding their distinctions.

Although De Beauvoir and Irigaray seem to take as opposition on the concept of women as the subject of gender, both have the same concern as "Repression of women historically". The pivotal point of their debate circulates women who have been raised as reducible to masculine (men) subjects. Both Irigaray and De Beauvoir try to get away from the epistemological way of knowledge, which has postulated females (they use word 'women' everywhere) as a subsidiary or subordinate in the history of philosophy. If Iriagary gives a proposal that the idea of humanity make up of two sexes 'Man and Woman' as two genders like De Beauvoir has a demand that women be regarded as the same part of single humanity like their masculine correspondent. Thus, both, attempt to find out the idea of humanity which is affable and incorporating to women.

In fact, this diversity in women's experiences in daily life shows there are varieties in Muslim culture and Muslim interpretation about Islam is different in all places and epochs. This is the reason; women's have unique and varied experiences and expressions of life on their own. But the author justified in his findings that their experiences also have a great effect from their cultural norms and beliefs. For instance, the lives of Muslim females in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan as well as in Indonesia vary from each other. According to Qasim Amin [1992] in his piece of work "The Liberation of women and the New Women, "that woman's daily based experiences are different from culture to culture.

Mernissi [1975] a feminist from Morocco, is agreed with Qasim's view about the diversity of Muslim women's daily experiences. But she argues that despite the different experiences, women share the same pattern of how they unintentionally raise their identity, status and role for society. She, further, elaborated that it is assumed in Muslim societies as women is a sexual being who can be a threat to society. To maintain the social order, it is vital to monitor the sexual modesty of females that is

the reason for social furore ('Fitna' in Arabic). Due to this reason, women should be her world just to stop her from inviting social chaos.

In life with the research works of feminist and male agalitarianists, in chapter third of the dissertation, it will be attempted to analyze the religious (Islam) and cultural factors that create the hierarchical and egalitarian concepts and practice of gender. Unlike the foregoing literature, I interpolate the idea of gender with Islamic (Quranic) and cultural interpretation in both the religion and culture of Pakistan, which is mostly mixed and general confusion.

To generate a discussion of the contradictory claims of gender hierarchy and egalitarianism, I will present the Qur'anic discussion of gender, which often provides the grounds for such inconsistency as is described in the above section.

This Chapter will not only concern itself with the field research to measure the impact of Islam on Pakistani Mulsim's belief about gender but it will also elaborate the discrepancy in the authoritative legitimacies on gender issues through their belief and their subsequent impact on the competing views of gender patriarchal hierarchy and egalitarianism. It will also analyze the extent to which this discrepancy has generated the patriarchal system of Muslim culture. An elaboration of the resulting inconsistency can be achieved by investigating the system and mechanism that generate and nurture the theological, social, historical and cultural roots of a dominant gender relationship and its impact on the construction of the self. In line with this attempt, it will analyze the roots of gender hierarchy in the patriarchal system of Muslim culture, especially the Qur'anic view of the creation theories and the making of gender, the politics of reproduction and its impact on women's role in conception, the masculine concept and practice of femininity, and the construction of gender-based on male superiority and supremacy and the negation of the female sense of self-identity. Though these issues are intrinsic within Muslim cultures and Muslim women generally do not consider them as their problems. For this reason, we believe that it is Muslim men's and women's moral responsibility to re-examine actively what

constitutes "self" and its socialization and to unfold the elements of the patriarchal system of Muslim culture.

Within the Muslim societies, the interpretation of gender varies from culture to culture. It is affected by the degree to which local ideas, practices and individual minds intersect. These influences are intermingled in the Muslim quest to interpret and implement Islamic teachings within different societies and cultures in the Muslim world. The diversity of Muslim interpretation, along with the existing patriarchal system, has also tended to produce contradictory claims regarding gender, although the prevailing tendency has been to stress one interpretation at the expense of the other. The popular and accepted claim of gender generates and nurtures the establishment of gender hierarchy. This anti-egalitarian perspective has persisted in Muslim culture, history, and civilization for fourteen centuries, leaving women with no choice but to give in to such a system [Walther 1993]. Because of this perspective, we examined the contradictory claims of gender in the patriarchal system of Muslim culture. We analyzed how the popular claim of gender contributes to the way in which the (female) self is constructed—whether gender is constructed in association with the self or alienation from it.

Gender identity also carries value judgment; as certain cultures prefer one sex to the other. Having a female body in many Middle Eastern countries, for instance, makes a human being "incomplete" or causes her to be seen as having "something missing" [Saʿdāwī 1982]. In fact, it is a great embarrassment in some cultures for a family to consist mainly of baby girls [Baveja 1981]. This is true of many Muslim parents, who would freely admit that they prefer baby boys, although some of them welcome both sexes [Errington 1990]. This general tendency does not negate the fact that female babies are sometimes more desirable in some Southeast Asian Muslim cultures, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore because when the parents get older, they can move in with their daughter's family. In any case, parents' preference for one or another sex usually goes along with the societal assumption of being a male or a female.

While male and female sexuality refers to anatomical distinctions of a biological nature, the sexual category refers to "the sex or gender whereby an individual is attributed through social categories" [Davidson et al. 1979]. For instance, Simone-de-Beauvoir stated in a text with a title "The Second Sex" as the construction of gender is developed in conjunction with the view of the opposite: "men are attributed for something powerful, significant and positive, as demonstrated by the widespread use of men in general for the designation of living beings, whilst women constitute only to symbolize the negative things, which is based on restricting requirements, beyond mutual recognition" [English 1977]. Samione depicts female's alienation, in essentialness, and inferiority as being the other. The other one was also the opposite that emerges from the one.The "other" is the opposite concept, which is made up and recorded culturally into every society. Therefore, the ties of males and females to human civilization are interpreted in that way where the only man is embraced by society, whereas females are related to and reliant on males.

In contrast to De Beauvoir, who refuses to be recognized as "the other," Irigaray demands that women be identified as "another" [Irigaray 2001]. She argues that the negation of women as others implies the refusal of "another" as the equal of the masculine subject. It demands the stability of the fundamental form of a human being as "one, singular, solitary, and historically masculine ... with the many always subordinate to the one" [Irigaray 2001]. This ideal model of humanity results in obedience to the singular and one model of subjectivity, which belongs to traditional philosophy and is historically masculine. Irigarayan maintains that women should view themselves as another subject, which is irreducible to a masculine subject. Thinking of women as another also implies that women enjoy a position equal to that of men. So that men and women become coexistent subjects, what constitutes humanity should be predicated on "the two." Here the outstanding aspect of the "two" lies in "sexual distinction," meaning that: [Ibid] two entities who may not be placed in genealogical ties and that they are obliged, while acknowledging the distinctions, to preserve the human race and promote their heritage.

That viewpoint is refreshing since only a few works discuss the construction of the self and its relation to the established institution of gender. To generate a discussion of the contradictory claims of gender hierarchy and egalitarianism, we will present the Qur'anic discussion of gender, which often provides the grounds for such inconsistency as is described in the following section.

The main root of gender hierarchal prevalent ideology in Muslim culture is believed to be mentioned in legal and social aspects of the Quran. While there are a few legal references as opposed to the whole text, the impacts are immense in terms of anti-egalitarian gender theory as they are interpreted in the context of the patriarchal points of view. The impacts of such readings generate the authoritative legitimacies that govern the personal, familial, and social levels of unequal gender relationships in Muslim communities. The following verses are instances of the Qur'anic verses that have been read in a hierarchical world view:

"Man will care entirely about a woman with the payouts God has placed on the former rather than on latter and even with their belongings. And the only women are the true devotees, who watch over the dignity that is watched over by the Almighty. Then for the woman who is reluctant you to be frightened, first scold them; then let them alone, and after that smash them; but if they give you regard, don't attempt to hurt them. God truly is the best, the strongest! [Sorat 4, "Al Nisa" 34]

"If sons and daughters stand up to get an inheritance, a son will get the equal shares of the two daughters. [Sorat 4, "Al Nisa", 176]

"Therefore, rely on two of the male members to be as witness: and if the two males are present, then one male and two females will be witnesses because the other will inform of one if any one of these is mistaken."

[Sorat al-Baqara, 282].

Following the above verses have been interpreted following the hierarchical understanding of gender relations. This rationality operates based on the following assumption:

- The dominance of man results from the predominant existence of their evolutionary heritage and is thus in all ways superior.

- Differences in genetics and gender defend male dominance in the continuation of life, where males are the mobile theory of birth.

- Distribution of power within families by men is more justified due to sexual and biological differentiation as it is mentioned in the Quran which grants favours to a man as financial supervision, inheritor rights, the right to give divorce, the privilege to physically punish his wife and the right of sole testimony.

- The men are the household supervisors and wage earner, whereas the women have to look after the family by living in homes.

- The distribution of sexual labour within the household contributes to female's domestication, whereas males engage in public affairs.

- Thus, in all respects, males and females can not be claimed as equal.

- While gender inequality is drawn from the particular definitions of gender hierarchy and legal situations which have been the basis for the widely justified theory that males and females are not comparable.

This widespread acceptance shows how the legal matters and social facts of Muslim women are considered as representing the whole teaching of Islam regarding gender issues. Because the authoritative legitimacies throughout Islamic history belong exclusively to Muslim jurists, their ability to read and interpret the Divine Will to find the truth embedded in the texts became the centre of text-based legitimacy [Abou El Fadl 2010]. Muslim jurists' readings of Qur'anic passages thus transform the specific historical contexts to which those verses responded and render them universal law.

Muslims have generally integrated the hierarchical and anti-egalitarian principles and practices of gender into their daily lives. The prevalent practices of gender together with the anti-egalitarian interpretations of Islamic teachings have perpetuated the subordination and the domestication of women to the extent that women are alienated from their selves, bodies, family, society, religion, knowledge,

and civilization. These alienations have been internalized into women's lives, which in turn generate the images of subordinate, domesticated, and inferior Muslim women.

The isolation of women's bodies from their selves is often attributed to male control over the production of knowledge. Men have been responsible for the interpretation of sources, the Qur'an and the hadith. Males are in charge of the production of power and knowledge whose effects are moulded into women's bodies. They regulate women's bodies so that they are sexually, financially, biologically, emotionally, and intellectually in the 'control' of women. Given that men control the power of knowledge operating within Muslim communities, male interpreters, along with the established patriarchal system, have perpetuated the construction of hierarchical gender theory and practice that serve men's needs and interests.

On the contrary, the egalitarian principle is embodied through its social, religious and ethical background. Females barely recognize their status as equals. The majority of Muslim women do not even bother to think of their daily experiences. They have been living their entire life within the current gender inequality and oppressive patriarchal culture that any modifications which contradict the existing practices are not acceptable. Females are also used to gain and execute male's supremacy and their patriarchal interpretation of knowledge.

Females have therefore consistently been a focus of religious assumptions and have always been exempted, based on their self-interpretation about genealogy, background, law and religious beliefs. Women never make their history but have become a passive part of history.

For centuries, women have been alienated from their own "selves", personalities, agencies, characteristics, and identities. Women have become the mirror of what men want them to be. Women are never asked or allowed to be what they want. Their voices are unheard because they are discouraged to express their voice due to the fear of inciting evil. Women are also never encouraged to speak for themselves because fathers, brothers, and eventually sons have continued to serve as their extensions, not because men can recognize the wishes of women, but because

Muslim men are empowered to decide on what is best for them. Females are often prohibited from disagreement with, or communicating with, authoritarian members in the household and society, as to show dissatisfaction or dialogue is supposed to have no manners. women, therefore, are taught to be quiet and obedient to what is culturally, socially, and religiously accepted behaviours, conducts, and actions.

Muslim women's alienation from the rest of the world is moreover reinforced with the practice of seclusion. The purpose of isolation is compassionate and virtuous, as it protects the modesty and integrity of a woman. The system of segregation is inherently misogynistic, therefore, since the dignity and morals of woman are assured and excluded, as she is a woman. This custom presupposes that women's sexuality is an underlying risk to society, therefore, women's social existence must be legitimized to their separate spheres. In this sense, many women have been living without unrestricted access to their own life, family, education, beliefs, economics, politics, community and culture.

The use of seclusion as an entity to control the conduct of females has proven that the appropriation of gender roles is constructed in alienation from their persons and selves. Instead of constructing gender in association with the self, the notion of gender is defined concerning others. The construction of sexist ideas of women as cunning, irrational, sexual, socially threatening, and alluring is mapped in terms of their associations with other members of society. The notion of honour killing, which has been practised in Muslim societies, especially the Middle East and South Asia, demonstrates the idea that the family's reputation for chastity depends heavily on women's behaviour, while men's behaviours are not subject to this tradition however bad they might be [Abu-Odeh 1996]. This is also true for the kinds of roles that are deemed appropriate for women; they are recognized through how women relate to males, for instance, husbands, brothers, and later sons.

The question now is to what extent does the Qur'an advocate mistreatment of women? Barlas has stated that the Quran has the equalitarian nature and that it advocates women's liberation [SANDS 2003]. Its teachings do not promote inequality

and discrimination, but it has the potential to be read in patriarchal modes. Mostly, Such readings are primarily taken from 'the original, called as Tafser (scriptural interpretation) and Hadith (the supposed legends describing Prophet Muhammad's life and practice) [Ibid]. In view of the argument that the Quran does promise equality and liberation for male and female in what follows, we will discuss the basis of gender egalitarianism with the reference of Quran.

Quran treats and recompenses men and women equally when dealing with ethnic-religious responsibilities. However, it appears to discriminate against women when dealing with social and legal obligations [Esack 2001]. The following verses constitute a few examples in which the ethics of gender equality or gender justice is evoked:

> "Ah, human being! Bear in mind to your Sustainer who made you from a living being and created your partner and extended a plurality of man and woman from each of them everywhere. And mindful of Lord, from whom you claim each other of your rights and these links of kins. Indeed, Your Lord is keeping you watching." [Sorat Al-NISA 4, 1-2]

> "For every man and woman who has dedicated himself to Lord and every man of faith or woman of faith, all women and men of honesty and loyalty, both women and men who are sincerely faithful to their lips, all women and men compassionate in their suffering, both women and men who are humble in their deeds, every woman and man who are conscious about their sexual modesty, and every man and woman who are self-deniers for the love of their God, Allah has already forgiven them all and will reward them immensely." [Al- Ahzaab, 33-36].

> "All that what every man or woman does is his / her own fault and he/she will not have accountability by the burden of another one." [Al-Inaam 6, 165].

> "The wife's rights to husband are the same as those that husband has to her." [Sorat Al-Baqra 2, 229].

These verses offer metaphysical, social, ethical and eschatological bases for the egalitarian theory and practice of gender.

- Man, as well as woman, are Allah's creations regardless of their presence in the earth.

- Man and woman are expected to give honour one another, as individuals and as friends, community leaders and servants of Lord.

- Male and female will be rewarded by God according to their actions and behaviours and one will not be liable to answer of other's burden.

- It is the duty of man and woman to discourage bad and encourage good in a collective manner.

- Man and woman are also reasonably obligated to uphold one another's rights as individuals, spouses, parts of society and God's creations and service members so that the future will be rewarded.

These formulations provide a basis for human beings to treat one another equally in such a way that none will offend against others due to their sexuality, ethnicity, race, or religion. All persons, who form the building blocks of every social institution, are expected to preserve the duty of maintaining their rights and responsibilities proportionally. Guaranteed this proportional respect for their rights, these persons are expected to preserve their rights and responsibilities towards others in the family and a more complex web of social relationships.

The egalitarianism of gender relation between man and woman is a frequently discussed moral topic in the Quran. One example of this can be seen in al-Ahzab, 33:35, in which verse God reveals the foundation for moral and spiritual equality. Many feminists who attempt to establish the theme of equal rights and duties among males and females in Islam refer frequently to the following verse.

> "For every man and woman who has committed himself to God, and every believing man and woman, and every genuinely devoted one and every devoted one, and every man and woman fully faithful to their words and all those who

struggle in suffering, all women and men who submit themselves before their lord and every man and woman who protect their sexual modesty and every self-denying man and woman has a great reward already set by their God." [Sorat Al-Ahzaab, 33- 36]

This verse [Al-Ahzaab, 33-36] offers a balanced virtuous quality, which rewards all individuals, regardless of their sexual difference. By mentioning the same qualities for both sexes, the verse identifies the fundamental foundation for human moral conditions with equal moral and spiritual obligations for human beings. [Ibid] The implication of this verse is important in that ethical qualities such as piety, chastity, truthfulness, patience, charity and kindness are not only appropriate for human beings as individuals but are also relevant as political and social beings.

Although the ethical message of normative Islam emphasizes the egalitarian concept of gender, the practice of marriage seems to condone hierarchical relations. Ahmed, an Egyptian feminist, argues that the ethical vision of gender egalitarianism in Islam competes with the hierarchical relations between the sexes and that these are institutionalized within marriage [Ahmed 1992]. Similarly, the normative function of marriage is not to enshrine the superiority of one being over the other, since the rights of both are equally respected [al-Baqara 228] but to ensure mutual love and support. However, there are many instances where women's lives after marriage are much worse than when they were single because marriage has subdued them to men in an institutionalized system in which gender relations are not adequately shared.

Concurring with Ahmed's egalitarian concept of gender Murata, in "The Tao of Islam" argues that the relationship regarding gender in the Islamic intellectual tradition rely on the depiction of the "sapiential tradition" regarding the nature of reality [Murata & Schimmel 1992]. Murata situates the issue of femininity within the framework of the three realities. She speaks of the duality of each reality, namely, God, macrocosm and microcosm. Majesty and Beauty, for instance, are God's divine attributes, which are to be understood in terms of masculinity and femininity respectively. The attribute of beauty refers to a feminine quality, while that of majesty

refers to a masculine one [Ibid, 69-73]. Similarly, the macrocosm also contains a binary opposition, in which the earth is usually identified as female and heaven as male. This polarity, however, is not to be interpreted as a total contrast, but a unity, in that male and female gives rise to one of the relational pairs of the universe. The absence of either of the two would make the creation of such a universe impossible [Ibid, 18-19].

Humans too have the fluidity of masculinity and femininity. This fluidity allows for the possibility of having an egalitarian relationship between men and women. Human equality is inherent within Islamic teaching, in the sense that individuals are responsible before God for their selves [al-An'am 6,164, Ghafir, 40, 17, and Taha, 20-15] an assertion that will be discussed in the last chapter of this dissertation. Similarly, individuals in Islamic Sunni religious tradition, have equal access to God's truth, regardless of class, race, or gender [Abou El Fadl 2010]. The opportunity afforded individuals to interpret God's divine truth results not only in a diversity of consciences, beliefs and acts but also in the richness of Islamic doctrine [Ibid].

Such a diverse understanding of Islamic doctrine has shaped how the fluidity of masculinity and femininity operates within Muslim societies. While ideal and normative Islam promotes gender egalitarianism as part of the harmony between God, macrocosm and especially microcosm, Muslims have adopted the concepts and practices of gender from their deliberative choices when dealing with women. It should be noted that Islam is not an active agent in the embodiment of gender egalitarianism; human beings are, therefore, responsible for creating the hierarchical and egalitarian views and practices of gender. For this reason, it is important to recognize that these hierarchical and egalitarian understandings of the concepts and theories of gender have always coexisted within Muslim cultures.

As we have seen, the conflicting views of the hierarchical and egalitarian principles of gender in Muslim societies and scholarship have their bases in Muslim cultures. Both views originate in the interpretation of the sources of Islamic teachings, to which social and cultural values contribute greatly. Interpretations are not scripture,

since the creative process of interpretation of the normative, immutable, and divine Qur'an involves human mind, experience and tendency so that there are legal, scriptural, social, mystical, philosophical, ethical, religious, eschatological and ontological dimensions of the Quran with the historical background of Muslim intellectual heritage. Moreover, as Quranic verses were revealed over almost 23 years and on different occasions, they often reflect situations. Yet, most interpreters (and we share their view) would contend that even though these revealed verses were inextricably linked to given sets of conditions, the ethics of the scriptural text must transcend the existing contexts to create a better and just society. In conjunction with this ethics, the Qur'an was meant to improve the human condition in the seventh century and beyond, not be justified with contemporary moral and political codes.

In the course of my fieldwork, I had conducted eighty in-depth interviews with an approximate time of one hour. At the start of interviews, informants were explained briefly about the object of study and then after their consent, a demographic form was filled by participants. Respondents were allowed to miss any question or at any time pause the session.

All interviews had been audio-recorded with the permission of participants. After data collection, all the data was analyzed and evaluated. The objective of the assessment is to be maximum accurate to the expressions of the respondents. There are three steps to analyze data in SQR. First, data is classified into general points with a focus on interview questions. Second, the core idea of the data is analyzed with quotations and summarizes the essence of the informant's words. The third and final is to conduct cross analysis to draw the common themes across informants.

Informants have been invited to express their views on men's and women 's responsibilities, positions and place in society and to explore how Islam influences their ideology and effect of this influence on their relationship. Questions were inquired which attempted to cover the concept of gender in the context of Islam which has a great influence on the culture and belief of Pakistani Muslims. So, research has been conducted to know about similarities and differences in male and female, family roles,

occupational roles, personality, sexual modesty, belief about domestic violence, social issues facing by women specifically honour killing and belief of Muslims males in that context and finally sources of gender role beliefs. While participants addressed similarities and differences, it was commonly expressed that male and female are different from each other. They cannot be equal except for the rights of education. Regarding education Zain reports;

> All human beings have been commanded by Allah that they should educate themselves, but women should be instructed in religious education and domestic chores because they have been created as caretaker of children and home.

Although, Ali speaks of his wife for obtaining an education as a sign of encouragement by Islam for female's right to get an education.

> My better half had just completed her Master's degree and in my family, my father had supported all my siblings in higher education. Thus, you may remember that Islam does not restrict women, but in every culture, it differs from person to person who may support or oppose them.

Abdullah remarks regarding the intellectual level of both male and female, as:

> Women can never be equal to men especially intellectually; it has been mentioned in the Quran. So, they have not given the rights of witnesses because they are weaker mentally as compare to men.

Ibrahim reports:

> Women are as intelligent as men but physically they are weaker than men and it was said by Allah in the Quran.

So, participants typically commented that man is stronger than women, mentally and physically. Women cannot tolerate certain things, which are tolerable for men. Informants have different responses regarding belief about the different between subjectively, the males and females. Islam considers discrepancies between genders;

both are different, women are mentally and physically weaker and more emotional than men. For example, Faheem reports;

> It has been stated by the Quran that woman is weaker as compared to man, and this is the main reason for making a man of their guards. She is not wised enough for serious decision making like a man. So, In either case, it is impossible to consider the balance of man and woman.

Imran explains:

> Men and women are almost equal according to Islam, but with minor differences, as men are the caretakers of women and woman is the caretaker of children. Quran gave me the idea that man is strong enough to have the responsibility of women.

Usman adds more of Imran's remarks:

> Women and men cannot suppose to be equal, they are different in all respects and women are weaker than men in every context. Islam has declared her the subordinate of men. It is completely absurd to assume the man and woman to be equal and the Quran cannot be wrong in this context.

The part played by man and woman in a home as well as in society was also questioned through interviews. Usually, respondents informed that female as a mother is a sole caretaker for infants and responsible for domestic chores. Various participants responded that the man's first duty is to support a family financially and women's primary obligation is to take care of a home.

Hassan explains:

> Women are supposed to have a role as a nurture of children and caretaker of husband and his parents. Four walls of the home have been specified for a woman to protect her from outside the society.

Saram comments:

A woman has been confined to home. So, she is the only one who has been created by nature to bring up the children more than a man does. This role has been specified by Islam for women. We cannot change her position from home to work outside.

Finally, it was summed up through the responses by respondents on the male and female roles that man is a financial provider and woman is responsible for household labour and man cannot do that because he has been created on the same nature of women. Tahir speaks as he addresses the status of male and female within Islam and culture.

Within Islam and our society, there are some specific roles expected from a man. Like they can be an economic supporter to run the family and cannot be child-bearer. Another role of a man is to have a check on his wife as a supervisor of her right and wrong. That's why man has been given the right to scold his wife to make her a good mother and lady.

Variant responses while commenting on the role that a man and woman should separately play in society, participants mentioned an example of Holy Prophet supposed to be an ideal case. For instance, Amjad reports:

A man should help his wife in domestic chores when she has a burden of work. Prophet Muhammad said the one who is good with his partner is a good man. Even Prophet Muhammad used to weave his clothes and clean the house.

Belief in occupational expectations would include the various responses that women should contribute to family financing but it is a fact that women are not able to work in physically demanding jobs. Some specific jobs are appropriate for females. Most of the responses were that women should not do the job in any case because working ladies cannot take care of her family well and she should live in a home and away from the outer world as is mention in Islam. Many responses were that division of labour

between both genders is a global phenomenon that exists because of disparities inability. Kashif describes it:

> In any circumstance's woman should not do the job by living far from her home. In Islam, there is no need for a woman's job to support the family economically because she can never be replacing on man's duty. She has been created to play a role as a mother, sister, wife and daughter and she is better in all these statuses. And for all these four statuses can be proved at home not outside by working in a society of men.

Abdul Rafay reports his thoughts about the job for women with specific conditions;

> A woman is a treasure and treasure is always tried to conceal from others. So, a woman is better to play her roles in keeping the household. But, if, some crises will compel her to do a job, she should know about her limits specified by Islam. She can work at those places where the only women work, like teaching or Stitching.

Ghayoor explains;

> I am married but I do not want my wife to work in any circumstances. And I think it's better for women to live at home and trained themselves for bringing up the future generation. I cannot support women's jobs. This is the humiliation of women to work as cashier, hostess, and receptionist or in marketing, nurse, doctor.

Mohsin says that if a woman does not breach the shariah principles, her occupation is permissible:

> If a job has no violation with Islamic engagement, that's good, she should work. She might work as a teacher for example. However, she must promise to wear big outfits and cover her head.

Participants addressed their beliefs regarding relationships between opposite sexes. Usually, participants claimed that Islam restricts Muslims for interacting with women,

and variance comments contained believing that Gender segregation is troublesome and in Islam dating is forbidden. Regarding men and women interaction, Amin states:

> Frank interaction of man with a woman is considered unacceptable in my religion and culture. Even combining males and females in my religion is an issue. It was mentioned in the Quran that women should not talk to a man politely because it may be possible for her to melt the heart of a man.

Adeel alludes to the limitation on dating by Islam:

> It's an Islamic vow, no girlfriend, no boyfriend. Neither man nor woman can be mates. If male and female get together without any legitimate relation, the third will be the devil and God's curse.

Farhad expresses;

> As everyone agrees it's a reality they have an affinity for the opposite genders, so they get drawn to each other. Even though they don't have any sexual encounters, they still enjoy the company of each other so they get pleasure from this too. I am afraid to say it's going to be a satanic practice. Therefore our culture and religion are against the interaction of men and women.

There was also a discussion of sexual modesty among the participants. Usually, participants reported that the hijab protects women. Participants' numerous reaction contain comments that veil (to cover the full face) seems controversial but Hijaab (to cover the head) can be said as an obligation. However, partners democratically chose to carry by following veil and headscarf but modestly. Azeem discusses the question about the value of hijab in preventing women from having sexual objectification:

> Hijab makes a clear sense to me just because it lets us look at someone like a human and not like a thing that can be tested until we can speak to her, so we may think of her as a potential partner and not of her sexual features. It is a concern for us since I always doubt and desperately managing to justify. we should consider her as a person, and it is undoubtedly a woman. It seems that we are probably to feel about some physical connection.

Ahmad clarifies:

> When the woman is married, she must wear something like a large dress that covers her head and covers her body as well. Such factors shield them against anything unforeseen. And I think ' Parda'(Hijab) is the beauty of a woman.

Imad also agrees:

> Hijab protects females from man's dirty sights and women's sexual objectification. You can even note that there are fewer cases of rape in Islamic countries. So, I have a strong faith in Islam that is protecting our women from the lure of man.

Tanveer regards Sharia niqab as the actual practice of Hijab (Veil):

> Women who dress nearly all the way and only uncover their eyes to see through, and in my view that is the true Islamic Hijab (Parda). I have even married a lady who follows Sharia Niqab and she hides from every person other than me and her father and brothers. That was my only concern in seeking a lady who follows Sharia Hijab (full veil).

Participants spoke about their beliefs regarding the treatment of women by Islam. Usually, respondents commented that Islam has restricted women's roles, but it forbids the mistreatment of women and emphasizes women's respect. A variant reaction included the participants ' assumption that Islam advocates women's security and that man can be strict with it and scold or slap her for her betterment. Regarding how to treat women, Farhan discusses:

> As the Holy Book says, women must be revered and hidden like a treasure. This is the responsibility of the man to keep her in the right way by checking on her boundaries and handling her by her good and bad behaviour. And I believe that men have a right to be violent if women do something objectionable.

Ahmad refers to how to treat and protect women:

> Mostly, females behave as feminine as they are constructed; and males behave as masculine according to their instinct. Most women would therefore be a glass wall to be shielded. And that's not because We ere expecting that the

females just say yes without complaining because we are protecting them. However, the concern is also as the relation is like glass that would be crack with their negligence and religion is trying to shield woman with this way.

Respondents dealt with social issues that women face. Various comments have included consideration about misconception towards females in Islam that they are facing exploitation.

Hassan reports:

In my opinion, and that's what I have heard from media that Liberal European people believe that we as Muslim are not appraising or disrespecting our ladies. It is wrong reasoning, I believe, because whatever they say is often groundless and often they use the quotes from the doctrines taken out of their meanings.

Asad addresses women's oppression:

In my culture, women are predominantly exploited, and it's not pleasant. I want to do as much as I can to eradicate that for my part. Nonetheless, I cannot defend this before most of my friends, who interpret Islam in their way and try to apply it to the cases of women's oppression.

Faheem focuses on the persistence of injustice suffered by women because of the wrong treatment by men:

Men are stronger beings, and women are often more obedient. It doesn't matter whether someone is Muslim or Christian. If I talk about my culture and religion, let me confess that violent treatment to women by men is extensively high. Patriarchal interpretation of Islam has a great influence on how the man treats a woman and considers her to be his property.

Hassan justifies about the treatment with a woman:

Man has a right to treat a woman, as he wants. I don't know why woman demands equality which she has not been granted in Islam and she violates the verses of Quran. If a man is the sole financial supporter of a woman, why

should he accord her respect? If a woman is not earning equally financially with a man, why should she be given equal respect and superiority.

Respondents debated about origin of their beliefs regarding gender roles. Most of them discussed that their cultural practices and families setup are influenced by their religion. Various respondents commented that the source of their faith in Islamic doctrine. Abdulla describes the effect of his faith on his views:

> Perhaps, some of the ideas can be associated with religion. That is almost always what someone wants to explain. I can do the same. Yet I believe that the root of my belief is primarily Islam.

Ajmal explains how Islam embraced his belief:

> Islam is a rational religion; it positively influenced me. It promotes equality between genders, in particular women's rights. Yet Islam is interpreted by people to defend their beliefs and deeds.

Many respondents have stated that Islam is the basis of their beliefs. Saeed clarifies:

> I mean whatever God, as well as His Prophet, announced concerning the existence of the roles established to every man and
> woman in Muslim societies. I am simply following what the creator is expecting me to do.

Fahad Reports:

> I should suggest that references in the Quran and Sunnah contribute to the understanding of how to interpret the relationship of both genders.

Ibrahim demonstrates:

> By reading the Holy texts; We can understand all the obligations for man and woman defined by religion in Koran and the authentic hadiths. In my opinion, all the Muslims, as I am, need to be persuaded that the division of burdens between men and women is exactly right and absolute in all ways.

3.2. Interpretation Of Gender Roles In Islam Through The Lense Of Pakistani People's Voices

The conception of gender in Islamic societies varies from culture to culture. Local ideologies, traditions, and even individual minds effects on the construction of gender. These effects mixed with interpretation and implementation of Islamic teachings in the Muslim world within various cultural societies.

Diversification in interpreting Islamic thoughts along with the patriarchal system has also been supposed to induce contradictory claims regarding gender. The widespread and approved claim of gender brings into being the formation of gender hierarchy. This anti-egalitarian conception has been kept going in Islamic society and its historical background for almost fourteen centuries, by giving such structure to the Muslim Women and leaving them without choice. In the context of this perspective, I have tried to examine the contradictory claims of gender in Muslim culture with patriarchal structure. Mainly, I have explored how the familiar and customary claim of gender plays a role in which the society (female) is set up.

Informants had been invited as an interviewee for sharing their opinions and beliefs concerning the role played by both genders as well as their duties and status and elaborate how Islam has influenced or gave any shape to their cultural attitude. Questions were attempted to cover the concept of gender in the context of Islam that impacts the belief of man and woman within the case of Pakistani culture and politics. So, research has been conducted to know about similarities and differences of male and female, their family and occupational roles, expected personality, sexual modesty, beliefs and attitude about domestic violence and polygamy, social issues facing by women specifically belief about honour killing and finally sources of beliefs regarding gender role.

While talking about similarities regarding male and female, participants reported that man and woman cannot be equal in any way except the equal rights of

education and they are different from each other. This mindset has been highly pronounced in tribal areas from the province of Balochistan and NWFP where cultural norms are deep-rooted. Seventy percent informants have same response whether of any age or educational level and other thirty percent (urban areas with high education from the province of Punjab and Sindh) have a democratic opinion about man and women and called them human being without gender distinction and commented that female deserve the equal freedom of life similar as a man.

This qualitative research investigated the influence of religion on the mindset of Pakistani Muslims and tried to see how religion impacts their thoughts regarding the concept of gender. This research has also examined some reasons for stereotypes beliefs about gender and revealed that cultural and demographical background of Pakistani Muslims plays an important role. The objective of this survey is to bridge the gap in literary works about gender stereotypes in the Muslim people of Pakistan. In contrast to most of the quantitative researches, in which Muslims have been focused and gender attitudes were measured just in statistics. This analysis offered a profound overview of Muslim's perceptions and highlighted the interpretation of their religious beliefs about gender and its penetration in their social and personal lives. Particularly, respondents had been given the chance to answer open-ended questions through a semi-structural interview concerning Islam and religion-cultural impact on gender role beliefs.

The central finding of the research on the assumptions around gender diversity can be summed up by the notion that respondents claim that females are biologically inferior and unable to carry out stressful work. That belief is also surprisingly common among the general population in Pakistan whether they have any other religion that gives an indicator that culture is influenced by the patriarchal interpretation of Islam. This trend prevails in the whole Pakistani society, even if woman proof herself mentally and physically compatible with a man and she is paid less than a man in professional life with same nature of job [Zakar 2013, Naz 2017]. So, participants typically commented that man is stronger than women, mentally and physically.

Women cannot tolerate certain things, which are tolerable for men. Informants have differing responses regarding belief about the difference between subjectively, the males and the females. Islam considers discrepancies between genders; both are different, women are mentally and physically weaker and more emotional than men.

On the questions of duties for women, nine out of ten male respondents reported that females have been the primary caretakers of kids from far past and this claim by Pakistani men also supports the previous investigations conducted by Sadaf Naz [2017] and Filomena Critelli [2010]. Respondents clarified that women care for young kids mainly because they are created biologically for raising children. Women are more nursing because of the biological role played by women in bringing up the children, which is discussed by the Quran [SANDS 2003]. This belief also fits the views of many Pakistani male members who think that when women as mothers give full time to home rather than work, it is better for children. Very few (5 male respondents) has commented that female should perform in society as professionals if she has can balance both home and office.

Personal views concerning sexual modesty of male and female were inquired; eighty percent of people reported that 'hijab' is a prerequisite and prevents women from sexual objectification as harassment. They mostly have a common response as women should be in a hijab to prevent themselves from rape or harassment and also prevent a man from the temptation to commit any sin like rape or harassment. Few of them (mostly educated or religious persons) had a claim that women in West or modern societies face more rape than in Islamic societies due to the practice of sexual modesty and Hijab. Indeed, informants did not speak about men's sexual modesty which is also mentioned in the Quran as "Muslim men ought to take care of their gaze and not look at the females as sexual objects". It reveals that respondents pursue a conventional patriarchal interpretation simultaneously which means that men are unable to control their sexual impulses and a pro-feminist philosophy that implies female sexual objectification as a social issue.

The response regarding the question about polygamy was in two opinions as seven out of ten informants said that man has a right to keep four wives according to Quran [verse 3;4] and he should marry if he is financially strong to support them. However, the second response of almost thirty percent respondents was that to keep four wives is not obligatory; one wife is enough if you are satisfied.

The respondents also spoke about opposite gender interaction; the majority of them (usual informants with the age of above 30-35 and uneducated) discussed the fact that Islam does not encourage men and women to interact in a social sphere, in line with theories of traditional scholars. Rubeena Zakar [2013, 798] has also discussed that man in Pakistan have different scale for himself and for the women who are fifty percent of the population and this is the proud of male family members to claim that their females always live at home and any man never see them. But when the women asked about their rights and duties, 90% females said that they have been made delicate and weak to be under male responsibility and to live at home as a responsible for children and man has been created as a breadwinner for the family. A woman cannot compete for the society and she must segregate herself from male-dominated sectors. It signifies that people appreciate the conventional male stereotype of men being "strong" and thus not prone to social issues, like females.

However, very few of the respondents explicitly approached the issue and acknowledged that women are oppressed by stereotyping culture particularly with the wrong interpretation of Islam. Informants pointed out the involvement of Islam in influencing their beliefs about gender. Majority of the respondents stated that their beliefs about gender are explicitly rooted in Islamic principles. Comments were received that their thoughts influence families and cultures based on Islamic teachings watered these beliefs.

The "Theory of Social Cognitive" about the concept of gender belief and role formation states that " perceptions regarding the role and belief about gender are outcomes in a wide spectrum of cultural impacts, familiarly as well as various social structures that are embedded in people's daily lives" [Eric 2012, 13, Bussey & Bandura

1999, 676, Kim 2010]. The majority of respondents commented that their beliefs about gender roles are the outcomes of a complex relationship between their culture, family and religion that promotes the 'Social Cognitive Theory'. It seems through the views of these informants that Islam serves as a clear source regarding beliefs of people about gender-based attitudes, through society and the family and these beliefs impact how the respondents view Islamic gender-based doctrine. As this findings support the argument of Rubeena Zakar [2013, 799] who stated that Pakistani men get the power to make a woman down from the support of their family and culture and use religion as a justification. But when the participants spoke about how women should be treated according to Islam, they commented that Islam has restricted the women's roles, but it also forbids a man to mistreat the women and emphasizes on women's respect. But variant reaction included the participants ' assumption that Islam advocates woman's security and she has been commanded to be under the supervision of man. So, man can be strict and scold or slap her for her betterment.

And variance comments have the same opinion that male-female segregation is essential to prevent the society from complex troublesome and in Islam dating is strictly forbidden. Belief in occupational expectations would include the various responses that women can contribute to family financing but there are some specific jobs appropriate for females like teaching. They reported it is a fact that women are not able to work in physically demanding jobs. However, most of the responses were that women should not do the job in any case because working ladies cannot take care of her family well and she should live in a home and away from the outer world as is mention in Islam. Many responses (informants from urban areas with higher education) were that division of labour between both genders is a global phenomenon that exists because of disparities inability as man is created as breadwinner and woman as caretaker of the family. In the tribal areas of NWFP, women are not listed out as a discussion of male members of Pashtun society. Even, they do not count their daughters while talking about the numbers of their children. The common phrase which was stated by the informants (most of them were aged) that women are for

home or grave and there is no place for her other than this. It was shocking also for the researcher that female family members are not recorded in the family lineage tree (mother of the researcher is from NWFP whose own family tree contains only male members). So, it can be found out that the customary values have more influenced in than religion in the tribal areas of NWFP (50 %) and Balochistan (42 %) where the literacy rate (9 % in tribal areas where education is supposed as un-Islamic) is less than the other two provinces; Punjab (71 %) and Sindh (69%) [Rehman 2015, 142].

Finally, it was revealed through the majority of respondents on the male and female roles in society that man is a financial provider and woman is responsible for household labour as a man cannot be a home caretaker because he has not been created on the same nature of women. Almost all the respondents [even the female respondents and male of without age and education factor] typically commented that female as a mother is a sole caretaker for infants and responsible for domestic chores. Various participants responded that the man's first duty is to support a family financially and women's primary obligation is to take care of home because both of them are biologically created like that.

The objective of this chapter consisted of quantifying the influence and role of Islam in Pakistani Muslims' beliefs, their attitudes and their relationship with the viewpoints of gender. Most of the respondents interpreted the Quran relating to gender beliefs, but they claim that Islamic teachings are the source of their beliefs and opinions. Females are more physically vulnerable than males, a woman is best prepared to provide meals and care for babies and both the man and woman have same rights for education but women should be educated about religion and housekeeping. Communication of women with men is discouraged by Islam and the position of the women should be restricted to the house. However, religion forbids the exploitation of females but husband have a right to scold or dictate her to make according to Islam. Hijab is obligatory for Muslim women to prevent a man from committing rape or temptation, and household labour should be the responsibility of women because women are created biologically for this. So, it can be visualized that the majority of

the views are representative of patriarchal traditional theories which are prone to problems of social inequality experienced by a woman.

Respondents further clarified the connection of culture and religion and Islam's historical position in social setup and Hindu culture in Islam. So, it is hard to measure the influence of Islam on culture because of the oppression of women (as women's oppression is also in Hindu culture where widow cannot marry, women do not have a right to get a divorce or cannot marry out of caste and dowry system) and secondly, Islam has the flexibility to be a mean of merging in ethnic cultures.

In this analysis, detailed and concise details about the influence of Islam were given on cultures and gender role beliefs of Pakistani Muslims. Similarly, to stereotypes, gender beliefs of the participant are the same as mentioned by Traditional Scholars of Patriarchy. And all these concepts are fluid and multidimensional and shaped by the diverse interrelations of culture and Islam. However, the most significant notion is that cultural and Islamic interpretation of gender beliefs has a different level of intensity from province to province (as every province has a distinct culture with only one common particular religion 'Islam'). Like the province of Balochistan and NWFP have strict customary values and Islamic patriarchal interpretation regarding gender beliefs no matter of their age, sex, occupation or education. They interpret religion according to their cultural norms which sometimes cannot be justified within Islam, for example, the customs of honour killing, Vani, Bani, Laag. However, the gender role beliefs and impact of Islam on the mindset of people from the province of Punjab and Sindh is lesser due to modern education, acceptance of technology in youth and media.

In general, the study underlines the value of questioning primarily one-dimensional depictions of Islam as well as Muslim patriarchy which is directly going to influence the fifty percent population (i.e. women) of Pakistan. I have also demonstrated, with the use of the categories of gender and indeed in Islam and society, that this social structure is impacting the Pakistani women who are facing oppression due to the cultural set up as well as religious patriarchal interpretation. The images

and ideas of good Pakistani women were embedded into the nationalist narratives and made into symbols of national identity. This resulted in strong public scrutiny of the women's performance of their social roles and increased concern about it on the part of the government and its leaders. Gender roles and "good woman" issues have become connected to the national narratives, ideas about Pakistan state and were placed at the frontlines of political struggle. Unresolved issues of Pakistani ideology, including the precise understanding of a Muslim, a Muslim man and a Muslim woman, and controversial efforts to settle these problems have often only exacerbated violence, intolerance and social fragmentation. The issue of a place and the role of women according to Islam have become a central theme and a symbol of on-going Islamization of Pakistan.

4. THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF PAKISTANI MUSLIMS

My focus in this chapter is to study the everyday life of Pakistani people in the context of religion (Islam). The expansion of the study of the phenomenon of everyday life, its contradictions and changes, is because, in the second half of the 20th century, the interest of scientists was attracted by the practices and relationships of everyday life. The study of everyday life comes to the fore in social knowledge under the influence of the so-called "turn to practice", which allowed scholars to show the multilayered and complex structuring of this phenomenon. The daily routine of believers is captured by Robert Orsi, Ivan Strenski, and several other authors of the concept of "living religion." Insisting that religious everyday life sets a special social and cultural context, this group of authors initiated the popular today approach to religion as a set of social practices, while "practice" is understood as a set of actions by which this or that tradition, church or community sets the boundaries of what it means to be religious. The "living religion" concept is characterized by three lines of understanding religious everyday life: firstly, the emphasis on recognizing the differences between official doctrine and officially prescribed norms of behaviour and various manifestations of adaptation, resistance, or improvisation by members of the congregations regarding formalized ideas about religion and attempts to strictly regulate the behaviour of believers; secondly, practices are not conceived as random, but as taking the form of a ritual. Accordingly, scientists who study a lived religion carry out field studies both in temples (places of official worship) and during pilgrimages, secular holidays, holy days, family gatherings, etc. The third line is the study of the connection between practices and systems of meanings and symbols. Islam understood as a living religion in a country where Muslims constitute the

majority, is a topic much less studied than the theme of Islam as a living religion in Western Muslim communities.

4.1. Religious Studies, the Studies of the Everyday and the Concept of Lived Religion

The conceptual framework here is comprised of of three strands: religious studies, including religious ethnography; the concept of lived religion; everyday studies. Having considered these, I will examine, with their use, my empirical findings.

The first strand is religious studies. The current writings about Islamic societies show that there are different doctrines of Islam that have their interpretations of Islamic thoughts and practices. So, every school of thought practices religion according to their interpretation, whether it is a matter of state law, family law, or minor everyday activities as Hill & Hood says that "For the layman, the role of religious knowledge can be varied widely and it depends on the institutional structure of a given religion. That's why the correlation to the understanding of Islamic doctrine is always not clear. Scholars have identified the matters of an overgeneralization, but now they have begun to address. Early scholars attempted to explore a comprehensive model fit for all dimensions of religion, to understand it in a culture. These debates largely failed with this realization that it is almost not possible to compress all aspects of religion in one folder. Therefore, a subdivision of religious dimensions was the solution for all these debates. Thus, all doctrines of religion do not use the same number of dimensions; they generally identify similar distinctions. So, I have selected four commonly used aspects.

Probably, according to many writers, the best aspect of religious dimensions is documented in the division between ritual practices and religious beliefs. Charles Glock, in his original work, says that religious beliefs are as the "ideological" aspect

of religion, and it has the strength of a person's opinion as well as the orthodoxy of said beliefs. He contrasted religious faith with the "ritualistic" dimension keeping it in a culture. He included both private and public religious rituals in contrast to religious beliefs, to differentiate it from cultural customs [Davidson et al. 1979]. Glock elaborated on another aspect of religiosity in his same book by continuing his discussion. He said that there is a separate relationship of every individual with his religious knowledge, and he passes his life in a society (in a specific culture) according to this relationship with religious experience, intentionally or unintentionally [Glock 1962]. Though few scholars have researched religion of Islam in Muslim majority countries [e.g. Azad armaki & Tezcur 2008] few scholars have studied the dimensionality religious commitment among Pakistani Muslims [Priester and Jana Masri 2007, Kumar 2005 and Theodore 2008]. Glock included both private and public religious rituals in contrast to religious beliefs, just to differentiate it from cultural customs [Glock 1962]. Glock elaborated another aspect of religiosity in his same book by continuing his discussion. He said that there is a separate relationship of every individual with his religious knowledge and he passes his life in a society (in a specific culture) according to this relationship with religious knowledge, intentionally or unintentionally [Glock 1962]. Like, the meticulous nature of the relationship between religion and culture has been magniloquently defined by Tillich in this statement that "in the cultural activities,…religious is substantial; in the religious act.... cultural is formal".

The study by Tillich shows that culture and religion give complementary contexts of meanings as a religion by import and culture through shapes. Also, it has been denoted that religion and culture are vice versa for each other as well as cannot be spoken in the absence of one another. Thus, culture and religion can be discussed separately for analytical purposes. Religion delineates a form of cultural system-conveying the meaning and shapes up of the long-standing moods and inspiration of the given community.

In Gallup Pakistan, the survey was conducted about the proxy measures of prayer, people in Pakistan appear to be quite religious. The government of Pakistan conducted a National survey [2009] on every day time use of Pakistanis. This survey aimed to find out the economic and non-economic activities of Pakistan. However, this study also sheds light on some religious practices in the country [Anon 2009a]. Stark and Glock deal briefly within a discussion about the dissimilarity between private "devotional" and public "ritual" religious practices, but it has been explored in detail by Jose Casanova [Casanova 1994]. Casanova mentions that there is some ambivalence between the distinction of religious rituals and cultural practices. It is required to explore whether this distinction is viewed as profitable or whether it is considered lightly in public religious worship and individual visible as well as invisible beliefs. So, from the above follows, I will try to explore germane of each of these aspects, which are commonly used in religion, including both public/private and visible/invisible distinction, for Pakistani Muslims.

Many approaches can be included in the cultural study of religion. A pivotal part of these relies on the idea that human beings are distinguished from each other, particularly in personality and culture. Generally, psychologists look at the character, while sociologists and anthropologists look at culture [Anon 2009a]. So, how a person lives, and his personality bound up with his culture, and the other way in which one lives and represents one's culture depends, of course, on one's (or individual) personality. At the beginning of the twentieth century, personality was the focal study of many scholars, as a reason for the existence of religion. If the assumptions are made more broadened, religion purely believes in a spiritual entity. Writers tried to elaborate religion as part of the process by which an individual thinks in a semi-rational way or tries to link his thoughts with the psychic and emotional legacy of his childhood [Anon 2009a]. Geertz, in his one writing "The interpretations of Cultures," has defined culture as " Culture is a system of inherited conceptions which indicated in symbolic form by those manners in which men communicate, preserve, and give development to their knowledge and behaviour toward life" [Anon 2009a]. He declared that "culture

is inevitably semiotic, and this very theory has directly influenced on comparative political science.

Speaking of everyday Islam, Malory Nye says in her book "Religion, the Basics" [2008] that religion is what people do at the day-to-day level. If I take this statement in another way, religion is a compilation of those beliefs and ideas in which people engage themselves and the depiction of their daily practices and lived experiences. Therefore, religion-cultural studies have primarily concerned to understand religion as to how it is essential in contemporary societies and of how people may indicate differences across the world. Malory Nye has described that religion usually impacts on some or often all the aspects of life, but it is also a need to understand that religion has chances to involve more than often does. For example, when religion is studied in different cultures in the whole world, with various aspects, it is difficult to find out that religion affects every aspect of human life in public or private both sectors [Derry 2018]. This is the main reason for talking about religion and culture together by keeping both in society. There are multiple ways in regarding disparate and distinguish, but they also interconnected and influenced each other. Malory Nye justifies this concept as the society with a specific culture in which human beings live, are greatly affected by the predominant religions [Derry 2018]. And similarly, the religion that a person practices will always be influenced by their cultural context and location. In many ways, we can understand religion and culture as separate and distinct, but they also overlap and have an impact direct or indirect on each other. The culture in which we live is strongly influenced by the predominant religion (or religions) of their society. And similarly, a religion which is practised by a person in a society is also influenced by their cultural and geographical context [Derry 2018].

The book "Measures of Religiosity" written by Hill & Ralph W. Hood [1999] is an in-depth analysis of religion with a focus on the public ritual practices and personal beliefs about God in the daily life of Muslims and Christens. They say that it is entirely reasonable to think that the prayer of Muslim is more firmly attached with

public ritual practices, for example, mosque attendance and funeral prayer, even studies have found that there are specific prayers which are more connected with the personal belief about the role of God in everyday life [Derry 2018].

Therefore, I am introducing an approach in this chapter on the everyday life of Muslims in Pakistan, which studies culture within religion and religion within the culture. However, it is admissible to denote that religion is essential or backbone to other aspects of cultural activity across the world.

Historically, religious practices or life activities which are influenced by religion has been thought as a tool of oppression, and irrational practice [Derry 2018]. However, this conception of oppression about religion participation and in social life has been changed, and practice of religion is supposed to be associated with positive effect in life except for those people who still think that religion in everyday life is a tool of aggression, oppression and irrational behaviour.

If we further talk about current studies related to the role or impact of religion on life, another feature is the focus of physiological and physical health. Hence, the effect of religiosity in general and prayers, in particular, have been considered as a source healing, coping with the traumatic state of mind, depressions and other psychological problems in life. Koening [2001] justified further that religion has also been influenced in the improvement of people's lives by making the pathways to intensify well-being, mounting up pleasure and life contentment, an adaptation of deprivation, and letting down rates of alcohol and drug utilization and other misconducts and criminal activity.

When I planned my empirical work, I have studied the existing research. The most extensive research conducted on the attitude toward religiosity is the "World Values Survey." It has been collecting data through surveys about "Values" since the early eighties in the whole world, consisting of many Muslim countries. Findings of this report have shown that the majority of the people (almost 80% or more than 80%) from virtually every Muslim country (excluding Soviet and European countries) suppose that religion has a very significant role in their lives. Alike, their other

conceptions about religion, as they consider themselves the religious person and significance of the existence of God in their life, seem less in the sense of religious beliefs. But, in fact, their response for asking the question above mention subject "Religion is the source of comfort and strength," showed that generally, the citizens in Muslims countries are highly religious. Nevertheless, this is important to interpret these statistics with some great cautions, because this report did not provide the knowledge and Islamic practices of respondents. Furthermore, it cannot be correlated that being a religious means someone has back support from religious parties or connection with religious, political ideologies. In this same report, it has been noted that some Muslim country as Pakistan, Nigeria, and Iran are on a higher level of religiosity, but it is difficult to claim that they eager to manifest the personal religion in their state politics. For example, citizens of Pakistan are Islamic, but in fact, they are not ready to be ruled by the leader who convinces them religiously. Even this can be seen through the results of all presidential elections, in which any of the religious, political parties have never received the public votes in the majority.

The second part of my conceptual framework in this chapter is the concept of lived religion. Today, the sense of religion is no longer what it used to be. At different levels, religion is evolving into modern, revived and diverse forms. Moreover, we live in a culture of pluralism, through globalization and migration revolutions, which re-describes the role of religion. This is a threat to religious bodies that had previously a privilege on religion in societies who had specific culture. As an outcome of the deterioration of mutual coding systems, this leads to an increase in the liberty of the person to articulate its sense of existence, of dramatic change and of multi-speculation that is characteristic of our recent culture. Ivan Strenski suggests that philosophers who study Religion have reviewed their interpretation of the term "religion " and they are going to follow the paradigm of political philosophy. Likewise, Bryan Rennie [2012] takes an interest in the collaboration involving the philosophy of science and history, as a paradigm for how philosophy about religion could work together with history about religions. Kevin Schilbrack [2012] claims that philosophy, in the field

of religion ought to strive for developing closer ties within the branch of religious studies beyond the philosophy of religion. Thus, it is particularly reasonable to start discussing the positive future of philosophy about religions with the viewpoints of the historian of religions such as Ivan Strenski. And it is not unexpected that Strenski's opinion is a critique of the way as a philosophy of religion is being practised. Here author wants to discuss the theory of "Lived Religion" in a philosophical interpretation suggested by Strenski and McGuire because his idea of lived religion directly hit the religious culture of Pakistan.

Strenski states that the "philosophy of religion" requires a study of both philosophy and religion separately. He refers to analytical philosophy while defining the term "philosophy". He believes that the interpretation of religion is simplified by analytic philosophy. From the last two decades, the analytical philosophy of religion has widely considered the nature of theism as the focus of its study [McGuire 2008]. The core issues to discuss in the analytic philosophy of religion are generally interpreted from primary data like books and published texts. And it is the main concern to reveal, whether someone can claim that God exists or not if God exists as administrator then why evil prevail in the world? The bond between rationality and belief in God and the miracle as a breach of laws concern nature. It is also not extraordinary for an analytical philosophy in theological textbooks to address issues taken directly from Christian theology: the essence of God, spirituality, prophecy, the survival of the soul.

This is certainly preferable for social theorists to a paradigm change, who has been more obsessed with studying the religious practices and values at the elemental level rather than investigating doctrines and religious structures [Anon 2009]. The analysis of, for instance, Parker [2002] articulated this quantitatively. He made a list of replies for selection from the group, in different surveys conducted in Latin America, 'Catholic in my way' and thoughts of devotees outside of the Church [Gumucio 2002]. He figured out that among all every third out of six Catholic persons chooses to join certain heretical groups. They still consider themselves as Catholics

but wish to depart from the orthodox doctrines and practices enforced by the Church. This is connected with McGuire's idea of lived religion, which indicates that religious rituals and practices in daily life do not go down the direction of religious institutions [McGuire 2008].

McGuire [2008] relates to lived religions that are practised and define as of resurgence of popular religions; nowadays these forms of religion are in a trend for most of the societies. The rise in consumer culture and the communication technologies and the emergence of globalization have developed an open room for the individualization and development of religions in a kind of unrestricted religious environment where individuals may have the freedom to follow whatever they want. McGuire [2008] stepped away from official religion which is analyzed on an institutional base and focused her work on social and individual rates. She dealt with an agglomeration of religious belief which is sometimes shifting, multidimensional and conflicting, which is an element of religion which religious institutions sometimes find to be of little significance. The lived religion that has come to fact and represents that not only the beliefs and the authorized religious communicators (priests, religious scholars etc) have changed, but most significant is, what society perceives about these changes. That idea of lived religion as a practice and dimension of behaviour has been currently applied by Ganzevoort and Roeland [2014].

Analytic theological philosophers mostly narrate what they are doing as the investigation of " generic theism" and they say that they research problems that are usually important to monotheists, no matter they are of any theistic religion i.e Christians, Muslims, Jews [McGuire 2008] The concerns dominating their study are better expressed as the facets of Christianity that are more or less intertwined with all other Monotheistic religions. Although the Maimonides or Ibn-e-Sina appears on instances, one hardly sees critical theological philosophers addressing issues that are pivotal to non-Christian theological doctrines. Analytic philosophy has not described anything about pilgrimages, to have fasting, or following the law of nature, inheritance and revelation (although such issues are mentioned in Christian theology). Strenski,

therefore, justifies that the analytical philosophy of religion is primarily influenced by Christianity [McGuire 2008]. Strenski restricts his criticism to religions' analytical philosophy and he had not arraigned Continental philosophy of theology. Here, Kevin Schilbrack gives regard to John Caputo as a representative who is head of the continental philosophy of religion. Caputo describes religion as "God's love" [Caputo 2018, Schilbrack 2004].

The distinguishing feature of this concept is that it emphasizes on devotion and hence includes all phenomenological dimensions of religious affections in the philosophy of religion. But this philosophy no longer includes all religions all over the universe by describing religion as "faith in God"; it is still impersonating as generic theism (Islam is theistic religion as Christianity and can be studied under Strenski's analytical philosophy of 'live Religion"). Strenski suggests that "the sacred" is the comprehensive and right direction for understanding the religious affairs. Currently, Strenski's main criticism of theological philosophy is that it takes what he terms a logical interpretation of religion [McGuire 2008]. In other terms, it describes religion through spiritual phrases, values, belief systems, traditions as well as other kinds of theological debate. Analytic philosophy of theology believes that the ideas what religious beings think or believe are essential to religions.

Strenski proposes that theological philosopher considers "lived religion " to be their primary focus, which includes identity, material culture, social behaviours, the emotional state of being, way of life, and cultural heritage. My point of view is that the propositional dimension (the "beliefs ") is not possible to take away from a definitive place in practising religion. I value the theological historian 'Bruce Lincoln [2003]' who remarked that "Religious beliefs and practices are described as those whose purpose is to bring about a world and its human beings in a right and a real way". It is notified through definition by a religious belief that something might be a religious practice or not, and thus discursive is indeed pivotal key.

While discussing the philosophers of religion, Ivan Strenski is right in his claim that they interpret and study theological topics in a truncated way. Philosophers of

religion suppose that beliefs or theology are all that is important in society or essential, and so they misinterpret the term "Religion" [McGuire 2008]. In doing so, they dissociate and exclude the religious faiths and doctrines from the rituals regarding religion, cultures as well as all those institutions that play a role in making up the lived religion. Strenski has fairly highlighted the lived religions as ways of life that make the discourse meaningful. When philosophers of religion assume that ideas that seem necessary are all prepositions, they concentrate on all that is, under one or more labels, essential for understanding the purposeful conduct. While studying religions, I suggest (Godlove 2002 supports me in my proposal) that the discursive and philosophic aspect of religion is unavoidable as it is inevitably important to understand human behaviour. Hence, Acceptability of the suggested emphasis on lived religion by Strenski does not mean that philosophers of religion should not discuss the religious beliefs, but it means they would not study them anymore in a "cognitive" way.

The point of view by Strenski is that "as the interpretation of religion shifts by philosophers, the philosophy of religion shifts with it automatically". Here, I would like to follow his direction just to see where I believe it goes. Strenski is right in one sense: when the targeted topics to study will be changed—from abstract terms and religious attitudes towards lived religion, namely allegiance, material culture, habits, emotional existence, personalities as well as community — the results of philosophy of religion would be surely distinct. In this regard, Schilbrack [2004] has highlighted the point about the performance of philosophers of religions and questioned that what philosophy of religions has historically done is to explore the logic regarding religions.

In a nutshell, the analytic philosophy of religion (slighter extent; continentalism must) must create a new terminology for being, belief, attitude and so forth [Schilbrack 2004]. The good thing is that philosophers of religion are going to progress in the same way. In the previous century, philosophical tendencies like existentialism and pragmatism were mostly anti-Cartesian, as did the theory of behaviour, Marxist philosophy and feminist philosophy. There was even a strong switch towards practice this approach in philosophy. The unpleasant things that this

study has not yet achieved the word "Philosophy of Religion" (Schilbrack 2004). According to Strenski, "philosophy of Religions must abrogate or justify the religious philosophy. Religion can only be the topic academically as "object" and not the focus of philosophical study as "subject" [Schilbrack 2004]. However, it can be visualized that the philosophers who acknowledged the questions raised by Strenski are the most important ones in the future for the Study of Religions.

Elements of Lived Religion by Ivan Strenski

1. Affiliation.

The most basic element of religious life is the way of interacting with people with each other. Through association, individuals establish and develop identification as to the meaning and intent of their activities. The general reality of the association of human beings therefore raises several questions including; is religiosity necessarily stratified? Will this have to be despotic? How can the association be established by religious rituals? What is the reason for ties of affiliations generated in religions sometimes deeper as compare to natural?

2. Material Nature of Religion.

All human beings exist in space and time, which is partially due to the nature of the material world around us that cause of sustainability for us. For instance, religious architectures perform a significant role in the founding of human life in a variety of contexts. He asks: What might Islam be without minarets called "Khana kaaba"? And he claims: no concept of Christianity without a horizon spots of steeples i.e. charges, Buddhism does not exist if there are not monasteries or temples? Although these religions could still exist without the visual context of their distinguishing architecture. The question raised by Strenski is that the above-mentioned religions would be similar without architecture? Or just take minor modifications in holy places of worship; a Switch the colours from white to shine-orange of the ancient Congregational Church of New England. If the cemetery can be walled or close or change, what will be the impact on its holiness? Is there a particular language to apply universally for holy space? And will it be more or less sacred if

there is a walling or fencing in the cemetery? Is the language of sacred space general or even universal? Under which circumstances will religious materiality help or impede a religious belief?

3. Cultural and Social Context of Religion.

Once we have developed allegiance as a reasonable role to be social beings and therefore religious part of being, we can grasp the several types of sociability which affiliates perceive. in that case, 'community' and 'culture,' which are seen in analytical and the philosophic perspective — can be considered as 'emergent' in life and therefore as drivers of their diverse series of challenges for their religion. Discussions on the relative worth about what peoples 'act' and what is their 'thinking' are not unique to the research of religion. However, a study in the whole area of human behaviour, in general, is nothing new. One of these questions is that behaviours are just social. The idea is that if they are social, they are not quite as true as, claim, internal perceptions or convictions in religious potency. The belief is that a religion that focuses on 'rites and rituals' seems to be something unreal and hollow. As we begin to discuss these problems, a range of similar questions arise. To what degrees can a religious rituals system, for instance, exist without religious faith? It is the articulation of religious beliefs and ethical values?

4. Sentimental Life.

The life of emotions may be the most refractive but popular aspect of religious life. The world of religious life is packed with emotions, moods, observations and behaviours with, or even more, certain facets of human life. What would be religion beyond sentiments of remorse and honour, the amusement of superiority and confidence, knowledge and desperation, devotion and fear? Emphasis on emotions also leads us to emotional disruption or communication mechanisms. What is the reason that religious music and sentiments, for example, so strongly connected? In what ways, religion functions to play with emotions; by controlling the human behaviour or manipulation of their sentiments? So, probably, we must avoid believing

that emotions and intellect are segregated. Is anything exist there as emotional religious cognitive?

5. Human being as bodies.

Probably, our bodies can be seen only as a part of the physical nature of human existence. Yet they are more than in their special and intimate relationship with our personalities. We are chivalrous, desirable, or alluring; adolescent, mature; Booming; men or women, straight or homosexual, white, brown, black and much more. The beings or human bodies might also be presented either completely or in part — the divine 'political body' of the emperor, Or the scent of purity that rises out of the corpses of a priest, monk, saint the teeth of Buddha or stubble associated with Muhammad Prophet, the 'arm' of God Almighty. What would be more important? Moreover, what can be, if there is any, the function of basic human biology?

By way of conceptual analysis, I want to say that the concept of lived religion is connected to the concept of popular religion. In the opinion of [Cristian Parker 1998], popular religion, unlike official Religion is a religion of rituals and myths, visions and feelings, the body and the search for this universal well-being. From a socio-scientific viewpoint, the definition of "popular religion" is hard to give, because what popular religion is meant depends on the context. The official religion in cities is more dominant, for instance, in locations with a stark contrast between rural and urban environments. Whereas in rural areas and among the illiterate populations there appears to be more influence of popular religion (e.g. syncretic elements of Islam and spiritualism).

Some scholars are describing popular religion, not in terms of urban/rural division or colonial background, but particularly concerning class division; the upper class follows the official religion and the popular religion is followed by the lower class. In line with Gramsci's vision, these theorists often consider popular religion as a means of resistance against the prevailing culture. The religion of the majority of the population may be viewed as the official and the oppressed ethnic population is disregarded in the domain of incoherence to the public interest as a popular religion.

Such popular religious doctrines are characteristic of the Afro-American and Oceanic tribal societies when they encounter Christianity. As [Parker 1996] states in the sociological context that the gods of the victory get survival when a conquest happens, but they are treated as deities or sorcery for the conqueror. This sort of popular religion then becomes a repository of the myths and the rites of aboriginal cultures and offers a place to deal with the de-acculturation phase that is embedded in the monotheistic and colonial mechanism. In Latin America, for example, Blancarte [2000, 600] refers to that cycle as certain: "Indians, like Africans, have tried to use all accessible means to survive, particularly religious, under both the colonial and western-liberal regimes. Instead, they engage in a dynamic connection within a prevailing set of creeds. The Indian and mainstream majorities need not develop a separate religious observance, fully sovereign from ecumenical bodies. Popular religion has thus become a tool of rebellion to many people, to integrate into the popular culture and religion". This disparity amongst ethnic communities does not happen if a stronger religion appears in a region, but if a non- migrating class travels to a foreign land and carries the religion of that land with them. Pace [1979] states that the popular religion, for Italian authors and researchers, is indeed a phenomenon followed by social classes. That is particularly practised by the class of subalterns and the pastoral class, most of them but not entirely. Davidson [1991] recalls that Peasantry is the major part of the community in the period of Gramsci. We, therefore, may expect Gramsci to be motivated by the same grassroots perception about popular religion. But the popular religion is not always that of the underprivileged. Nevertheless, in recent times in the modern world popular religion has been so dynamic that the distinction among both of these religious sub-areas is not as obvious as it was in the past.

Enzo Pace [1987] reveals while applying Niklas Luhmann's theory of diverse society that mystics (in Troeltsch's sense) have become a way of religious neo-populism. Although the popular religion seems to be a more complicated composite, it may be better described than opposing all the harsher modes of operating of the

conventional religious organization as a religion taking into account contextual criteria, emotional contact and face-to-face encounters [Pace 1987].

During the modern and the developed period, theology was to take the path placed by the Cause period and there has not been strong recognition of mystical forms of faith [Bouma 2006]. Although today in this era of the world, we are going to experience a contrary phenomenon. Current projections reveal that there is a rise in the belief in the devil. Most people tend not to be religious but they are not secular. Without belonging, they believe and may consider themselves as more spiritual (often through different religions) rather than religious. Religion tends to interact with institutional/coordinated forms of daily life while spirituality is seen mostly by individuals looking inside as a self-authored quest. The cultural influence of traditional religious institutions has decreased through secularism caused by globalization, but the quest for more personal relationships in religion has increased, that is, the pursuit of spirituality. In several empirical studies, the young generation has more interest in the following spirituality than being religious.

The word 'spirituality' was originally used to refer to elite religious practices during the 17th century; today it has a different connotation. Social scientists have proposed that "religion" can be replaced by "spirituality," because this concept is more relevant to the modern pursuit of faith within popular culture. Most of the people consider themselves simultaneously as "spiritual" and "religious. For instance, Wuthnow [2001, 307] argues that "several individuals who follow their modes of spirituality, still visit mosque, church and synagogue". However, it is also noteworthy according to Troeltsch's research on mysticism that has remarkable similarities with the current spiritual phenomenon. Troeltsch believed that mysticism at the advent of the 20th century was the clandestine belief of the educated elite, and predicted that this form of religiosity would eventually predominate in the educated class of the whole world [Campbell 1978]. Campbell [1978] saw this as a prescient growth of new religious denominations at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Today, at the advent of the 21st century, spirituality became much more significant and so

prevalent. Through this context, spirituality; a kind of religious belief followed by all social classes can be argued as adjustable with mysticism; a kind of religious belief followed by the aristocratic class of society. The popular religion, as spirituality was redeveloped and used by different social groups. Knoblauch [2008] also refers to the breakdown of the limits between official religion and mainstream culture, which make spiritualism a common religion, in our world of technology. Hamberg [2009] also notes some correlations among these two religious ideologies, even though recent debates of spirituality as compared to popular religion overshadowed the area of research.

We may note that the whole text about religion found in Google Books has used both key terms; spirituality and mysticism rather than popular religion and have modified over time. In the 1880s, the word "mysticism" was used more (at least in written form) and hit its peak in the 1930s and it stayed the most widely used term until the 1980s, globalization developed. The word "spirituality" was used at that time as a motto for these un-institutionalized religions and in fact, increased considerably in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the word "spirituality" is used by people who have 'Googled' it since 2004 and it was much greater in use than 'popular religion' or "mysticism". The spike had been in 2004 and since then it has declined; nevertheless, it clearly shows that the word spirituality is still prevalent.

The Baudrillards' [1988, 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1998] Theories of consumer society are the root of the word "hyper-real religion". For Baudrillard, now the culture is organized by symbols that make it hard to differentiate between the true and the absurd: therefore the constant state of the world has crashed due to that hyper-reality. Nevertheless, recently the difference is that the official religion seeks not only to adhere to the indigenous culture but also to the way of life of the people. It is not a question of modifying the religion to fit in a whole society, but rather of tailoring a specific method, known as life styling, to one of their 'religious output. Hence, it would not be forgotten that religion has certainly unhitched its influence on culture and it is not a communal power anymore, which unites all the social spheres of any

society. Bourdieu [1987, 119] refers to "dissolution" to demonstrate that religion has become a sub-area of society where priests or religious scholars are no longer the only experts in religion.

The third components of my conceptual framework are the theories of the everyday. The concept of everyday is persistent as a centre of debate in Humanities like social and cultural studies and gradually broadening its scope in other fields as history and politics. A significant amount of philosophical research has been devoted to "Everyday" as a theoretical concept. Everyday life, on the first glimpse, appears to be all over, then does not seem anywhere. Many researchers have been trying to trace a larger and complex theoretical origin of the concept of everyday since the early 2000s, which stretches back to the middle of the 1900s and reflects a wider variety of cultural sources. Such studies are great, enlightening and beneficial to any scholar fascinated in the concept of "everyday", but in consideration of the authors and theorists they address, are still androcentric.

Maurice Blanchot [1987] defined the term 'everyday' where it can be experienced the spontaneous or pre-reflexive undergoes- a way of life in the future'- without absolutism of abstract approach. The concept of 'Everyday has been explained by Michel de Certeau "as a realm of practical coping up which has not been merged into the discipline and which has demonstrated the robust ingenuity that 'grows just when practice stops to get its dialect. Henry Lefebvre [2002, 196] for whom the everyday accounts seem to be more skeptical regarding arguments for autonomy from broad organized activities in the field of social life, therefore he used the concept to define the "degree" of the reality of society and culture relating to the exponentially increasing rationalism of modernity but still mainly avoided; however, it is the very 'everyday' which bears the prospects.

Ben Highmore among other contemporary critics, played an important role in enhancing the critical ways of thinking and approaches in the analysis of everyday life and, more specifically, for researchers who are working in the humanitarian sciences. His theory has also inspired my recent study about culture. The approach by Highmore

primarily focuses on discrepancies and the dynamics of the theorization and delineation of the usual categorization of 'Everyday'. This has also been expressed in his writing "The Everyday Life Reader" [2000] addressing the issues and included several women 's cultural critiques and analysis of sociologists from the 1980s and far beyond, namely Mary Kelly, Carolyn Steedman, Kristin Ross and Dorothy E. Smith. Similarly, Highmore historically discusses the gender-specific ways of routine such as domestic chores like cooking and explores the socio-esthetic analysis of feminine cooking by LuceGiard [2004, 321]. Earlier fieldwork studies have emphasized the division across the everyday lives of 'male' and 'female', to such an extent that they identify them as 'two distinct realms that go unnoticed. A further dichotomy, between the practice and values and ambiguities in everyday as a concept, consists of a 'public domain' specified for a man and 'domestic domain' for a woman would be appropriate to complement by Hirschkind [2014] on the list of 'Orientalistic,' binary critics. In a parallel trend, PaninaWerbner's research of Muslim Punjabi female's transgressive manifestation of individuality, novelty and entertainment during many cultural moments like a rite of Hina night on wedding, could also be subjected to a same specific argument.

Turning to the more current and comprehensive review by Michael Sheringham in "Everyday Life: Surrealist Theories and Practices" [2006], it suddenly begins to feel that this gender gap does not reflect the spatial and selective constraints facing all writers. Sheringham's ambitious research has highlighted a wide selection of mainly continental thinkers, critics and cultural scientists and authors as George Bataille, Michel Leiris, Maurice Blanchot, George Lukas, Jean Baudrillard, Henri Lefebvre, MatinHeidigger, Andre Breton, Ronald Barthas, Stanly Cavell, Guy Debord, J.-A Boifford and LudwingWittingestein.

Hviid Jacobsen [2009] figured out that within the "modelling" of that field, more contemporary research was carried out by Highmore [2002] and Gardiner [2000]. From this and other writings, Jacobsen typically summarizes "the complexity of everyday life" in seven beneficial dimensions: site, time, space, attitude, objects,

approaches, objects, perspective, scholarly abstractions and experience. It provides an extensive map of everyday lives, a sort of "cloud atlas," "a maze of stories intertwined" that could seek to capture its "multitudes of encounters" [Ebrey 2016, 159]. The term "everyday" has emerged as an area of "experiences" as well as an analytical concept. This happened through three mechanisms identified by Watson and Bennett [2002, 10-13]. Firstly, the advent of "the public," "parts of the democratic transition of culture and political lives" that defined specific issues, attitudes and social entities as "in-shared", "usual" and "common," highly acknowledged to practice in the public views and transmitted using technology. Second, how the image of common and ordinary contributed to the "appearance of new modes of social institutes," that allowed more analysis of the term "everyday".The third and the last mechanism is the rise of new social and progressive movements, including LGBTs and feminism that are generating new insights into the power dynamics of everyday and different lifestyles.

In past, dominant factors of the theory of everyday tended to concentrate on popular culture, supported daily life and the general public and were primarily influenced by the ideas of Michel de Certeau and Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre and de Certeau are still two among the most prolific in the field of critical paradigm as compare to other critics like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and Sigmund Freud, because their studies are explicitly focused on daily life, unlike other major criticism of everyday as a concept. Whilst feminist critical theorist has highlighted the gendered restrictions for all those paradigms and the research of cultural scientists including such IenAng, Kristin Ross and Meaghan Morris is extensive and effective, it is surprising that no feminist critic has produced a critical analysis about everyday life. However, this surprisingly has to mention that most canonical theoretical concepts for "Everyday life" are discussed by male authors. Before the 1970s, it was a prevalent historical omission of women from the field of the intellectual discourse of these social concepts. Feminist critical theorists need to look at alternate modes for the different areas of culture like literature, live reporting, and art —for more and probably relevant perspectives and backgrounds of everyday theories. This is even more surprising than

those of the absence of a woman-written critic of daily life, is the gender discriminated work used as a phenomenon in a cultural and intellectual context of everyday as a concept.

In fact, for most of the social researchers, the un-directive everyday is correlated with all of its complexity and the variability due to the diversified nature of daily life affairs. In overview, there is an eminent feature in the theoretical approach for everyday, which sees the diversity and spontaneity of everyday practices and encounters that are not easy to conform to the main conceptual system of modernity and thus finds in the everyday for the means that can be critically questioned of this conceptual ordering. Girard and de Certeau offer the renowned framework that ordinary cultures are described as 'a viable science of the particular one' that causes of upturning our thought patterns wherein the scientific pragmatism knows about general.

When we talk everyday life in the context of Pakistani culture which is the culture of Islam and everyday lives revolve around religious principles, Asad Talal comes out of critiques of the anthropological approach of Islam where theologically Islam was quite missing until around the 1980s. He relied on Foucauldian thoughts of discourse, articulated the issue of Islam as just an anthropological topic. Everyday lives in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan can be explained and defined through the following claim by Talal:

"If you would like to begin writing about 'Everyday or Anthropological Islam', you should start from a notion what Muslims do in their daily lives which are included and related to the original holy text (Quraan and Hadith) of Islam. Islam is not a specific social system and not as stratified ethics and beliefs. Islam is just a traditional system".

Asad described 'tradition' as 'instituted practice' permitted through a discursive tradition. Some of the major critics of this philosophy have stressed that individuals who identify themselves as Muslims live and construct different types of identity in their everyday life, according to several spiritual, sentimental and aesthetical records

that are not necessarily approved by the religious traditional discursive system. Such scholars emphasize "the everyday life" in a context of 'indeterminacy, openness, and unclarity' in Islamic practice in defining aspects of Religion and Muslim's morals that are not appropriately represented on the Asadian discursive model of Islamic traditional system. Robbins emphasizes that traditions and beliefs 'provide everyday lives a great deal of the ways to progression or at minimum a sense of moral ability'. Robbins theory can be linked with the everyday culture of Pakistani people who claim that their religious beliefs give them strength for moralities and good deeds.

"In the cultural act…religious is substantial; in the religious act…cultural is formal": The everyday Islam of Pakistanis

The relationship between religion and culture has been magniloquently defined by Tillich in this statement as "in the cultural act…religious is substantial; in the religious act…cultural is formal". Now I explain how I used this and the conceptual framework which I described in the 1st paragraph to conduct empirical research among the Pakistani citizens. Of course, not all ideas that I described above went directly to my empirical studies but the following ideas informed them: first, the idea of the diversity of the ways to practice religion, second, the idea of lived religion, and third, the insights taken from the theories of the everyday. Participants were asked to describe their everyday activities to examine cultural heritage and religiosity in daily life. Open-ended interviews were categorized in multiple sections to grasp research about the role or impact of Islam and religiosity level of people in everyday activities and how they defend their deeds (culturally or religiously) and the intersection of religion with culture. Participants were asked to describe their everyday activities to reveal about cultural heritage and religiosity in daily life. Open-ended interviews were categorized in multiple sections of questions to grasp research about role or impact of Islam and religiosity level of people in everyday activities and how they defend their

deeds (culturally or religiously) and the Intersection of religion with culture and vice versa (please, see the detailed description of my fieldwork in Chapter 2).

Most of the Muslim participants reported that Islam has an important role in their lives from minor daily activities to serious decision making. Aslam typically reports that:

> Islam has a great role in my life. I cannot make any decision against Quran or God. Allah Almighty is my creator and He is responsible for all my profit and loss of life but it is possible only with a condition if I will involve Him in my life. That's why I feel Him (God) always with me.

Hussain justifies Aslam in similar remarks:

> I am a businessman and I start my work every day with a prayer to God and I know, I have respect and profits all due to sound belief in God because He knows well that I try my best to be pure in my dealings and do not want to earn with fraud. Allah blesses me more when I avoid the impure ways of earning for His willingness.

Asad typically reports about his core relationship with God as:

> I am working as an accountant in a company and my salary is two hundred dollars. I am married and have two kids and Allah has blessed me with everything and I am grateful for all that I have. I strongly believe in God that He will help me in my children's education and marriages.

When the people were asked about their daily religious practices (which is outlined as five times prayers, to attend mosque especially on Friday, to recite Quran) just to measure the religiosity level of Muslims, the majority of participant have a normal level of religiosity with a high bond of commitment. They are not that active in main daily worship practices but in their daily life affairs, they have a strong relation with religion. As Ismail informs:

I am a tailor and I start my every day with the recitation of the Quran and pray to God Almighty for profitable day and wish to refrain from sins. I cannot pray five times a day because it is hard for me to close my shop every few hours. I try my best to be a good Muslim in my daily affairs but I cannot be a practising Muslim due to the nature of my job.

Saeed typically answers similarly Islam informed:

I start my day with Fajar prayer (first prayer of the day) and recitation of Quran but the whole day, I cannot pray because I am a worker on someone's restaurant. But I realize that Allah is watching our deeds all in the whole day and night and He blesses me the power to perform my all daily activities with sincerity.

Amjad is a religious man who has a sound belief in God as well as on the positive effects of daily practices of Islam. He comments:

I pray five times a day and practice all the pillars of Islam (prayers, alms, fasting, pilgrimage and faith in God and all His Prophets). I left my job as a manager in the glass industry because the owner did not allow me to pray. I started my business just because I could not compromise on practising Islam. Actually, in my opinion, prayers refrain us from sinning by making our faith refresh after every few hours.

When asked about the involvement of religion in the everyday lives of people, informants typically reported that Islam is the right pathway to live a prosperous life and it guides them in all wakes of life. Zulqurnain reports:

Islam plays an influential role in our lives. It teaches us how to deal the life affairs even Islam has highlighted the rights of neighbours, slaves, subordinates and minorities. There is not any issue of life that has not been discussed in Islam. Everything has been mentioned clearly in the Quran. So, I think the religion of Islam is perfect in guiding the complete code of lives.

Furqan informs about the influence and involvement of religion in his life as:

> When I was a child, my parents always used to make me afraid of God to teach me ethics. They used to say that my bad deeds will be a cause of the anger of God and He will punish me and when I was doing something good, they used to assure me that God will reward me soon. So, I think, Islam played a great role as a monitor to make me a better human being.

Saifullah reports:

> I am the president of Law Bar Association and I must give this credit to my mother who always prays for me. I have a strong belief in her prayers and God who always listen to my mother's wishes. So, I want to say that Islam has the greatest role in coping up with hardships in throughout my life and I do Istahara (the specific way of prayer to ask for advice from God through intuition i.e dream) before any serious decision.

Aimin justifies the role and impact of religion in his life by explaining the Quran:

> I am a professor of Religious Studies and I have read the Quran in detail. I want to summarize the role and impact of Islam in our lives as it is complete religion that shed light in all spheres of life whether it's a matter of family (verses of Quran about rituals of birth, marriage, divorce, kin's taboos, male and female's duties and rights, inheritance rights, an adaptation of child), economy or politics.

Qaiser explains his remarks in a similar way to clarify the importance of religion in his life:

> As a Muslim, I feel lucky because whenever I am depressed I pray to God and recite Quran and it gives me mental relaxation and inner power. So, Islam influences my life as a spiritual healer in my crushing times.

When the people were asked about the way of treatment in physical or mental illness, most of the people report that medical treatment is essential but the disease must also be dealt with a spiritual way because God is the very one who tests us with disease and He is the real healer. As Raheem reports:

> There are mainly three ways to of treating any disease in our culture; medical, homeopathical, and spiritual. Mostly, in my family, we prefer medical treatment in serious problem otherwise spiritual treatment is also practised when someone has a headache, depression and mostly for kids.

Imran informs about the connection between medical and spiritual treatment:

> Medical treatment is required when the disease is complicated but we believe that all diseases come with the consent of God and they must be treated with the help of God. This is possible only when we consider both; medical and spiritual at the same time.

But Raheem contradict to most of the respondents and he reports:

> In this age of science; we cannot hang ourselves with a spiritual way of treatment. We have to trust in medical treatments. I am a witness of many cases in my village where the people go to the religious scholar for healing their wounds caused by snake or scorpion.

On asking about the source of their knowledge in Islam, the typical response of participants was that they listened from local religious preachers or elders or a book written by Islamic local scholars. Yaseen reports:

> I got all my knowledge about Islam from my family and Hateeb of a mosque in my locality. And if I have confusion about any issue concerning Islam, I visit religious scholars to ask for guidance. The reason is, I cannot read the Quran and I believe in scholars who have broadened knowledge about the doctrine of Islam.

Rehman informs in a similar way like Yaseen and clarifies:

> My first institution to get religious knowledge is my mother and grandparents and afterword I visited a local mosque to learn the Quran and the principles of Islam. I recite the Quran in Arabic but I cannot understand the underline meaning of the Holy book. So, my knowledge about Islam is not directly from the Quran, actually, it is from society.

So, it was an indication that the majority of Muslims has a lack of knowledge about real Islamic principles which is mention in the Quran because they recite the Quran in Arabic which is un-understandable for Pakistani Muslims.

When informants were asked about the distinction between religion and culture concerning an example of cultural tradition or Islamic ritual, it was hard for them to clarify. Adeel points out the difficulty in separating his religion (Islam) from culture.

> When I was born (1977) it had already passed thirty years of independence of Pakistan and government was built on bases of Islamic doctrines and Sharia Law (Law of Quran and Sunnah). So, it is really hard for me to differentiate my cultural norms and Islamic rituals. But I can say that every cultural norm has a religious justification because the culture has to follow a religion.

Usman responds in this regard as:

> According to my observation, Islam is a mirror of our social norms and social norms area mirror of Islam. Both institutions seem to like each other. So, it is difficult for me to differentiate both separately.

Asad explains about the influence of Islam on culture:

> As a Muslim, I try to do everything according to Islam but when I have to notice the distinction between my culture and religion, it is not easy to do because both look the same i.e. they are dominant on each other. For example, my everyday activities area depiction of my culture but area reflection of Islam i.e. to attend a wedding, funeral or birth all is a part of the culture but we have to perform under Islamic preaching.

Hassan reports about his sound belief in a statement that Islam has a great impact on our culture:

> It can be seen that everything that happens in our culture is deeply influenced by religion. And you can also notice that other religions like Christianity do

not have influence as much as Islam on society. Even Christians are mostly following Islamic rituals by considering them as cultural norms.

Informants have a different point of views concerning similarities between Islam and culture. Khalil reports:

> In my society, we have a lot of customs that come from other cultures (like Hindu culture) and are not in Islam. But when we follow these customs, they should be the reflection of Islam.

Shehram provides an example of the influence and similarity of Islam and culture:

> Islam has a great influence on our culture and both seem similar to each other. For example, females whether of any religion wear Hijab (obligatory in Islam) and all women cover their heads because it is also a cultural value in Pakistani society.

When the informants were asked about the distinction between their religious practices and cultural norms, there were various responses. Imran typically reports:

> If you read the history of Pakistani culture, it has been influenced by many un-Islamic foreign cultures. The latest culture that intermingled in our culture is Hindu culture which influenced our culture and it is not easy to get rid of its customs. Like, marital customs and caste systems are the reflection of purely Hindu culture and there is no concept of these customs in Islam.

On asking about the oppression of women (usually, supposed in religion) most of the informants who belong to the educated class have justified that it is a cultural thing and cannot be attributed to religion. Adu-l-Rehman reports:

> Pakistan consists of ethnic cultures with the majority of Muslims. You must notice that the treatment with women varies culture to culture despite the same religion. So, in my opinion, women, violence or oppression cannot be attributed to Islam and most of the marital practices contradict religion.

Suhail justified the reasons for some unpleasant practices like the oppression of women as:

> Some traditions are purely cultural in our society due to the external influence of other Un-Islamic cultures and they are too powerful to abolish. For example, dowry system, child marriages, inter-marriage i.e. in caste or sect and domestic violence, all of these are cultural practices, not Islamic ones. But sometimes people get confused and intertwine culture with religion.

The author is studying in Russia and some Pakistanis are also studying here who became the source of information as an interviewee. They shared their views about wedding customs which are not Islamic. As Waseem reports:

> I am a software engineer and got married ten years ago. My in-laws gave me a car as a present at my wedding and my wife brought a dowry cost of fifteen thousand dollars. Recently, my sister has a wedding and her in-laws are demanding the same what I received and it is really hard for us to fulfil their demands. But what can be done! It's an obligatory custom in our culture with a fact that it contradicts with Islam.

Azeem has similar remarks as:

> I feel pain when I came to know by my family about any wedding function and the materialistic demands of bridal by the groom's family. I know mostly bridal's family have to take out a bank loan to meet all customs and it takes years to pay back. Even a lot of girls remain unmarried in their whole life due to poverty. You know well, it is all un-Islamic but the part of the culture and still going to practice.

But Asad has tried to justify the reason for cultural traditions which are not Islamic:

> You can notice a lot of changes are going to happen globally due to technology. So, this is also impacting our culture with the influence of other cultures and religions. I am Christen and we are practising the same traditions

as Muslims are doing. I know all of them are not from my religion (Christianity) or Islam but are the production of global culture.

Fawad explains how the media and culture influence his culture:

Two main elements are going to impact our social norms is media and religion. In every home, the world has been involved unnoticeably. Dramas, films, and all type of social media has made a world like a small village and revolutionalizing the whole world. So, the people in Pakistan are also taking the same influence as the people in other worlds. But when my society gets a step diverted from religion, they are brought back again by our religion because religious preaching system is influential in our society.

While talking about the education system whether it should be religious or modern, the answers were variant according to the class of occupation or educational level of informants. As Saeed (professor of Physics in University) reports:

I think, religious education is more important to make the children civilized and they must do everything in light of Islam. I am not against the modern education system; it is also important to survive along with society in this technological era.

4.2. Everyday Life Through the Lens of Pakistani Muslim: Empirical Analysis

Role of Islam has become significant on public and political level especially when religion is being supposed as an obstacle in social integration and global development [Yasemin 2014, 54]. So, it is important to explore how religious the Muslims are and it is only possible by their every life and by knowing that how they use their cultural and religious thoughts in their daily lives.

The focus of this chapter is to study the everyday life of Pakistani people especially concerning religion (Islam). It has been revealed that the culture within religion and religion within the culture. And I attempted to know the impact of religion on culture and level of religiosity among people in their daily lives. My aim is also, as a locale person of Pakistan, to reveal the actual mindset through the lens of the daily life of Pakistani Muslims, who are supposed as orthodox and sometimes radical on a global level. So, here the researcher has divided the daily life of her informants into two dimensions; religious and cultural. The reason for dividing is that everyday life particularly in developing or underdeveloped societies revolves around both the culture and religion [Mc Daniel 2010, Morgan 2009]. So, the empirical analysis conducted through semi-structured interviews (responses of informants in form of direct dialogue have been described above in chapter) is elaborated here and the first dimension will be everyday life with more focus on culture and secondly, everyday life with the level of religiosity will be discussed.

Informants typically delineated while talking about the junction of religion and culture that there is a historical relationship between both the social institutions and both have to be compatible with each other. It finding gives a novel direction to past cultural analysis and also support David Morgan's analysis that culture, as well as religion, give the complementary context of expressions as a religion by import and culture by shape or form [Morgan 2009, 89].

It was really hard for participants to distinguish between Islamic practice and cultural norms (already has been justified the reasons in chapter II). But it was surprisingly crystal clear by the majority of the participants that Islam has a more direct influence on culture as compare to cultural impact on religion. For example, Islamic preachers have more authority in all matters whether political, social or even family matters and people also give reference to their source of knowledge by them. So, it is an indication that culture is a follower of religion, that's why there are more similarities than distinctions between Islam and culture of Pakistan and both have a great influence on the everyday life of people.

In many of the occasions, the fine line between culture and religion is so ambiguous that even notifying such variations could be tantamount, for example, committing blasphemy or honour killing or justification of domestic violence [law of Pakistan related to rape and blasphemy and honour killing; Pakistan Penal Code Act XLV 1980 in the era of zia-ul-Haq] is justifiable religiously and particularly in culture, by the majority of informants. But, the intensity in their opinion varies from culture to culture, for instance, the people in Northern Part (NWFP and Balochistan) where daily life has more impact of religion have more rigid views regarding this and the cases happened mostly in these areas (honour killing is the purely a custom of tribal areas and bluntly justified) [BBC; 8th May 2019]. However, in these kinds of cases, religiosity has been found as a reason for increasing intolerant and aggression or gives the justification to wrongdoer [Zakar 2013, 802, Naz 2017, 92]. For instance, it has been explored that rigid followers of the religion or more traditional people from rural or tribal areas (age and education factors also matter here i.e. old and illiterate people) are more likely to be oppositions of liberalism and modernism because they think that it is a threat to the religion (Islam) and cultural values. Similarly, Mc Daniel [2010] discussed that most religious people have a weak level of tolerance and they always try to defend themselves under the cover of religion.

When the informants were asked to choose a way of education (religious or modern) for children, eight in ten informants choose the traditional or religious education, even the highly qualified were in favour of also religious with modern education. Few of the respondents (all belongs to a tribal Pashtun and Baloch culture where education ratio is 9% and due to boys schooling not of girls) said that they are in favour of only religious education, especially for girls. They justified that women will not go to earn, so why they need modern education. This finding gives a notion that cultural custom is stronger than religion because religion allows everyone for every type of education without gender discrimination.

Eventually, it was found by asking general opinions about some social and political issues (i.e. honour killing, blasphemy, polygamy, women domestic violence,

women's repression already discussed in previous chapters) to measure their concerns either they are extremist or against extremism. There were a fair number of participants who were in support of Islamic extremism or fundamentalism. They were trying to justify their opinions in light of Islam. As Juergens Meyer [2000] denotes another aspect or criticism of essentialism of religion through a functionalist lens as religion might be a tool to justify cruelty and terrorism. Like in many cases, unequal treatment with women minorities associated with different religions and homosexuals and restricting measures of abortions, all are justified or survived in the shadow of religion, even when there is no existence of such postulation in the Holy Book or scripture [Rubeena 2013, Critelli 2010].

It was surprisingly hundred percent responses that Islam has an important role in the lives of informants from minor daily activities to serious decision making. They were mostly connecting their opinions with Islam but generally, the majority of participants have a normal level of religiosity in practice which is outlined as five times prayers, to attend mosque on Friday, to recite the Quran once in a day. They are not so active in above-mentioned practising rituals but in daily life they have a strong relation with religion like childbirth or death rituals (funeral), bringing up the children with Islamic codes and outside the homes, they bargain by saying that they have a strong belief in God, so that, they cannot do corruption. It is essential to coding here that Professor Riaz Hassan has conducted a research of ten Muslim majority countries including Pakistan with the aim to measure religiosity in everyday life. His statistics for Pakistan explored that "Country is highly orthodox with very high religious commitment but in practising rituals they are not as active as in everyday affairs " [Riaz 2008].

It was found out on asking about the relationship of participants with God and how they show it. Most informants reported that they have a strong relationship with God because God is the creator of all creatures and responsible to feed them but the condition to make the God happy, they need to believe him in all ways and remember Him all the time. They explained that their belief in God refreshes their religiosity by

following it in the whole day activities and God bless them more. But it has been surprisingly cleared that women are more religious and have an intimate relationship with God rather than men. It can be the reason that normally, Women bring up their children by teaching Islamic principle and even they make them afraid of God to stop them from immorality or to convince them for ethics. This finding also justifies the previous studies regarding Islamic societies whether in any country that females are comparatively more religious and spiritually committed [Riaz 2008, 87, Pakistan Gallup Survey 2017].

Regarding the role of Islam in people's lives, every informant reported that Islam is the right pathway ("Sera'at-e-Mustaqeem" in Arabic) to live a prosperous life and it guides them in all wake of life. Islam guides them in coping up with hardships through patience and spirituality and teaches them the codes and ethics for treating others. They explained that Islam even has taught them how to purify their body, heart and mind as well as manners as guests and hosts. So, Islam is complete religion in all codes of life whether it's a matter of family (verses of Quran about rituals of birth, marriage, divorce, kin's taboos, male and female's duties and rights), economy and even politics.

Participants accentuated the importance of Islam in all aspects of life which indicates that verses are intrinsic but religiosity in people's life is extrinsic. Because when it was asked to participants about how they are practising Islam on daily basis, most of the participants typically answered that they cannot manage time for all five prayers but they try to pray, at least, Fajar (first prayer of the day). A minority of the informants (from the area of NWFP) explained that they strictly observe the religious practices like all five prayers of the day, reciting Quran or following the dietary rules of Islam in everyday life. Most reporters answered that the institutional rituals of Islam are difficult to comply with but they try to follow the dietary laws as much as possible and solve their daily matters by following Islamic dictations.

On asking about the source of their knowledge in Islam, the typical response of participants was that they listened from local religious preachers or elders or a book

written by Islamic local scholars (Arabic to Urdu interpretation by male authors). They reported that they recite the Quran in Arabic which is un-understandable for Pakistani's Muslims. So, it was revealed that the majority of Muslims have a lack of knowledge about real Islamic principles which is mention in Quran purely in Arabic. Therefore, mostly they have negative or extreme stereotypes that make them contradict each other and cause of sectarianism and fundamentalism. There were few of the informants (teachers and some university students) who suggested that it is the obligation for Muslims to portray Islam genuinely and discourage the extreme stereotypes which are not the actual part of Islam.

It was conceded by forty percent responses (four out ten participants) that foreign cultures are impacting their culture directly and religion indirectly because Islam acculturates with multiple cultures before and after the freedom of Pakistan (i.e. Hinduism and Christianity). For instance, the wedding customs like inter-caste marriages, dowry, social status of widow and divorcee and many other daily life activities and thoughts at domestic level are practised according to Hindu culture (older people mostly stick to theses customs because they had been living with Hindus). Secondly, the modern culture (Britain's culture) which was tried to perish by Pakistani rulers, is still prevailing in various form through media and technology. So, the respondents had views that this Britain culture is still in the roots of Pakistani culture and affecting their religiosity.

They explained through their personal experiences how Islam is practised differently in different cultures and it made diversified doctrines of Islam (i.e. sects as Sunni, Shia, Wahabi, Deoband) which have their own rule of laws and practices but major pillars of Islam are same. And it is also clear from current writings and Islamic societies that there are different doctrines of Islam that have their own Interpretations of Islamic thoughts and practices. As Hill & Hood [2005] stated that "For a layman, the role of religious knowledge can be varied widely and it depends on the institutional structure of a given religion within a particular culture[s]. That's why the correlation to the knowledge of Islamic doctrine is always not clear. Scholars have identified the

matters of an overgeneralization but now they have begun to address, So, this acknowledgement supports 'Stone's theory of Dynamic interconnection between both 'culture and Islam' who argued that Islam has been adapted in diverse cultures which influenced Islam and divided it in more than one Islam or doctrines. That's why, Islam in Saudi Arabia, U.S.A and Pakistan is different.

However, the majority of participants reported that Islam has more influence on culture than culture has on religion. They justified their statement with personal examples that they have to follow the Islamic rules in every aspect of life and have to justify themselves with religious reference, even cultural norms also have to be followed according to it. So, it is crystal clear that Pakistani culture is shaped by Islam and people have a social and religious pressure to follow it whether they want or not.

A theme derived from participant's explanation about the influence of Islam on their lives and culture is that it was really hard to differentiate between customs and rituals (i.e. culture versus Islam). Casanova [1994] mentioned that there is some ambivalence between the distinction of religious rituals and cultural practices. But some of the informants were able to distinguish between religion and culture especially while talking about the oppression of women and defending religion. Nevertheless, participants added that women's repression in Muslim-dominated societies is antithetical to Islam and it is not the same in every society due to diversified cultures but it is undeniable that Islam is used for justifying the women's oppression due to patriarchal interpretation in male dominating societies.

But religious expressions vary considerably; there is also significant agreement among the religions of the world as to how religiosity must be expressed and measured. So, now I am going to give the second phase of analysis (I have divided everyday life into two parts as cultural life and religious life) of responses by Pakistani Muslims regarding their everyday Islam. There is a lot of research conducted on religiosity but not with the amalgamation of culture by highlighting everyday life. So, here for the religious phase of my analysis about everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims, I have applied the model of religiosity applied by a number of social scientists

[Yasmin 2014, Hassan 2008, Huber 2003 & 2009, Pew Research Center 2007, Brett feld & Wetzel 2007] with some additions or omissions and this model was presented by Stark and Glock [1968]. They classified five main dimensions (few of them used six dimensions) regarding the level of religiosity, in which most of the varying demonstrations of religiosity are manifested through different denominations of religion and it can be organized [Weinberger & Garriot 2009, Mason 2012, Hassan 2008, Mortos 2010]. These five dimensions are labelled ideologically, ritually, experientially, intellectually and consequentially. The combined evidence of religiosity from psychological and social research keeps supporting this multifaceted interpretation of religiosity. This multi-dimentional concept of religiosity influenced my research and evaluation of everyday Islam as well as an attitude toward gender belief of Pakistani Muslims. Researched has elaborated her empirical research through the five dimensions one by one.

The ideological dimension is the basic beliefs that a religious individual is anticipated to adhere [Schmidt & Memin 2012, Riaz 2008]. In the religion of Islam, there is a tremendous focus on assurance and deliberate belief. Some of the fundamental doctrinally based beliefs were described through Islamic Holy Scripture and were inquired from informants. The belief in the existence of God, faith in the revelations and miracles mentioned in Quran, belief in the reality of the satan, and believing that only those of us, who believe in the Muhammad as last Prophet, would able to go to heaven was the most popular and thus chosen to detect the intensity and degree of the ideological element of religiosity in Pakistani Muslims.

These are the five fundamental beliefs which identify the religiosity of Muslims and their everyday attitude. When respondents were asked about these beliefs compasses in ideological dimension, hundred percent informants completely believed without any doubts. Most of them reported that they find themselves believing all the time in the existence of Allah. On asking about the reality of the devil, all of them gave the same remarks that it exists and astray us from the right path of God. Half of the informants reported that devil astray them many times in daily life like they cannot

pray or practice good deeds and they easily bend to sinful deeds. But all of them have a strong belief that Muhammad Prophet will be as a saviour or source of salvation on the Day of Judgment. It was surprisingly contradicting to the researcher's hypothesis that seventy percent informants had a belief that the Muslims or the people who believe in Muhammad as the last Prophet would go to heaven. Theses all result in term of fundamental religious beliefs and its impact on their attitude towards everyday life shows that Pakistani Muslims have a high level of orthodoxy.

Ritualistic dimension includes particular deeds of religious piety and devotion which people practice to demonstrate their religious dedication [Garriot 2009, Schmidt & Memin 2012, Riaz 2008]. Mainly, there are four religious rituals that Muslims practise in everyday lives and researcher has used in this piece of research as an attempt to develop the ritual dimension of religiosity; Practicing of daily prayer; recitation of Qur'an paying alms; Fasting. On asking about the performance of daily prayers only thirty percent informants pray five times a day and most of them pray sometimes or only on Friday. Half of the respondents recite Quran regularly or several times in a week. Only ten informants reported that they Pay Zakat and sometimes they also cannot pay due to over-expenses and talking about fasting in the month of Ramazan is twenty-six respondents who try to practice it. Thus, it can be evaluated that Muslims in Pakistan have less degree of religious commitment in term of practising rituals.

Experiential dimension encompasses particular acts of worship performed in public or private [Yasemin 2014, Huber 2009]. All those experiences, emotions and feelings of a religious person involving some sort of bond with God or a supernatural being are included in this dimension. The interviewees were questioned: have they ever thought that they were in the presence or protection of God, or feeling that they were protected by the prophet Muhammad if they thought that they were punished or rewarded or by God, were they tempted by satan in daily lives whether in any deed and do they have a feeling of being afraid of Allah? Almost all respondents reported that they surely had this experience of being present and protected by Allah and

Prophet. Everyone has their different experience with the same sense of answer about the fear of Allah and His judgment to punish or rewarded on their sins and virtues. Therefore, the majority of informants use the teachings of the Quran and Islam in their everyday dealings to get reward and protection by Allah. Thus, the degree of experiential dimension is higher than the ritualistic dimension in everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims.

The main conclusion that can be revealed from this experiential dimension is that the feelings of fear and punishment are the main part of their experience to feel a sense of the Divine reality of God. It is shocking for researcher's expectation that Pakistani Muslims try to be ethical and good Muslims, not to make themselves better human beings or in the love of God but they are afraid of God due to being punished or tempted to get the reward. In this experiential dimension of religiosity, age and education are significant factors. These experiences of religious beliefs get higher with the increase of age and the more educated people have more encounters of religious experiences. The level of experiential religiosity in everyday Muslim lives is higher than the ritual dimension of religiosity.

The intellectual dimensionality of religiosity indicates that religious people are supposed to have some understanding of the fundamental beliefs of their religion as well as about the holy texts. The distinction regarding devotional acts and rituals is that rituals are usually public and obligatory, and devotional activities are highly private ways of worship and meditation only for the love of Divine [Schmidt & Memin 2012, Mortos at.al 2010, Riaz 2008].

Mostly, Muslims worship secretly beyond their religious obligations. The Muslims are dedicated to Holy Qur'an and believe that the messages in holy texts are the best and ultimate guide to make their conduct ethical. Many Muslims, therefore, use the Holy Quran as a healer to provide direction in their everyday lives. The respondents were asked: "To understand your everyday lives and your commitments on how and where to manage and invest your life, how to interact with others, how

your kids are raised, to what degree does the Qur'an assist you decide things in day to day life?

All the respondents reported that the Quran helps them in every way of life and often consult Quran to make certain decisions. They were using different similes to proof that everything about social, personal, religious, political and constitutional stuff has been mentioned in the Quran. As one of the informants said that the Quran is a guide for everyone and everything and it is like a bunch of flowers with all varieties. They commented that the last guidance that was sent by God to humanity is 'Islam'. It is indeed a guide from God intended for all, not just those who associate themselves with the religion. This uniformity raised by informants presented that Islam has attribute as transnational and it has been given to the rest of humanity.

Information regarding the observance of religious rituals privately, as a devotional dimension, age and gender are significant to mention; Women are more devotional in practising rituals in private as compared to men. And old people practice religious rituals privately more than young ones.

The consequential aspect involves the secular impact on the person of his religious faith, knowledge, practices and experiences. It comprises the all religious guidelines that indicate what humans should do and the behaviours that they should adopt as a result of their religion [Schmidt & Memin 2012, Yasemin 2014, Riaz 2008]. I justified this consequential dimension in my research as an impact of religiosity in Pakistani Muslims. Practising the Islamic daily rituals (Prayers and recitation of Quran) or religiosity level is higher in NWFP (one of the four provinces of Pakistan) due to the influence of Islamic institutions running with the Saud Arabian donations. Islam has a direct impact on culture more than culture on Islam. All the cultural norms have a depiction of religion and must have to be according to religious parameters that's why sometimes it is hard to distinguish between religious ritual and cultural norm. It can be concluded that Islam is the culture of Pakistan and Muslims want to obey Islam but in their way of understanding about Islamic doctrines due to lack of Quranic actual teachings because all the texts (Quran and Sunnah) is written in the

Arabic language. Lastly, the participants who are more religious in practising Islamic rituals, they have more intensive and rigid thoughts.

Careful assessment of the facts revealed that socio-demographical variables affected the extent of religious orthodoxy. Like, in Punjab and Sindh people have less degree of religious orthodoxy as compared to Balochistan and NWFP. Generally speaking, gender did not influence the level of religious beliefs, but in term of practising rituals, females are more committed than male as it also revealed by Riaz Hassan in "Inside Muslim Minds" [Riaz Hassan; 2008]. Age factor is also significant to mention those elderly people being quite more orthodox in their fundamental religious beliefs as well as in practising rituals in daily life. Education is also a major factor in measuring the degree of religious belief and commitment to religious practices. This was also against my expectations that people with higher levels of education were associated with the same level of orthodox religiosity as people with less education. But, in the case of observing religious practices, people with less education or illiterate are more committed than highly educated people.

Lastly, the participants who were more religious in practising Islamic rituals, they have more intensive and rigid thoughts. Like, Lehrer [2008] notes that intensify or strength of religiosity have various degrees. For instance, when one's participation in religious activities is moderate, it will make ones cool down and domestic violence will be decreased but it increases for those who are more active in religious participation. As, when participants were asked about the views for honour killing or women's freedom, more religious informants, were more in favour of honour killing and against women's equal rights or freedom.

In short, these findings indicate that Muslims in Pakistan have a high level of religiosity in beliefs and in following Islam in everyday matters of life. But regarding the practice of Islamic rituals (five prayers a day and recitation of Quran, visiting mosque) they are not as active as in following intimately and connect their all daily matters with religion. It can be concluded that Islam is the culture of Pakistan and Muslims want to obey Islam but in their way of understanding about Islamic doctrines

due to lack of Quranic actual teachings because all the texts (Quran and Sunnah) is written in the Arabic language. Therefore, the source of Islamic knowledge of people by local preachers and secondary literature i.e. translated text in local languages (Urdu). Practising the Islamic daily rituals (Prayers and recitation of Quran) or religiosity level is higher in NWFP (one of the four provinces of Pakistan) due to the influence of Islamic institutions running with the Saud Arabian donations. Islam has a direct impact on culture more than culture on Islam. All the cultural norms have a depiction of religion and must have to be according to religious parameters that's why sometimes it is hard to distinguish between religious ritual and cultural norm.

However, despite with all facts and findings, it would not be wiser to think that religion is the only rigorously and radically ascertaining these factors in life, because many other influences are also involved culturally and politically. All regions have their own historical, cultural, economic and religious backgrounds that significantly impact the lives of peoples. For instance, Wedding, childbearing and divorce are bound up with religious identity and involvement but also impact by local and foreign cultures. So, it can be concluded that everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims are not only the depiction of religion but also local cultures global culture is playing a role in changing their mindsets which is significant to make a change progressively in society.

CONCLUSION

In what follows I first address **results of the conducted research** and then touch upon recommendations and prospects for future research. The concern of this dissertation has been to find out the role and impact of religion "as a process of Islamization" in state politics and in the everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims. I aimed to examine what it means to be Muslim and how Pakistani Muslims make sense of Islam and how they interpret gender roles and beliefs culturally and religiously.

The **first task** of the dissertation was to analyze the existing approaches to the influence of Islam, to consider the ongoing discussions in the literature, and to identify the religious foundations of the genesis, content and social practices of Islamization. I have developed the theoretical framework, comprised from the following concepts: "lived religion", Islamization, gender, the everyday and religious nationalism. This framework was employed to look at the following three aspects of the contemporary Pakistani society: the everyday, gender relations and the state governance. First, I have elaborated the concept of 'lived religion' based on the views of Orsi, Lincoln, Ammerman and McGuire. All these researchers interpret the approach based on their particular objects and academic contexts, but in a slightly different way. For instance, everyday religion understood as observing contemporary religious lives comprises an essay by a social scholar Meredith B. McGuire, now one of the leading supporters of lived religion. Parker's concept of lived religion is connected with McGuire's idea of lived religion, which indicates that religious rituals and practices in daily life do not go down the direction of religious entities [McGuire 2008]. Second, the concept of Islamization in our dissertation was defined and explained with the ideas of different authors as Farzana Sheikh [2008], Riaz Hussain [2000, see also 1985], Rasul Bakhsh Rais [2017], Shafqat [2002], Mumtaz & Shaheed [1987] and Juris Pupcenoks [2012]. These scholars' ideas were employed to discuss the phenomena of Islamization as a

gradual process to inject religion in all sphere of society through political power. I differentiate between a narrow and a broad understanding of Islamization. A narrow understanding is that Islamization is the concrete political program which was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s and proclaimed increased justice and other public goods under Islamic laws made available by revelation. A broad understanding of Islamization deals with ambivalence toward modernity and its values that is expressed in the on-going attempts to "Islamize" the state, the society and the culture in Muslim majority countries undertaken by the nation-states in recent decades, including Pakistan. I demonstrated that this notion captures both the attempts of different political groups (i.e. the military) to capitalize on Islam and the various impact of this process on society, i.e. gradual move of Pakistan towards a theocratic legal framework, limiting females' roles in the public sphere, depicting women As the underlying cause for corruption and poor morals and the breakdown of cultural norms [Farzana 2008, 594, Mumtaz & Shaheed 1987]. I define Islamisation not as a fixed ideology but as *the processes and networks* by which various political actors try to capitalize on Islam and religious groups and citizens in Pakistan try to build their ideas of the 'true Muslim'. In the first half of the 20th century, the origin of the concept of Islamization rooted back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.Islamization is commonly seen as a phase of religious and cultural change aimed at expanding the involvement of religious entities and the intensity of religious observance particularly in Pakistani state and society [Pupcenoks 2012]. Pupcenoks [2012] suggested that Islamization would be better conceptualized through three approaches which concentrate on the Islamization of (i) education (ii) social policies (iii) economy. Islamism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with multiple aspects and each aspect has various functions and a particular set of factors. The Phenomena of Islamization as a process represent in various ways like repressive, tolerant and democratic Islamization [Pupcenoks 2012, 286]. For instance, both states; Pakistan and Turkey are Islamic democracies. The Islamization in Pakistan is mainly a kind of "repressive Islamization". While discussing Islamization in the context of Pakistan, it has been

explained by a lot of authors that how Islam has been being used in politics since the past seven decades of the history of Pakistan.

Third, the concept of gender' is a significant area of research for studying culture and religion. Thus, as a researcher of religion and culture, we are inspired by number of authors who talked about gender but the notion of Malory Nye [2008], Filomena Cretelli [2010], Rubeena Zakar [2013] and Sadaf Naz [2017] that directly influenced our work. For instance, Malory Nye argued that 'gender' is defined and distinct by cultural and religious background and it must be conceptualized and differentiate in the context of that particular culture and religion. Religious studies must be critical for gender. Muslim feminist and egalitarianists have drawn the concentration of researcher to the social, cultural and religious raise of gender in Islamic societies. So, Egalitarian and traditional both school of thoughts regarding gender have been discussed.

Fourth, the concept of the everyday has been explained with the discussion on its definition, roots and expansion in research field. Several researchers have been trying to examine the historical roots of the theory of the everyday from the beginning of 20th century. Michel de Certeau clarified the idea of the everyday as a sphere of practices which had not been fused into any discipline. Jacobsen summarized "the complexity of everyday life" in seven beneficial dimensions: site, time, space, attitude, objects, approaches, objects, perspective, scholarly abstractions and experience. Whereas, Robbins emphasizes that traditions and beliefs 'provide everyday lives with a great deal of the way to progression or at minimum a sense of moral ability' [Robbins 2016]. Robbins theory can be linked with the everyday culture of Pakistani people who claim that their religious beliefs give them strength for moralities and good deeds.

Fifth and the last as a theoretical concept is the link between culture and religion Focus of the work of Max Weber, Paul Tillich and Clifford Geertz, the concept "religion and culture" is employed by scholars to name a field that studies the links between these two fields and directly hit our dissertation.

To study religion in culture is to assume that everything is the outcome of human's beliefs, behaviour pattern and social structures. Religion is an aspect of human cultural systems and thus something that can be studied using the same tools and methods that are being used other components of culture. For instance, Geertz speaks about 'the cultural dimension of religious analysis' [1993, 89]. Whereas, the importance of the problem of the meaning in the definition of religion have also been elaborated with the reference of different authors.

The second task had to do with the explication of the conceptual logic of critical works on political and everyday Islam and with formulating and considering key problems caused by the process of Islamization. The key problems I identify are political and cultural. I considered how religious nationalism emerged into Islamic fundamentalism and evolved from a modern secular state to extreme vision of the Islamic state. Since Pakistan is a nation-state whose identity ostensibly is derived from Islam, I have observed how almost every measure taken by the Pakistani state has become emblematic of Islam and has constituted a publicly recognized religious symbol. Political confrontations have ensued as Pakistan's religious parties have challenged the state policies of various regimes to prevent the establishment of what they considered in each instance to be an objectionable conceptualization of Islam and its relation to society. To make it more clear, the author has divided the political history of Pakistan into six phases, on the bases of religion. The phases were named as (1) Indo-Muslim Modernization: when all laws and norms were implemented according to Britain's period. (2) Islamic Modernism: Era of development with the involvement of religion. (3) Islamism: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Era (4) Jihadism: Zia-ul-Haq Era (5). Theocratic Extremism i.e. Talibanization: Benazir Bhutto Era (6) New Orientation and struggle against terrorism. Each phase of the history of Pakistan has been discussed and demonstrated how state power has been exercised to implement policies that serve to establish a new definition of Islam and its impact on society. After discussing all these phases it has been revealed that Islam has a great influence on the whole of state structure because Islam was the backbone reason behind the

existence of Pakistan. So, all the policies on macro and micro level have been made according to Quran and Sunnah as the ideology of state. It also has been explored by empirical research that the degree of disunity of the Islamic community: 63% of respondents say that their sect is distinguished by the true purity of Islam, and 45% believe that different sects are not equal before the state. Moreover, 42% of respondents supported violent, including terrorist, ways of treating non-believers. However, respondents need to recognize that, from a political point of view, religion serves only as a screen for the militaristic elite.

The cultural problems caused by the process of Islamization include, I argue, gender aspects of identity and its religious and cultural interpretation. I reveal that patriarchal attitudes dominate the Pakistani society. The research emphasizes the significance of challenging the Muslim patriarchy or masculinity and the one-dimensional representations of Islam. But, the informants justify all their views with Islamic and Qur'anic references. So, it can be summarized that Islam has a great impact on gender interpretation and cultural values, no matter one is Muslim or not. Islam has injected in social institutions; cultural norms, family environment, education system, economical sources and state politics. Most of the informants have their views about gender according to their culture and family background and they interpret Qur'an in a literal meaning with their mindset. So, mostly the beliefs are indicative of traditional ideologies of Patriarchy that are critical questions about women's social justice.This study offered comprehensive and concise evidence on the extent of Islam on societies and on the belief about gender roles. The respondents' gender views are closely linked to the gender norms that discussed by traditional scholars of patriarchy. And these philosophies are diverse, nuanced, and shaped by an association of dynamism among religion and culture. The research overall emphasizes the significance of challenges to Islamic and Muslim patriarchy that are largely single-dimensional, and negatively affect the 50% of Pakistan's populations (i.e. women).

The third task of this dissertation was the analysis of the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of religion and religious studies in order to find those concepts that

allow to demonstrate, again, the religious dynamics in a specific region. The concept I focused on was the one of "living religion" (lived religion). The idea of lived religion as a practice and dimension of behaviour has been currently applied by many and the contemporary well-known advocate of lived religion approach is Ivan Strenski who does not confine himself with the focus on American mainstream religion but the world religions (i.e. Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam) are his discussion while applying this approach. I emphasized that if most scholars of lived religion (Orsi, McGuire, and Ammerman being the most influential) provided concepts which are useful for this research but in a general way, Ivan Strenski's ideas are even more directly relevant for the case of Pakistan as an Islamic society because he is the one who applied his lived religion approach on Islam (above three scholars' focus is the religion of America and modern society). Our review of Orsi, McGuire, Ammerman and Ivan strenski – perhaps the most prominent four social scientists involved in the study of lived religions – shows that the approach of lived religion is not reliant on a particular theory or methodology, but rather pronounce to a broader trend in research.

To apply the concept of lived religion, I summarized that Muslims in Pakistan have a high level of religiosity in beliefs and in following Islam into everyday matters. I examined dimensions of Muslim religiosity based on the statements about Muslim men and women's everyday lived religion. I demonstrated, by following Ivan Strenski, Robert Orsi and other scholars of lived religion, that it has dynamic and controversial nature. I have reconstructed in my dissertation, a specific social and cultural context which, according to Orsi [2002] is characteristic for lived religion. Combining conceptual analysis and qualitative work with the citizens of Pakistan who belong to the Islamic majority in the country, I conceptualize Islam as a lived religion in the country where Muslims constitute a majority. Finding regarding the practices of Islam (five prayers a day and recitation of Quran, visiting mosque) they are not as active as their strong beliefs. They connect their all daily matters with religion whether it belongs to the economy, education or family. They follow Islam in all matters of life but with their interpretation due to local preachers and lack of Quranic actual

teachings which is all in Arabic. So, when they interpret Islam according to their own local sources of knowledge, it creates contradictions among each other and become a cause of fundamentalism, sectarianism and extremism. Finally, it has been concluded that Islam has a direct impact on culture more than culture on Islam. Because all the cultural norms have a great influence by religion and even sometimes it is hard to distinguish between religious rituals and cultural norms.

The fourth task of the dissertation was to identify the key arguments and components of the methodology of religious studies and to complement the existing range of approaches and options for analyzing the specific ways of existence of this Islam in the context of the countries of South Asia, those that allow you to analyze the daily life of this religion. As the key argument, I identify the possibility of investigate the unofficial ways of practicing religious believes which has been put forward by scholars of lived religion. I have attempted to examine the impact of religion on culture and level of religiosity among people in their daily lives. I tried to reveal the actual mindset of Pakistani Muslims, through the lens of the daily life. Globally, Pakistani Muslims are depicted as orthodox and sometimes radical . So, the empirical analysis conducted through semi-structured interviews (responses of informants in form of direct dialogue have been described in chapter) has been elaborated. The analysis has been divided into two dimensions; the first dimension is 'everyday life with more focus on culture' and secondly, everyday life with the level of religiosity. The reason for dividing is that everyday life particularly in developing or underdeveloped societies revolves around both the culture and religion [Mc Daniel 2010, Morgan 2009]. To analyze the religiosity in everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims, we have applied the model of religiosity applied by a number of social scientists [Yasmin 2014, Hassan 2008, Huber 2003 & 2009, Pew Research Center 2007, Brett feld & Wetzel 2007, Stark and Glock 1968] with some additions or omissions. They classified five main dimensions (few of them used six dimensions) regarding the level of religiosity, are known as ideologically, ritually, experientially, intellectually and consequentially (Questionnaire regarding each dimension has been

added in appendix). The combined evidence of religiosity from psychological and social research keeps supporting this multifaceted interpretation of religiosity. This multi-dimensional concept of religiosity influenced my research and evaluation of everyday Islam as well as an attitude toward gender belief of Pakistani Muslims. But religious expressions vary considerably; there is also significant agreement among the religions of the world as to how religiosity must be expressed and measured.

Findings indicate that Muslims in Pakistan have a high level of religiosity in beliefs and in following Islam in everyday matters of life. But regarding the practice of Islamic rituals (five prayers a day and recitation of Quran, visiting mosque) they are not as active as in following intimately and connect their all daily matters with religion. It can be concluded that Islam is the culture of Pakistan and Muslims want to obey Islam but in their way of understanding about Islamic doctrines due to lack of Quranic actual teachings because all the texts (Quran and Sunnah) is written in the Arabic language. Therefore, the source of Islamic knowledge of people by local preachers and secondary literature i.e. translated text in local languages (Urdu). All the cultural norms have a depiction of religion and must have to be according to religious parameters that's why sometimes it is hard to distinguish between religious ritual and cultural norm. Careful assessment of the facts revealed that socio-demographical variables affected the extent of religious orthodoxy. This was also against my expectations that people with higher levels of education were associated with the same level of orthodox religiosity as people with less education. But, in the case of observing religious practices, people with less education or illiterate are more committed than highly educated people. However, despite with all facts and findings, it would not be wiser to think that religion is the only rigorously and radically ascertaining these factors in life, because many other influences are also involved culturally and politically. All regions have their own historical, cultural, economic and religious backgrounds that significantly impact the lives of peoples. For instance, Wedding, childbearing and divorce are bound up with religious identity and involvement but also impact by local and foreign cultures. So, it can be concluded that

everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims are not only the depiction of religion but also local cultures global culture is playing a role in changing their mindsets which is significant to make a change progressively in society.

The attempt also has been made in this dissertation to diagnose some negative impacts of religiosity on Pakistani society. By going through the ethnographical analysis and historical background of Pakistan, it can be noticed that religiosity impacts the personal lives of Pakistani Muslims as well as has a great impact on the social sphere of society. Religion (Islam) rules as a coercive force on every social institution and has been deep-rooted in the cultural and political structure. For example, freedom of expression hardly exists and space for public discourse has shrunk i.e. there is no café life. Intolerance and extremism penetrate due to promoting religion through legal enforcement of Islam in every social institution. Like blasphemy and religious fatwas are enforced laws to protect Islam. When people have threatened by-laws (blasphemy) just to stop them from freedom of expression, society cannot be nurture with progress.

Recommendations. Above I analyzed some negative impacts that Pakistani society is facing like intolerance, extremism and boundaries on freedom of expressions due to extreme version of religion injected by religio-political coercive force. I have some recommendations to overcome the rigidity in society stemming from excessive Islamization. First, Pakistan is considered a democratic country; therefore, the media must be free as a watchdog to scan the society neutrally. And the art of disagreement through freedom of expression also must be permitted and promoted through academic ways because it can be a great threat for the extinction of intellectual minds by snipping the voices. Under the shreds of all these findings, it can be said that society can be prospered only when the people have a free will beyond any religious or political dictation. And most importantly, religion must be of a personal and individual matter and even it should not be involved in politics to be used as tool for power.

Second suggestion can be considered if religion cannot be separated from state policies. So, Pakistan's stability and development demands from its leaders for

institutionalization of the new liberal orientation of religious nationalism. And Pakistan was offered that chance to build a new orientation after 9/11. The author suggests that to harmonize social and cultural conflicts, it would be more reasonable to rely on religious nationalism, which recognizes the diversity of forms of Islam in Pakistan, than on religious fundamentalism, which is extremist and exclusivist in nature.

The research overall emphasizes the significance of challenges to Islamic and Muslim patriarchy that are largely single-dimensional, and negatively affect the 50% of Pakistan's populations (i.e. women). So, this issue can be resolved though education and awareness. And, again here I want to suggest that religion must be away from bringing up the society in its own traditional way.

Perspectives of further research. Based on this dissertation, it would be beneficial for the future social scientists to compare Islamization in Pakistan with another Muslim majority or any Islamic country. This study could also help to determine the extent to which gender ideologies of Muslims versus non-Muslims are similar or distinguished.

The research of this dissertation contains multi-topics and every chapter has its own distinct theoretical and practical approach. So, it can be a thinking track for the research including theory and history of religion, sociology of religion, regional studies, and modern Islam.

This is one of the novel researches conducted on Pakistan after years that have contributed with a combination of the conceptual achievements of literature with empirical test on Islamic everyday life and gender relations made it possible to introduce into scientific circulation new information about the development of the everyday religiosity of the Muslim majority in Pakistan.

The research conducted in this dissertation is a new perspective for social science by presenting an amalgamation of religion with culture, politics and gender roles and beliefs. The conceptual and theoretical materials contained herein can be used in

designing lectures on multi-fields of studies as theory and history of religion, regional studies sociology of religion and Modern Islam.

APPENDIX 1

DEMOGRAPHIC FORM

Name………

Region……..

Religion……

Q1. What is the name of your city?

Q2.How old are you? ---------------

Q3. What is your qualifiqation?

Q4.What is your economic source?

Q5. Mention your marital status?

Q6.How many children do you have?

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is your sect if you believe in?

2. How you are practising Islam?

3. How many times do you pray in daily life?

4. Do you recite the Quran? (a) Once in a day (b) more (c) No (d).............

5. Do you attend religious sermons particularly in the mosque? When last time you attended? (Khutba, Quran khawani, dars, funeral)

6. What is the schedule of your whole day from getting gup still sleeping? (Please try to answer in all aspect like household, working and religious activities).

7. Do you visit the Shrines? No/Yes (please explain the reason)

8. What do you think about religious education and trend education (Schooling)? Prob: Which is more important?

9. How the wedding should be held in your opinion? Prob: In the Islamic way or modern way.

10. What type of dowry did you receive from bridal? (If you a remarried)

11. How are you bringing up your children? Prob: (Religious way is prominent or modern education or both)

12. What is the schedule of your school-going children?

13. What do you think about life insurance?

14. If someone will say bad words for Islam, what will be your response?

15. How you heel yourself if you have some physical or mental or financial problem? Prob: Medical, Spiritual, Physiological, Wazefaa, Istahara

16. When you feel Contrition (feeling very sorry and guilty for something bad that You have done) in life?

Questions on Gender Role Beliefs

1. What are the rights and duties of men and women? [Prob: clarify please, are these duties and rights are in your family structure, culture or Islam]

2. kindly explain that the family personal issues are connected with your culture or religion? Prob: [Like Divorce due to no understanding, immaturity, modernism or giving up of Islamic norms, Intolerance)?

3. What do you think about the percentage of husbands in your neighbour who uses violence against their wives as an instrument?

4. What type of violence do they mostly use? Prob:[condemn, beating, abusing, the threat of divorce or just annoyed]

5. Do you think man has a good reason to hit his wife? If yes, in which circumstances and on what basis?

6. Can you explain how religion impacts your relationship with your wife? Probe: [Islam teach you to condemn women if they are wrong or give you extra hold on women in this regard]

7. Do you think man has more wisdom or power than women? If yes, in which context? Prob: [physically, mentally]

8. Do you think a woman should have a right of Khulla?

9. What do you think about the effect of violence on marital relationship or children?

10. What do you think are the main reasons for violence? Prob: (What are the things which make a husband or man aggressive about women).

11. What is your opinion about a working woman?

12. Who is an ideal woman in your opinion? Prob: [how do you want to bring up your daughter]

13. What Allah says, how a wife should be treated and what is her duties for her husband?

14. What do you think about polygamy?

15. Should a woman have freedom of choice to select her better half?

16. If a woman commits disloyalty with husband what should be done with her in your opinion. And what the Quran says about it?

17. What type of jobs a woman should do in your society? (Please justify your answer)

18. What do you think about marriage held out of caste, sect or religion? (kindly response each of these).

19. What you think about Parda (Veil) of women.

Questions on State Politics

1. What system of politics is better for Pakistan? [Democratic i.e. modern or Sharia Law]

2. Which political party is better for Pakistan and why?

3. What do you think about the way of enforcement of Shariat by Taliban?

4. Is it okay if Pakistan is governed by Islamic Scholars (Mullas) like Tahirul-Qadri or Altaf Hussain any other like that?

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